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PREFACE
More than fifteen years ago I started my PhD research on EU con-
stitutionalism and the Europeanisation of national constitutional 
law. I had had the hypothesis that the economic-then-political in-
tegration triggers the approximation of national constitutional stan-
dards, the decline of sovereignty-reasoning and the rise of seeking 
for a more and more enhanced protection of common constitu-
tional values of human rights, dignity, rule of law and democracy. 
One can say that I was a young optimist back then, however, some 
of my ideas were supported by the tremendous efforts in Europe to 
create a new treaty called constitution, and integrate the various 
levels of the European human rights standard.
The first two decades of the 21st century brought however more 
challenges than solutions. Thus, I decided to analyse some of these 
challenges from the viewpoint of human rights protection and other 
constitutional principles. As Gábor Halmai wrote in his book in 
2014: “Ultimately, the globalization of constitutional law implies 
that constitutionalism is no longer the sole prerogative of nation 
states, but emerges instead as a set of standards for an interna-
tional community that is in the process of taking shape.” (Halmai 
2014, 6) This statement inspired me to apply continuously the mul-
tilateral approach to constitutional evaluation, and discuss the prin-
ciples, institutions, instruments and proceedings from global, 
European and domestic perspective. 
I thank my colleagues, András Jakab, Balázs Majtényi, Georgina 
Naszladi, András László Pap, József Petrétei, Zoltán Szente, Emese 
Szilágyi, Tamara Takács, Márton Varju and Attila Vincze for their 
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cooperation and openness to discuss my often discursive ideas, or 
just ensuring me about their friendship.
I am grateful to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the Bolyai 
János Research Scholarship that I was granted twice to investigate 
the current human rights challenges. I am also grateful to the Eötvös 
Loránd University Faculty of Law for supporting my visiting research 
in the TMC Asser Institute in The Hague where I completed this 
book. The three years I have spent as research fellow in the Institute 
for Legal Studies HAS Centre for Social Sciences also gave me a lot 
of inspiration and support.
And, the foremost thank and gratitude goes to my family, my 
husband Zoltán and my two dear little sons, Zoli and Bence who 
heartened me during the long years of research and were always 
on the board to help and gave me rays of hope that I am able to 
accomplish this mission.
The Hague, 30 April 2017
INTRODUCTION
Problems discussed in this book are set out on three levels: global, 
European and local. From these perspectives, especially Hungarian 
challenges and pitfalls are analysed. However, these levels and 
problems are not completely separated, as in a multilevel constitu-
tional area the horizontal challenges are interrelated and intersect-
ed; each level may also vertically influence the success or the fault 
of an attempt at another level. During the discussion references and 
feedbacks will be made to each level. In the meantime, I strongly 
believe that no constitutional question is worthwhile to discuss in 
splendid isolation, through the prism of solely the national legal 
system. Global and European constitutionalism is still the most use-
ful frame of argumentation in this regard.
Globalisation is a fact, and it has inevitable influence on consti-
tutional and human rights law. While the globalisation of business 
is a very fast movement, human rights are far slowly “globalising”, 
and their protection is still first and foremost the duty of the states. 
The first part of the book is devoted to a global challenge of human 
rights protection: the issue of business and human rights. The di-
lemma for responsible business is how to respect and support human 
rights in complex social, political and economic contexts – particu-
larly where these human rights are being violated. The main objec-
tive of the business and human rights discussion is to expand the 
international human rights obligations to multinational enterprises, 
transnational companies and other business entities. For the success 
of the business and human rights concept, it is necessary to shift 
focus on non-state actors, NGOs and corporations as – at least – 
secondary subjects of international law.
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The years of 2010s brought a period of frustrating crises to the 
European Union. There are still no adequate responses to the fi-
nancial and monetary crises, refugee crisis, exit aspirations of 
certain member states and the increasing constitutional crises in 
Central Europe. In addition, the broad scope of crises veils some-
how the backsliding in fundamental rights protection level in the 
states making an illiberal turn. Under the given circumstances 
further efforts for an integrated and balanced European system 
of human rights protection is extremely important. Two entities, 
first the Council of Europe and later the European Union made 
significant attempts to find a harmonised best level, but the mis-
sion is not accomplished yet.
From the aspect of the development of the European human 
rights standard, the accession of the Union to the European Con-
vention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) is of great significance, as it realizes the con-
solidation of human rights protection in Europe. The accession is 
inevitable – even if the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) stopped it for a while –, because the Treaty on European 
Union stipulates the obligation (not just the possibility) for the 
Union to access. The first chapter on European human rights pro-
tection evokes the antecedents of the EU’s accession to the ECHR 
– especially the relationship between the case-law of the Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg courts, and then summarises the state 
and advantages of the accession.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has 
become part of the primary sources of Union law in December 2009. 
This reform has been of key importance from the aspect of the 
(constitutional) development of the Union. The second chapter on 
European challenges aims to collect arguments for direct applicabil-
ity by assessing the significance and effect of the Charter so far, and 
underpins its strong relations to the general values of the European 
Union. First, I try to evaluate the actual situation with its deficiencies 
and controversies in respect of the EU values, the rule of law mech-
anism, the effect of the Charter and the recent case law of the CJEU 
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and finally argue for the removal of the legal limitations from the 
way of direct application, considering also its difficulties and ad-
vantages, with special regard to member states risking the common 
EU values, such as Hungary.
Since 2010 the Hungarian constitutional developments have 
attracted widespread attention throughout Europe. Criticism and 
concerns, welcome and self-justification – various explanations 
surrounded the new constitutional identity building. After a rel-
atively rapid period of constitution making the new ‘Fundamental 
Law of Hungary’ (it is the official translation of its title) came into 
force on 1st January 2012, but the constitutional patchwork was 
not finished. Six adopted amendments have shaped and shaded 
the new constitutional architecture, and of course not with equal 
significance, but all influenced the present landscape. In the back-
ground, a practically unlimited constitution amending power – 
a two-third majority in the parliament – acted during 2012–14, 
when most of amendments were adopted.
Developments in Hungarian constitutional law after 2010 suggest 
that the era in Hungarian constitutionalism characterized by a com-
mitment to the rule of law has been replaced by an era where the 
law is regarded as an instrument available to government to rule. 
Under the new constitution, the constraints which follow from the 
rule of law have been habitually overridden or ignored by the gov-
ernment acting in parliament. The Constitutional Court’s attempts, 
to continue the legacy of pre-2010 constitutional practice, were 
reproached by the government delimiting the powers of the Court 
or overruling its decisions in formal amendments of the Constitu-
tion’s text.
After a short introduction and overview of replacing the ‘old with 
new’ architecture in the Hungarian Constitution, the first chapter 
on the Hungarian constitutional crisis analyses the relationship 
between the new Hungarian constitution and the normative values 
of the European Union with special regard to the legally binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that articulates the general values 
into individual rights. To ground this comparison and evaluation, 
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the notion of EU values will be clarified and their impact on mem-
ber states’ constitution-making will be outlined. After this, the focus 
is shifted to the question, to what extent the new Fundamental Law 
of Hungary is compatible with the shared values of the European 
Union, with special regard to its fundamental rights standard. In 
the following chapter, I undertake to examine in terms of some 
European constitutional values how much did the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary endeavour to enforce European standards in the 
course of interpreting the Fundamental Law and how much did it 
try to contribute in the European Network of (Constitutional) Courts.
The ‘rule by law’ governance and the frequently amended new 
constitution of 2011/12 also reformulated the frameworks for the 
protection of human dignity and social solidarity. The decline of 
the standards in this field is spectacular and visible. The third chap-
ter about the Hungarian situation intends to draw attention to the 
dangers of this path which may even lead to challenging European 
solidarity. For this purpose, a short section is devoted to the prin-
ciple of social solidarity and its implementation in Hungary in the 
pre-2010 practise. The Constitutional Court in the late 1990’s was 
even willing to strike down austerity measures for the protection 
of social rights closely tying them to the protection of equal human 
dignity. Although social solidarity was an underdeveloped societal 
practice for several reasons, the Constitutional Court strongly com-
mitted to the protection of human dignity and this way guaranteed 
a higher profile for social (solidarity) rights, especially in case of 
social care based on needs. Then, to a contrast this, the ‘non-solidary’ 
system of the Fundamental Law and the new directions of the con-
stitutional case law is discussed. The recent case law of the Consti-
tutional Court reaffirms the initial concerns, that dignity supported 
by solidarity got lost in the post-democratic transitions in the past 
seven years.
The last chapter evaluates the constitutional rules in the context 
of national identity and ethnicity, with special regard to those ar-
ticles which are of discriminative nature and may lead to social 
exclusion. The first point is that – while the former Hungarian con-
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stitution was neutral regarding the values and applied the political 
nation concept – the new constitution does not clearly identify the 
political community to which it shall be applied, due to an incon-
sistent and controversial use of the concepts of political nation and 
cultural nation in the text. Using the category of nation in a cul-
tural sense, the text allows for both a narrower and a wider mean-
ing of membership than the category of political nation. Thus, 
because the definition of the ‘nation’ is rather controversial, it is 
unclear whether ethnic minorities fall under the same norms of 
political solidarity as the Hungarian majority. The second point is 
that the rights associated with the social solidarity might be inter-
preted restrictively. The possibility of penalizing homelessness or 
distributing social benefits compared to the ‘usefulness of one’s 
activity to the community’ – again, combined with the ethnocentric 
nation concept – may in practice lead to social exclusion and indi-
rectly sanction systematic discrimination against the largest Hun-
garian ethnic group, the Roma people, the members of which are 
most likely to live in poverty.

GLOBAL CHALLENGES  
– BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Introduction – global constitutionalism
Globalisation is a fact, and it has inevitable influence on constitu-
tional and human rights law. While the globalisation of business is 
a very fast movement, the constitutional human rights are far slow-
ly “globalising”, and their protection is still first and foremost the 
duty of the states. The dilemma for responsible business is how to 
respect and support human rights in complex social, political and 
economic contexts – particularly where these human rights are 
being violated. The main objective of business and human rights 
discussion is to expand somehow the international human rights 
obligations to multinational enterprises, transnational companies 
and other business entities. For the success of the business and 
human rights concept, which does not even belong to the interna-
tional soft law to date, it is necessary to shift focus on non-state 
actors, NGOs and corporations as – at least – secondary subjects 
of international law.
The concept of global constitutionalism accepts the convergence 
of national constitutional configurations in case of those states that 
share the same constitutional values, i.e. belong to the same con-
stitutional families.1 According to Law and Versteeg, this convergence 
is characterised by constitutional learning (i.e., in the course of 
attempting to learn from one another, countries are likely to imitate 
one another), constitutional competition (i.e., the need to attract 
and retain capital and skilled labor gives countries an incentive to 
offer similarly generous constitutional guarantees of personal and 
1  David S. Law and Mila Versteeg: The Evolution and Ideology of Global Con-
stitutionalism, California Law Review Vol. 99, 2011, 1164–1166.
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economic freedom), constitutional networks (i.e., reward countries 
for adopting the same type of constitutional regime that others have 
already adopted), and constitutional conformity (i.e., countries face 
pressures to conform to global constitutional norms in order to win 
acceptance and support).2 The content of the national constitutions 
of democratic states converges in three aspects. First, they refuse 
the legislative supremacy – or the sovereignty of the parliament – 
and accept some form of the judicial (constitutional) review. Second, 
they are committed to the protection of fundamental human rights 
by prescribing explicit or implicit proportionality clauses. Third, 
they respect the rule of law guaranties.3
The results or effects of globalisation in constitutional law are 
that one the one hand the core of the constitutional human rights 
can be identified as part of the majority of national constitutions, 
and on the other hand the growth of the generic rights became 
a general trend, in other words the rights creeped over the past 
decades.4 This tendency must be influenced by the evolution of 
international human right law, i.e. constitutional fundamental rights 
and international human rights have strong interrelation – the lat-
ter are the basis of the former, because states do not enact the rights, 
but recognise them.
2  Ibid. 1173–1187.
3  Mark Tushnet: The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, in Harvard 
Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper № 09-06 1–2. and 
A. E. Dick Howard: The Essence of Constitutionalism, Constitutionalism and 
Human Rights: America, Poland, and France, in Kenneth W. Thompson and Rett 
R. Ludwikowski (eds.): A Bicentennial Colloquium at the Miller Center, 1991, Lanham, 
MD, University Press of America, 3–41. 
4  Law and Versteeg has created a rights index composed of 60 constitutional 
human rights. While in 1946 the constitutions contained 19 rights in average, in 
2010 this number has increased to 33, which means 70 % growth. Law and Versteeg 
‘The Evolution and Ideology’ 1190.
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1 Concept of Business and Human Rights
Business and human rights (BHR) is seemingly a recent movement, 
however its roots can be found in the concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).5 Thus it is not a completely new initiation, 
although still a recognised challenge since the late 1980’s. In the 
last decades a range of research projects, books and articles apply-
ing multidisciplinary approach were devoted to the topic.6 The main 
objective of BHR discussion is to expand somehow the (interna-
tional) human rights obligations to multinational enterprises 
5  The term “corporate social responsibility” came into common use in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. CSR is a form of corporate self-regulation integrated into 
a business model. CSR policy functions as a built-in, self-regulating mechanism 
whereby a business monitors and ensures its active compliance with the spirit of 
the law, ethical standards, and international norms. Originally CSR was considered 
to be voluntary and distinct from law. Today the CSR normativity is increased by 
the influence of human rights law, labour rights, environmental and anti-corrup-
tion rules. See also Karin Buhmann: Business and Human Rights: Analysing 
Discursive Articulation of Stakeholder Interests to Explain the Consensus-based 
Construction of the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy UN Framework’, International Law 
Research 2012, Vol. 1, № 1, 88–102.
6  See e.g. Klaus M. Leisinger: Business and human rights, in The Future of Sustain-
ability (ed. Marco Keiner), Springer, 2006, 117–151.; Richard Falk: Interpreting 
the Interaction of Global Markets and Human Rights, in Globalization and Human 
Rights (ed. Alison Brysk), University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
London, 2002; Marion Weschka: Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises: 
How Can Multinational Enterprises Be Held Responsible for Human Rights Vio-
lations Committed Abroad? ZaöRV Vol. 66, 2006, 625–661.; Florian Wettstein: 
Multinational Corporations and Global Justice, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California, 2009; Sarah Joseph: Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litiga-
tion, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2004; Janet Dine: Companies, 
International Trade and Human Rights, CUP, Cambridge, 2007; Radu Mares (ed.): 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implemen-
tation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2012; John G. Ruggie: Just 
Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, Norton, New York and 
London, 2013; Tamara Takács: Human rights in trade: The EU’s experience with 
labour standards conditionality and its role in promoting labour standards in the 
WTO, in J. Wetzel (ed.): The EU as a ‘Global Player’ in the Field of Human Rights, 
Routledge, 2012, 97–112. See also Institute for Human Rights and Business, http://
www.ihrb.org/ and Business & Human Rights Resource Center, http://www.
business-humanrights.org/Home
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(MNEs), transnational companies (TNCs) and other business enti-
ties. It is more than the CSR as softly tries to create enforceable 
duties for companies beyond the self-regulation, and establish the 
grounds of their accountability for human rights violations. In con-
stitutional legal terms it leads to the old question of third party ef-
fect of human rights on the one hand and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
of the national courts on the other. As a related problem, the con-
stitutional background of the application of international law by 
the courts can also be mentioned.
To understand BHR, one can choose a top down approach, and 
analyse the actions and instruments of the United Nations and – at 
least in regional context – the follow-up actions of the European 
Union, which are to date of voluntary nature, and even not belong 
to the international soft law, but they may be assessed as a kind of 
policy. The other choice is the bottom up approach, from the side of 
the national feedbacks to the international standards and the relation 
of international human rights and domestic fundamental rights ob-
ligations, determined by the constitutional design of the states.
Both mentioned approaches may be influenced by the concept 
of global constitutionalism, which accepts the convergence of na-
tional constitutional configurations in case of those states that share 
the same constitutional values, i.e. belong to the same constitu-
tional families.7 This chapter applies both the top down and bottom 
up approach and tries to evaluate the outcomes of the BHR policies 
and strategies in the light of global constitutionalism.
2 Top down approach
The core problem is how the individual’s inviolable and unalienable 
fundamental rights can be guaranteed in a globalised community, 
if we presume that a kind of ‘world democracy’ may come into ex-
istence. In other words, as Galgano formulated, the question is how 
7  Law and Versteeg ‘The Evolution and Ideology’ 1164–67.
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can the features of democracy, having developed within a national 
framework, be adapted to a post-state system of governance?8 Sure-
ly essential is the access to effective fundamental right protection 
with efficient remedies for the legitimisation of international law 
and international public order.
According to Tomuschat, the international community has attained 
the positive international protection of human rights in three theo-
retical and historical stages. The first step is reaching a consensus 
with respect to the necessity of protection and the scope of the rights 
to be protected. The second stage is international codification, put-
ting it into a treaty and national adoption. The third stage is estab-
lishing and operating a mechanism for the enforcement of rights. 
Even the universalist approach admits that whilst the first two steps 
have, by and large, been taken successfully, the third – and perhaps 
most important phase – has not yet been accomplished.9 In addi-
tion, the system of international protection must be treated as a dy-
namic system; it has to be continuously adjusted to the changing 
state of global reality (handling terrorism, crime, flow of data, en-
vironmental disasters, pandemics, economic and financial crises, 
ethnic tensions, etc.).
As the UN Human Rights High Commissioner formulates the 
phenomenon in respect of business, “The global developments over 
the past decades have seen non-state actors such as transnational 
corporations and other business entities play an increasingly im-
portant role both internationally, but also at the national and local 
levels. The growing reach and impact of business enterprises have 
given rise to a debate about the roles and responsibilities of such 
actors with regard to human rights. International human rights 
standards have traditionally been the responsibility of governments, 
aimed at regulating relations between the state and individuals.”10 
8  Francesco Galgano: Globalizáció a jog tükrében [Globalisation through the prism 
of law], HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2006, 7, 9.
9  Christian Tomuschat: Human Rights: Between Realism and Idealism, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2003, 3.
10  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx
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In Ruggie’s words, “The root cause of the business and human rights 
predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by globaliza-
tion – between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, 
and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequenc-
es. These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for 
wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanction-
ing or reparation. How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in 
relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.”11
Many scholars pointed out that MNEs can infringe human rights 
directly or indirectly. The infringement is direct, if the enterprise 
uses child or forced labour, does not guarantee safety and health 
precautions, or establishes inhuman working conditions (like in 
sweatshops), discriminates on the bases of gender, race, sexual 
identity, belonging to ethnic, religious minority on the workplace, 
pollutes the environment, etc. Indirectly, typically during armed 
conflicts or by supporting autocratic or totalitarian regimes MNEs 
can be complicit in or benefit from human rights violations com-
mitted by host states.12
At the same time, it also worth to keep in mind that the increased 
economic development goes hand in hand with improvement in 
human rights; and the role of the MNEs (their investments and 
operation) is inevitable in this respect. They not only contribute to 
the socioeconomic welfare but promote the efficient exercise of 
civil and political rights as well.13
This dual effect shall be taken into consideration in constructing 
the international and constitutional legal instruments in the field 
of accountability of business enterprises for human rights.
11  John Ruggie: Protect, Respect and Remedy – A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, Innovations Vol. 3, № 2, spring 2008, 189–212, 189. http://www.
mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/itgg.2008.3.2.189
12  Weschka ‘Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises’ 626–627.; David Weiss-
brodt: Business and Human Rights, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 74, 
2005, 57–58.; Leisinger ‘Business and human rights’ 117ff.
13  Falk ‘Interpreting’ 61. and William H. Meyer: Human Rights and International 
Political Economy in Third World Nations: Multinational Corporations, Foreign Aid, and 
Repression, Praeger, Westport, 1998, 108.
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2.1 Assessment of UN instruments for responsible business 
With the increased role of corporate actors, nationally and interna-
tionally, the issue of business’ impact on the enjoyment of human 
rights has been placed on the agenda of the United Nations. Over 
the past decade, the UN human rights machinery has been consid-
ering the scope of business’ human rights responsibilities and ex-
ploring ways for corporate actors to be accountable for the impact 
of their activities on human rights.14
For initiating universal attempts, instruments and strategies it 
was necessary to recognise that the human rights treaties just pro-
vide for indirect human rights responsibilities of businesses. The 
first efforts to define direct responsibilities of companies were more 
or less unsuccessful, or too ‘soft’, however good lessons to learn. 
Amongst these the drafts of the UN Commission on Transnational 
Corporations have to be mentioned that tried to create a code of 
conduct for companies from the 1970s,15 as well as the OECD Guide-
lines16 and ILO Tripartite Declaration17 that promoted responsible 
business in their sphere of competence.18
The UN Global Compact – a voluntary framework for respon-
sible business with the objective of sustainable, stable and inclusive 
14  Business and human rights – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx
15  See e.g., United Nations Draft International Code of Conduct on Transna-
tional Corporations, 23 I.L.M 626 (1984)
16  The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are far reaching recom-
mendations for responsible business conduct that 44 adhering governments 
– representing all regions of the world and accounting for 85% of foreign direct 
investment – encourage their enterprises to observe wherever they operate. The 
Guidelines were updated in 2011 for the fifth time since they were first adopted 
in 1976. See more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguidelinesformul-
tinationalenterprises.htm 
17  The ILO’s search for international guidelines in its sphere of competence re-
sulted, in 1977, in the adoption by the ILO Governing Body, of the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(MNE Declaration). See http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/
lang--en/index.htm
18  Weissbrodt ‘Business and Human Rights’ 62–63.
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global economy – was proposed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
in 1999 and it was launched in 2000. It contains a set of legally non-
binding values on general human rights duties of businesses, labour 
standards, environmental protection and – since 2004 – anticor-
ruption.19 As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon introduced the 
instrument, “The Global Compact asks companies to embrace uni-
versal principles and to partner with the United Nations. It has 
grown to become a critical platform for the UN to engage effec-
tively with enlightened global business.”20 A unique feature of the 
Global Compact is that participation not only commits the com-
pany as a whole, but specifically its leadership. However, its effect 
is limited because of the lack of clarity regarding the definitions and 
distinctions on the duties of businesses and states; furthermore 
there are neither clear standards for monitoring and evaluation of 
corporations’ conduct, nor repercussions for failing to adhere to the 
principles.21
It is not accidental that there is no international convention on 
the basic human duties yet, as such an international obligation 
19  The UN Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, 
within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption: Human Rights, Principle 
1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally pro-
claimed human rights; and Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses. Labour Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom 
of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; Prin-
ciple 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and Principle 6: the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Environment Principle 
7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental chal-
lenges; Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental re-
sponsibility; and Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies. Anti-Corruption Principle 10: Businesses 
should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.
20  http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
21  Weissbrodt ‘Business and Human Rights’ 63.; Denis G. Arnold: Transna-
tional Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights, Business Ethics 
Quarterly Vol. 20, № 3, July 2010, 3–4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1612296
See also http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html
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presumably would cause more damage than advantage to human 
rights law, providing governments with excuses to limit the exercise 
of human rights.22 The human duties have fallen into two categories. 
The first category comprises ‘vertical’ duties in the relation of the 
individual and the state, which might be enforced by the govern-
ment. The second category comprises horizontal duties in relations 
of the individual with other members of the society. Vertical duties 
usually appear in national constitutions, however separately from 
constitutional rights, i.e. the exercise of the rights is independent 
from the fulfilment of the duties. ‘Horizontal’ duties are usually not 
written into the constitution, as the constitution transforms these 
into vertical duties, as authorises the state to specify and enforce 
them, and thus intervene into the organic relations of the society. 
In 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights – building upon the previous initiatives regarding 
corporate social responsibility – approved a draft declaration on 
human social responsibilities (i.e., corporate human rights duties),23 
but finally the Human Rights Council (HRC) had not even consid-
ered the Norms. The draft was harshly criticised by the stakeholders 
because of its scope, vagueness, uncertain legal status and force, 
etc. As Arnold assessed, “the Norms fail to provide a plausible and 
defensible account of those duties and in so doing undermine, 
rather than enhance, efforts to ensure that corporations contribute 
to the fulfillment of those basic human rights necessary for a decent 
standard of living for all.”24
In 2005, John Ruggie, professor of Harvard University was ap-
pointed as a Special Representative to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations (SRSG) with a mandate to investigate a number of 
important questions relating to the obligations of business for the 
22  See John H. Knox: Horizontal Human Rights Law, The American Journal of In-
ternational Law № 1, 2008, 1–3.
23  Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (2003) 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/NormsApril2003.html
24  Arnold ‘Transnational Corporations’ 9. See also Leisinger ‘Business and human 
rights’ 2.
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realisation of fundamental rights. As Knox emphasized, that time 
the application of human rights law to corporations was highly 
contested: human rights groups (NGOs) and corporations differ-
ently approached whether corporations have, or should have, direct 
obligations under human rights law.25 Bilchitz pointed out, that the 
mandate of the SRSG arose from the failure by the HRC a year 
earlier to adopt the above mentioned Norms, as many of the states 
was on the opinion that BHR issues deserve further investigation. 
The SRSG was initially appointed for a two year period and was 
provided with a broad mandate that defined the terms of reference 
for his activities.26 The HRC endorsed unanimously Ruggie’s reports, 
first in 2008 and finally in 2011. As Mares assessed, “While the Norms 
chose a more direct path to corporate accountability, to a large ex-
tent relying on international treaties and monitoring, and national 
regulations, the SRSG conceived a broader and less centralised 
template aimed at leveraging the responsibilities and roles of vari-
ous social actors and relying on legal and other rationalities to move 
markets towards a more socially sustainable path.”27 The SRSG 
process created a reflexive law forum employing argumentative 
strategies and succeeded in generating a great consensus among 
the stakeholders. It was convincing enough for MNEs as well that 
a soft institutionalisation of business responsibilities for human 
25  John H. Knox: The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations, 
in The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Imple-
mentation (ed. Radu Mares), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2012, 
51–83, 51. Available also at http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/docLib/ 
20110829_Ruggie_Rules.pdf
26  David Bilchitz: The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate 
Human Rights Obligations? SUR international journal on human rights Vol. 7, № 12, 
June 2010, 199–229, 199–201.
http://www.surjournal.org/eng/conteudos/pdf/12/miolo.pdf
27  Radu Mares: Business and Human Rights After Ruggie: Foundations, the Art 
of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress, in The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (ed. Radu 
Mares), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2012, 1–50, 1.
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rights would reduce economic risks flowing from business related 
human rights abuse.28
As a result of the SRSG’s activity, there is now greater clarity 
about the respective roles and responsibilities of governments and 
business with regard to protection and respect for human rights. 
Most prominently, the emerging understanding and consensus have 
come as a result of the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework 
on human rights and business, which was elaborated by the SRSG. 
On 16 June 2011, the UN HRC endorsed Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights for implementing the UN ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework (hereinafter: the Framework), 
providing – for the first time – a global standard for preventing and 
addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to 
business activity.29 Along with the Framework, also Guiding Prin-
ciples were issued to assist governments and corporations in the 
implementation.
The Framework rests on three pillars. The first is the state duty 
to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation, and 
adjudication. The second is the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights, which means that business enterprises should act 
with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and 
to address adverse impacts with which they are involved. The third 
is the need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both 
judicial and non-judicial. Each pillar is an essential component in 
an inter-related and dynamic system of preventative and remedial 
measures: the state duty to protect because it lies at the very core 
of the international human rights regime; the corporate responsibil-
ity to respect because it is the basic expectation society has of busi-
ness in relation to human rights; and access to remedy because even 
the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.30
28  Buhmann ‘Business and Human Rights: Analysing’ 98–99.
29  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx
30  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Repre-
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2.2 Actions of the EU for enhanced corporate  
       social responsibility
The European Commission adopted a new CSR strategy in 2011, 
and encourages enterprises to base their approach to corporate 
social responsibility on internationally recognised CSR guidelines 
and principles.31 This is especially the case for larger enterprises 
and for enterprises seeking to adopt a more formal approach to 
CSR. For companies seeking a formal approach to CSR, especially 
large companies, authoritative guidance is provided by internation-
ally recognised principles and guidelines, in particular the updated 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ten principles 
of the United Nations Global Compact, the ISO 26000 Guidance 
Standard on Social Responsibility, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. This core set of internationally recognised principles and 
guidelines represents an evolving and recently strengthened global 
framework for CSR. European policy to promote CSR should be 
made fully consistent with this framework. As Erkollar and Oberer 
evaluated the EU’s CSR strategy: “The European Commission was 
a pioneer in developing a public policy to promote corporate social 
responsibility, defining in their ‘European Alliance’ (2006) the sup-
port of multistakeholder CSR initiatives, research and education on 
CSR, and the support of small and medium-sized companies in their 
CSR activities, as priority areas for the European Union to focus on, 
accompanied by an applicable legislation and collective agreements 
between social partners. With it’s new strategy on CSR (2011) the 
European Commission emphasized the need for the establishment 
sentative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 21 March 2011.
31  European Commission: An Analysis of Policy References made by large EU 
Companies to Internationally Recognised CSR Guidelines and Principles, March 
2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr/
csr-guide-princ-2013_en.pdf
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of sector-based platforms for enterprises and stakeholders to make 
commitments and jointly monitor progress, the improvement and 
tracking of levels of trust in businesses, the creation of guidelines 
for the development of future self- and co-regulation initiatives and 
the improvement of company disclosure of social and environmen-
tal information.”32
The BHR issues are involved into (or subordinated to) the broad-
er CSR strategy at EU level and has to date no overarching charac-
ter. The European Commission has published practical human rights 
guidance for enterprises in three business sectors (employment and 
recruitment agencies, oil and gas, information and communication 
technology). These guides are the outcome of an intensive multi-
stakeholder process, and are consistent with the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on BHR. They take particular account of the experience of 
EU companies, but aim to be as globally applicable as possible. The 
guides are not intended to be legally binding.33
The EU also requested member states to develop national action 
plans to support implementation of the UN Guiding Principles.
3 Bottom up approach – constitutional impediments
The system of international human rights protection may be criti-
cized more harshly from a perhaps somewhat partialist and instru-
mentalist approach. It must keep in mind that beyond the trends of 
globalisation, universalism and constitutional convergence, also 
“reverse globalisation”,34 particularisation and constitutional diver-
32  Alptekin Erkollar – BJ Oberer: Responsible Business: The European Union 
is Driving Forward the European Strategies on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Journal of EU Research in Business Vol. 2012, 1–15, 15. http://www.ibimapublishing.
com/journals/JEURB/2012/360374/360374.html
33  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-
responsibility/human-rights/index_en.htm
34  For the term, see Seyla Benhabib: Another Cosmopolitanism, with the Commentar-
ies by Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig, Will Kymlicka (ed. Robert Post), Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2006, 51.
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gence processes can also be observed in the global world. Donnelly 
pointed out that internationally recognised human rights create 
obligations for states, and international organisations call upon 
states to account for their fulfilment. If everybody has the right to 
x, in contemporary international practice it means: every state is 
authorized to and responsible for the application and protection of 
the right to x in its own territory. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is the common standard of achievements for all 
peoples and nations – and for the states representing them. Cove-
nants create obligations only for states and the international human 
rights obligations of states exist only in relation to persons falling 
under their jurisdiction. Although human rights legal norms have 
internationalized, their transposition has remained almost exclu-
sively national. Contemporary international and regional human 
rights regimes are supervisory mechanisms monitoring the relation-
ship between states and individuals. They are not alternatives to 
the essentially state concept of human (fundamental) rights.35 For 
example, in Europe (within the framework of the Council of Europe) 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examines the rela-
tionship between states and citizens or residents on the basis of 
subsidiarity. The position of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights is the same.36 The central role of states in contemporary in-
ternational human rights structures is also indisputable with respect 
to the content of recognized rights. The most important participa-
tory rights are typically (though not generally) limited to citizens. 
There are several obligations – e.g. in the area of education and 
social safety – which may be undertaken only with respect to resi-
dents and they apply to aliens only if they fall under the jurisdiction 
of the state. Foreign states do not have an internationally recognized 
35  Jack Donnelly: The Relative Universality of Human Rights, Human Rights 
Quarterly Vol. 29, № 2, May 2007, 281–306.
36  See also Nicolás Zambrana Tévar: Shortcomings and Disadvantages of Exist-
ing Legal Mechanisms to Hold Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human 
Rights Violations, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional Vol. 4, № 2, Octubre 2012, 
398–410, 403.
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human right obligation, for instance, to protect victims of torture in 
another country. They are not free to go beyond the means of per-
suasion in the case of foreign victims of torture. Contemporary 
norms of sovereignty prohibit states from applying means of coer-
cion abroad against torture or any other human right violation.37
For the success of the BHR concept it is necessary to shift focus 
on non-state actors, NGOs and corporations as – at least – second-
ary subjects of international law. From this perspective was the 
Ruggie Framework criticized by Bilchitz, because considering the 
limits of international human rights law enforcement, corporations 
should have binding obligations for the realisation of fundamental 
rights. Non-binding instruments – such as the Framework – do not 
assist in the development of customary international law in the area 
of BHR and may even hamper progress. Corporations should not 
only respect human rights, i.e. avoid their violation, but also ac-
tively contribute to the realisation of human rights (positive duties).38 
Corporate accountability also cannot be effectively dealt with 
through existing methods; as Vega, Mehra and Wong stated, “While 
[the Framework and the Guiding Principles] contain positive ele-
ments, they fall short of creating an effective mechanism for ad-
dressing the many corporate human rights violations that continue 
by not providing a remedy in the international arena when na-
tional systems are unavailable or ineffective.”39
Even in the European Union, which has an intensively evolving 
fundamental rights framework,40 are significant obstacles that ham-
per the efficient application of the UN Framework for BHR. A con-
37  Jack Donnelly: Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Cornell Univer-
sity Press, New York, 2003, 8, 14, 33–34.
38  Bilchitz ‘The Ruggie Framework’ 199ff.
39  Connie de la Vega, Amol Mehra and Alexandra Wong: Holding Businesses 
Accountable for Human Rights Violations – Recent Developments and Next Steps, 
Dialogue on Globalisation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2011, 1. http://library.fes.de/
pdf-files/iez/08264.pdf
40  Nóra Chronowski: Integration of European Human Rights Standard – the 
Accession of EU to the ECHR, in Efektywność europejskiego systemu ochrony praw 
człowieka (red. Jerzy Jaskiernia), Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 2012, 957–975.
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ference on CSR was organised during the Swedish EU presidency 
in November 2009, where remarkable conclusions were drawn 
about the problems with the functioning of the UN Framework. In 
respect of the states’ obligation to protect human rights, the inco-
herence of the member states legislation (e.g. on issues of trade, 
investment, overseas development and corporate law) was seen as 
presenting a fairly uneven playing field within the Union of 28 states 
even before relations with other states, such as Brazil, Russia, India 
or China. The accountability mechanisms relating to the overseas 
operations of EU-domiciled companies was also mapped, and cited 
as an important first step in understanding some of the state-based 
gaps that might exist. In the field of corporate responsibility to re-
spect, business requires states to play their appropriate role in order 
to help create additional demand. The issue of avoiding complicity 
in the human rights abuses perpetrated by others was also seen as 
being key feature here. As to the remedies, it was concluded that 
greater awareness of and adherence to existing international human 
rights mechanisms and greater access to effective remedies, both 
legal and non-legal is needed.41
It can be added that also the national constitutions and consti-
tutional jurisprudence should be more open to consequences of 
the global world order by giving up the regulative and applicative 
models related to and rooted in the traditional concept of state 
sovereignty. In the following three major questions of constitu-
tional design – the third party effect, the application of interna-
tional law and the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the courts – will 
be discussed which should be re-evaluated or even revisited for 
enhanced realisation of businesses’ responsibility for human rights 
violations.
41  Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, Protect, Respect, Remedy – a Conference 
on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Stockholm 10–11 November 2009, 
Conference Report, 5–8. available at http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Protect_Respect_
Remedy_Stockholm_Nov09_Conference_Report.pdf
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3.1 Third party effect (Drittwirkung)
Constitutions of the democratic states governed by the rule of law 
traditionally contain fundamental rights catalogue in line with in-
ternational human rights law. These rights shall be normative and 
effective, i.e. enforceable before the courts of law. The effect of fun-
damental rights can be vertical or horizontal. It is impossible to 
reproduce in the framework of this book the rich legal literature on 
the complex problem of horizontal effect (Drittwirkung),42 thus just 
the main points of the concept are highlighted in the context of 
BHR. 
The vertical effect of the fundamental rights stems from the his-
torical function of the rights, which is to protect the individuals 
against the state organs and limit the public power.43 The interna-
tional human rights law, as well as the UN BHR Framework relies 
on the states to guarantee the effective fundamental rights protec-
tion; and claims against the states can be brought to international 
human rights courts after exhausting the domestic remedies, i.e. if 
the given state fails to protect the rights. 
The horizontal effect of fundamental rights means that they pre-
vail also between individuals; and influence or determine the legal 
relations of private actors. This horizontal or third party effect can 
be direct or indirect.44 According to the theory of indirect horizon-
tal effect, the fundamental rights norm of the constitution is not 
applicable directly in private law relations; it is only used as an 
interpretative guide to determine private law relations among in-
42  See, e.g. Hans Carl Nipperdey: Die Grundprinzipien des Wirtschaftsverfas-
sungsrechts, Deutsche Rechtszeitschrift Vol. 5, 1950, 193–198, Ernst Steindorff: 
Persönlichkeitsschutz im Zivilrecht, Müller, Heidelberg, 1983, 12., Claus-Wilhelm 
Canaris: Grundrechte und Privatrecht, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 184(3), 1984, 
201–246., György Kiss: Alapjogok a munkajogban [Fundamental Rights in Labour 
Law], JUSTIS, Pécs, 2010, 125–184.
43  József Petrétei: Az alkotmányos demokrácia alapintézményei [Basic Institutions 
of Constitutional Democracy], Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2009, 440.
44  Eric Engle: Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung), Hanse 
Law Review Vol. 5, № 2, 2009, 165–166.
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dividuals inter se. Thus, indirect horizontal effect exists when private 
law obligations are interpreted with regard to fundamental rights. 
It is the duty of the state, i.e. the legislator to create the rules of 
private (trade, investment, etc.) law in compliance with the consti-
tutional and also international human rights so as the principles of 
the civil code to transmit the idea of human rights (dignity, equal-
ity, freedom, privacy, etc.); and thus the courts of law can interpret 
the private law regulation in the light of the constitutional (and 
international human rights) values. The theory of direct horizontal 
effect represents that the fundamental rights enshrined in the con-
stitution are applicable in the private relations of the individuals. 
This results that private or labour law contracts infringing funda-
mental rights are invalid.45 Direct horizontal effect implies that an 
individual has, in his action against another private party, a claim 
based directly on a constitutional right, which overrides an otherwise 
applicable rule of private law.46 This idea would however transform 
the private law claims into human rights disputes, and the private 
law regulation would lose its function.47 Thus the most widely used 
and followed concept in national constitutional practice is the idea 
of the indirect horizontal effect of constitutional rights.48 Without 
contesting the concerns on the direct horizontal effect it must not 
born in mind that MNEs and TNCs are very special, powerful and 
influential private actors, thus with regard to their overwhelming 
dominance over the individuals and even the states, the application 
45  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 441.
46  Olha O. Cherednychenko: Fundamental rights and private law: A relationship 
of subordination or complementarity? Utrecht Law Review Vol. 3, № 2, 2007, 4–5.
47  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 441.
48  That is the case in large majority of EU member states. Only the Portuguese 
and Greek constitutions allow direct horizontal effect. The European constitu-
tional case law seems to differentiate between rights in respect of their indirect 
horizontal effect. Leonard F. M. Besselink: General Report, in The Protection of 
Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon: The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National 
Constitutions (ed. Julia Laffranque), Tartu University Press, Tallinn, 2012, 91–93.
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of direct horizontal effect of fundamental rights would be reason-
able to their relations.49
3.2 Application of international law by national courts
The national constitutions usually contain provisions on interna-
tional law and international community, reaffirming the acceptance 
and respect of internationally agreed values, amongst the interna-
tional human rights norms. Thus these kinds of constitutional provi-
sions preliminary commit and restrain the national governments for 
and by the common international values.50 However, the constitu-
tional declaration in itself does not guarantee that the international 
human rights law is applied and enforced effectively in a given coun-
try, because the enforcement depends on and influenced by the way 
of implementation (monist or dualist approach), the level and ef-
fectiveness of protection of the relevant constitutional provisions (by 
constitutional court or courts of law with constitutional review pow-
ers) and the exact content of those provisions (e.g. they refer to in-
ternational law in general, or distinguish the sources of 
international law, firmly express the rank of the international law in 
the domestic legal system etc.), and finally the general attitude of the 
courts of law to the application of international treaties, internation-
49  It is worth to mention that the courts, even the European Court of Justice are 
very careful with the recognition of indirect horizontal effect. See e.g. Viking, 
Laval (on right to collective action, allowing indirect horizontal effect) and Domin-
guez (on right to paid annual leave, not granting clearly the horizontal effect) 
cases (C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Judgment of the Court of 11 
December 2007; C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareför-
bundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Sven-
ska Elektrikerförbundet, Judgment of the Court of 18 December 2007; C-282/10 
Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet 
de la région Centre, Judgment of the Court of 24 January 2012)
50  Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh and Zachary Elkins: Commitment and 
Diffusion: Why Constitutions Incorporate International Law, University of Illinois 
Law Review, 2008, 101–137. http://works.bepress.com/zachary_elkins/1
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al courts’ judgments, universal customary international law, peremp-
tory norms (ius cogens) and general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations. Or as Cram explained: “When considering the mi-
gration of human rights norms into the judicial sphere, two initial 
observations may be made. The first is that while some constitutions 
oblige national courts to engage with norms in international human 
rights law, the precise status that is given to these norms varies con-
siderably from constitution to constitution. Second, by comparison 
with explicit constitutional references to international human rights 
laws, there is a conspicuous lack of any equivalent constitutional 
exhortation to give effect to / consider / take account of national 
human rights norms.”51 
The judicial dialogue – i.e., considering and applying interna-
tional and foreign court decisions, drawing the consequences of 
international courts’ judgments by national courts – may support 
the international BHR principles as well. The question is whether 
the international and national courts do really have a dialogue, or 
they continue their parallel monologues?52
Dialogue is when two (or more) participants in equal position, 
are seeking agreement by exchange of views, generally in order to 
achieve some joint outcome. The precondition of the dialogue is the 
near identical or similar position of the participants, which primar-
ily occurs on the level of powers and influence, and from this per-
spective, assumes identical weight. The dialogue is actually 
a specific form of debate; therefore it shall be distinguished from 
the general discussion and consultation as well. As a specific form 
of the debate, some criteria may be outlined that characterise the 
dialogue and without this framework the parties would misunder-
stand each other. First, the dialogue assumes a common goal, or if 
51  Ian Cram: Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights 
jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases, Cambridge Law Journal Vol. 68, № 
1, March 2009, 119.
52  Nóra Chronowski and Erzsébet Csatlós: Judicial Dialogue or National Mono-
logue? – the International Law and Hungarian Courts, ELTE Law Journal Vol. 1, 
№ 1, 2013, 7–28. 
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you prefer, a common subject on which the dialogue is going on. 
The dialogue may never end in itself. Second criterion is the com-
mitment to the common goal. All the participants want to achieve 
the common goal, which is to eliminate or reduce the conflict, and 
the debate or the individual interests shall be subordinated to this 
goal. Regularity is also an important feature of the dialogue. The 
dialogue is rarely a single exchange of views, because the interests 
of the participants are usually complex. The fourth characteristic in 
a dialogue is that the parties strive to be conclusive and effective. 
All of them are interested in the conflict resolution, and therefore 
they are willing to ‘sacrifice’, i.e., to give up some parts of their own 
interests in order to reach a mutual compromise outcome, because 
this is usually more preferable for everyone than enforcing their 
individual interests. Finally the mutuality must be mentioned, which 
should characterize all of the participants. The mutuality covers also 
concession, empathy, tolerance, etc. The meaning of a dialogue is 
not overcoming each other, but to achieve a common goal. A focal 
question is, whether and to what extent do the national courts con-
sider the judgments of international or foreign courts. Do they just 
simply refer them, or do they reflect on them by overruling their 
own, former jurisprudence? The latter would prove the existence of 
judicial dialogue and contribute to the efficiency of international 
human rights law, the former, however, is not enough to satisfy the 
criteria of the dialogue.53
Applying the general features of the dialogue to the courts, one 
can conclude that the basic condition – the equal position – is given 
if we consider the powers and status of e.g. the ECtHR, the consti-
tutional courts and ordinary courts of last instance. As to the com-
mon goal and the commitment to that – first and second specific 
conditions – it may be supposed that the analyzed courts are to 
protect fundamental rights and common constitutional values, but 
these are very far and abstract common goals. The concrete goal of 
53  For a different and wider concept of constitutional dialogue, see Tímea Drinó-
czi: Constitutional dialogue theories – extension of the concept and examples 
from Hungary, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht Vol. 68, № 1, 2013, 87–110.
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each court is to solve a given case, safeguard e.g. the ECHR or the 
constitution in line with its function, and the way they reach this 
goal is influenced by the circumstances of the given case, the refer-
ences of the parties concerned, and the presumption of the judges 
regarding the ratio decidendi. The latter also interferes with the reg-
ularity, because the national courts usually refer to international 
sources only if it supports the reasoning or has stronger convincing 
force than the purely domestic legal based argumentation. Fourth-
ly, the courts have no conflict with each other, thus – although they 
respect each others statements and rulings – they need not to be 
conclusive and effective in this respect. Sometimes the domestic 
courts seem to be rather careful or reticent with the interpretation 
of international treaties as they maybe try to avoid a potential future 
conflict with the international tribunal authorised for authentic 
interpretation of the given treaty. Of course if all role-players – i.e. 
courts – agree that the conflict can be traced back to a given piece 
of domestic law infringing a normative international commitment, 
and the procedural conditions are available (their procedures were 
initiated, at least one of them has power to eliminate the concerned 
norm, they have appropriate procedural ties among each other), 
the international and domestic courts may cooperate effectively by 
referring each others’ decisions. Finally, in the ‘dialogue’ of the 
courts, the mutual respect can be observed and rivalry is really rare 
phenomenon, but it is also true, that courts are not compelled to 
mutual concessions. Thus, as a final conclusion, it can be stated that 
the domestic courts apply the international law if they have to or 
they want to decorate their reasoning with it, but it is still far from 
a constructive dialogue, and organic inclusion of international law, 
principles and practices into the jurisprudence. Only a few consti-
tutions encourage the courts explicitly to use international or foreign 
precedents; and on global stage still the domestic constitutional 
argumentation is decisive rather than borrowing or transplantation. 
Significant jurisdictions, such as the US courts follow exceptional-
ist practice and refuse the use of foreign judgments almost com-
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pletely.54 This attitude of the courts may reduce the effect of the 
legally non-binding UN BHR Framework on human rights litigation. 
3.3 The problem of extraterritoriality 
The problem of extraterritoriality related to the rule that interna-
tional law holds states responsible for human rights violations, and 
not MNEs or TNCs. The states as duty bearers have to guarantee 
that business enterprises do not infringe the human rights in the 
territory where they operate. First and foremost the host state 
(where the MNE operates or the potential human rights violation 
occurs) should establish guarantees against the human rights viola-
tions by their national laws and law enforcement mechanism. How-
ever, because of the dominance and mobility of the MNEs, as well 
as the needs, means, economic interests or state of development of 
the given country, the offered human rights guarantees are often 
insufficient in the host state. E.g. it is very typical in developing 
countries that the governments fail to take actions against MNEs 
for human rights violations, because they need foreign investment, 
jobs, technical enterprise or they simply do not have resources (fi-
nancials, legal procedures, non-corrupt judiciary, etc.) to sanction 
human rights abuses although would be willing to do so.55 For these 
reasons, it is a logical step on the side of the victims of human rights 
violations caused by MNEs that they – seeking for redress and com-
pensation – try to sue corporations for their activities performed 
abroad in the home states, i.e. in the country where the given busi-
ness enterprise is domiciled. According to Weschka, it is true that 
home states are not currently liable in international human rights 
law for failing to prevent, punish, or otherwise regulate the delin-
quencies of their TNCs’ overseas operations, but the home states 
54  Gábor Halmai: Perspectives on Global Constitutionalism, The Use of Foreign and 
International Law, Eleven, The Hague, 2014, 186–191.
55  Weschka ‘Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises’ 628–629., Joseph 
‘Corporations and Transnational’ 9–10., Tévar ‘Shortcomings’ 399–401.
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have high human rights records, developed procedures, non-cor-
rupt and functioning court system, and international law also “rec-
ognises the right of home states to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over their nationals committing wrongs abroad”.56 Thus 
the national courts have the chance to rule on MNEs’ overseas 
human rights abuses, and enforce human rights norms ‘horizon-
tally’. 
Numerous suits were filed mainly in common law countries, 
before United States, Canadian, Australian and United Kingdom 
courts against parent companies.57 The most successful legal instru-
ment for transnational human rights litigation seemed to be un-
doubtedly the US Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 1789 that had been 
dormant for nearly two centuries before lawyers began creatively 
using it in the 1980s to bring international human rights cases in 
US courts. The ATS grants jurisdiction to federal courts to hear tort 
claims by aliens alleging violations of the ‘law of the nations’.58 
However, the ATS in itself cannot help to solve the problem of li-
ability of the MNEs, because courts take several features into con-
sideration in respect of transnational litigation,59 such as the doctrine 
of separation of powers, the state action doctrine, the political ques-
tion, sovereign immunity and international comity considerations, 
the ‘corporate veil’ as well as ‘forum non conveniens’.60 
In the landmark Kiobel decision (2013) the US courts greatly re-
stricted the scope of ATS and limited the US courts’ jurisdiction in 
foreign human rights cases.61 US Court of Appeal for the Second 
56  Weschka ‘Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises’ 629., see also Joseph 
‘Corporations and Transnational’ 11–12. 
57  Joseph ‘Corporations and Transnational’ 15., Olivier De Schutter: Transna-
tional Corporations and Human Rights: An Introduction, Global Law Working Paper 
01/05, Symposium – Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, NYU School 
of Law, 2005, 7.
58  Tévar ‘Shortcomings’ 408., Joseph ‘Corporations and Transnational’ 10, 17.
59  Halmai ‘Perspectives’ 236–239.
60  Weschka ‘Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises’ 629–631., Tévar ‘Short-
comings’ 409.
61  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Decided April 17, 2013, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (U.S. 
2013)
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Circuit ruled that the ATS is inapplicable to corporations because 
corporate liability is not a discernible norm of customary interna-
tional law. The Supreme Court heard arguments over whether the 
Alien Tort Statute could apply to corporations, and later expanded 
the case to consider whether the law could be invoked in similar 
cases against anyone. The judgment finally was controlled by the 
‘presumption against extraterritoriality’, which means that the Con-
gress is presumed not to intend its statutes to apply outside the US 
unless it provides a ‘clear indication’ otherwise. The Supreme Court 
explained that, even where the claims ‘touch and concern the ter-
ritory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application’. The 
Court also discussed corporations, stating that corporations are 
often present in many countries, but a ‘mere corporate presence’ in 
the United States is insufficient.62
However, so long as at least some portion of the relevant conduct 
occurred within the US, ATS cases may still be sustainable. Alto-
gether, the Kiobel decision makes it far more difficult for the human 
rights activists to sue US corporations based on the corporation’s 
Petitioners, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States, filed suit in fed-
eral court under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging that respondents – certain Dutch, 
British, and Nigerian corporations – aided and abetted the Nigerian Government 
in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. The ATS provides that 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the Unit-
ed States.” 28 U.S.C. §1350. The District Court dismissed several of petitioners’ 
claims, but on interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the entire com-
plaint, reasoning that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability.
62  A few days after Kiobel, the Court vacated and remanded a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion that had allowed extraterritorial ATS claims to proceed [Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 
569 U.S. ---, 2013 WL 1704704 (April 22, 2013)]. In Rio Tinto, foreign plaintiffs 
sued foreign defendants who had ‘substantial operations in this country’, includ-
ing ‘assets of nearly $13 billion – 47% of which are located in North America’. Even 
this degree of corporate presence was not enough to overcome the presumption 
of extraterritoriality when the alleged torts had occurred outside the United States.
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overseas activities.63 As the post-Kiobel rulings of the US courts64 
show – although the door is not closed completely on using the 
ATS – plaintiffs can mostly rely on asserting parallel claims under 
federal laws that are expressly extraterritorial but limited to their 
own narrow circumstances.
4 Conclusions
The ways of development may be (1) an ambitious initiative for 
a ‘Business and human rights Treaty’ and (2) strengthening the legal 
characters of national action plans on BHR. 
As to the first path, it is not a mere fantasy. As de Schutter reports, 
“On 26 June 2014 the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a res-
olution calling for the establishment of an open-ended intergov-
ernmental working group (IGWG) ‘to elaborate an international 
legally-binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights 
law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises’. The resolution was tabled by Ecuador and South Af-
rica, and it was co-sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela. Al-
though strongly supported by an impressive coalition of civil 
society organizations who formed a ‘Treaty Alliance’ in support of 
a binding treaty and despite gaining support from a plurality with-
in the Human Rights Council, the proposal was highly divisive: 
within the 47-members-large HRC, it was supported by 20 member 
states and opposed by 14 states (including the United States and 
63  Rich Samp: Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & 
the Future of Alien Tort Litigation, http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/04/18/
supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-of- 
alien-tort-litigation/
64  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Al-Shimari v. CACI or Balintulo v. Daimler cases commented 
by Marco Simons: Post-Kiobel roundup: Apartheid case is not dismissed, but may 
soon be; some positive decisions from other courts (September 10, 2013), http://
www.earthrights.org/blog/post-kiobel-roundup-apartheid-case-not-dismissed-
may-soon-be-some-positive-decisions-other
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the Member States of the European Union), whereas 13 member 
states of the HRC abstained.”65
The achievements of the first session of the IGWG held in Ge-
neva during 6–10 July 2015 were summarised by Lopez and Shea: 
“This first session, which was relatively well attended, raised expec-
tations, especially from a wide array of civil society organizations, 
despite concerns of a likely boycott of the process by Western states. 
After all was said and done, the first session could be described as 
a qualified success. Although state participation was low and many 
discussions proved more political than legalistic, there was some 
meaningful progress. (…) Over the course of the week, there were 
eight panels addressing the following topics: (i) implementation of 
the UNGPs; (ii) principles of the treaty; (iii) scope of enterprises 
covered by the instrument; (iv) scope of human rights covered by 
the instrument; (v) obligations of states to guarantee respect of 
human rights, including extraterritorial obligations; (vi) enhancing 
the responsibilities of corporations to respect human rights, includ-
ing prevention, mitigation, and remediation; (vii) legal liability of 
corporations; and (viii) access to remedy.”66
Although many are pessimistic and remind to the failures of the 
1970s and the 2003 proposal by the UN Sub-Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights for the adoption of a set 
of Norms on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, de Schutter believes 
that we can maybe learn from the mistakes committed in the past, 
and examines “the legal as well as political feasibility of four poten-
tial options for a legally-binding international instrument in the 
area of business and human rights. The four options: (i) to clarify 
and strengthen the states’ duty to protect human rights, including 
extraterritorially; (ii) to oblige states, through a framework conven-
65  Olivier De Schutter: Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights, 
Business and Human Rights Journal Vol. 1, 2016, 41–67, 41-42.
66  Carlos Lopez and Ben Shea: Negotiating a Treaty on Business and Human 
Rights: A Review of the First Intergovernmental Session, Business and Human Rights 
Journal Vol. 1, 2016, 117–126, at 111 and 113.
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tion, to report on the adoption and implementation of national 
action plans on business and human rights; (iii) to impose direct 
human rights obligations on corporations and establish a new 
mechanism to monitor compliance with such obligations; and (iv) 
to impose duties of mutual legal assistance on states to ensure ac-
cess to effective remedies for victims harmed by transnational op-
erations of corporations.”67 De Schutter argues that a  hybrid 
instrument building on elements of the first and the fourth option 
may be the best way forward both in terms of political feasibility 
and improving access to effective remedies for victims.68
Of course, the strive for a BHR Treaty may fall short many ways, the 
developments in the field might be also triggered by the advocacy 
and sustained evaluation of national action plans (NAPs) on busi-
ness and human rights. The HRC thus encouraged the states to 
elaborate their NAPs.69 In 2017 there are 13 adopted NAPs, and the 
range of other in progress.70 “Every NAP process affirms the UNGPs’ 
essential tenet that human rights apply within the business sector 
and indicates a political commitment to bring domestic laws, poli-
cies, and practices into alignment with this norm.”71
To sum up, BHR is still a policy instead of a legal framework, 
although by further development a really efficient instrument could 
it be as response to the challenges of globalisation on human rights. 
The limits of the United Nations’ BHR concept are on the one hand 
67  De Schutter ‘Towards a New Treaty’ 41. 
68  De Schutter ‘Towards a New Treaty’ 44.
69  Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises’, A/HRC/RES/26/22 (15 July 2014), https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/083/82/PDF/G1408382.pdf?OpenElement
70  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx, 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-
tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-
action-plans
71  Claire Methven O’Brien, Amol Mehra, Sara Blackwell and Cathrine Bloch 
Poulsen-Hansen: National Action Plans: Current Status and Future Prospects for 
a New Business and Human Rights Governance Tool, Business and Human Rights 
Journal Vol. 1, 2016, 117–126, at 117.
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the deficiencies of international human rights enforcement mecha-
nisms, and on the other hand some constitutional dogmas on direct 
third party effect of human rights, the rigid and unimaginative ap-
plication of international law by national courts, and excluding 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in human rights cases. Thus, for the 
success of “principled pragmatism”72 of UN BHR Framework and 
policy, some paradigms of national constitutional law should be 
changed, or at least the domestic courts should make a better use 
of the constitutional convergence.
72  For the term, see ‘Just Business’ – Ruggie on Business and Human Rights at 
the UN. http://businesshumanrightsireland.wordpress.com/2013/05/13/just-
business-ruggie-on-business-and-human-rights-at-the-un/

EUROPEAN CHALLENGES OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
Introduction – human rights protection  
and the European Union
The years of 2010s brought a frustrating crisis era to the European 
Union. There are still no adequate responses to the credit crunch, 
refugee crisis, exit striving of certain member states and the consti-
tutional crises in Central Europe. In addition, the plenty of crisis 
veils somehow the backsliding of fundamental rights protection 
level in the states making an illiberal turn. As András Sajó assessed 
in 2003,
‘The collapse of oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe raised high hopes. It 
was believed that the strong desire to get rid of communist authoritarianism 
and the wish to enjoy the advantages of a market economy would result in 
new societies committed to the rule of law and constitutionalism. It was also 
believed that the emerging societies would create institutions that would undo 
past injustices and be concerned about preventing the development of new 
injustices. Skeptics, on the other hand, argued that the social and economic 
conditions require a process of transition that does not favor such noble im-
provement, and that the cultural and structural traditions of these societies are 
not favorable to the rule of law and market fairness, nor are they sympathetic 
to human rights.’73
Now it seems that defeatists were right. Ironically, those member 
states labelling themselves as illiberal are still highly relying on the 
benefits from the unique liberal value community that is committed 
to rule of law, democracy and human rights. In other words, the 
European Union is keeping to finance – on the basis of the mutual 
trust – these derogatory members as well. These governments gain 
from the deficiencies of European value protection system.
73  András Sajó: Erosion and Decline of the Rule of Law in Post-communism: an 
Introduction, in András Sajó (ed.): Out of and Into Authoritarian Law, Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague, London, New York, 2003, x.
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Still, the Union is not inactive: to strengthen the rule of law in the 
EU, the European Commission put forward a new EU framework in 
March 201474 that was inspired by the experiences of the Hungar-
ian constitutional crisis among others. In doing so, the Commission 
aimed to more effectively address any situation where “there is a sys-
temic threat to the rule of law” within any member state. The frame-
work is designed to complement existing means of protecting the 
EU’s rule of law. These include infringement procedures limited to 
a breach of a specific provision of EU law) pursuant to Article 258 of 
the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); and the 
“last resort” or  “nuclear option”75 preventive and sanctioning mech-
anisms provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). The purpose of the framework is to enable the Commission 
to find a solution with the EU country concerned so as to prevent 
the emergence of a systemic threat to the rule of law. 
However, this is a soft and careful political tool of persuasion just 
being tested on Poland. To preserve the rule of law and to prove 
a systemic threat to EU values of Article 2 TEU76 an effective legal 
instrument seems to be necessary that goes beyond the limited 
infringement procedures. The systemic threat cannot proved by 
member state based investigations, because the country threatening 
the common European values will cautiously and preliminary un-
dermine the domestic checks and balances. 
74  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM/2014/0158 
final, 11 March 2014
75  This exaggerated term was used by Manuel Barroso, former president of the 
European Commission. According to Armin von Bogdandy, this qualification was 
unwise and stuck. See Armin von Bogdandy: How to protect European Values in 
the Polish Constitutional Crisis, http://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-protect-euro-
pean-values-in-the-polish-constitutional-crisis/
76  Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are 
common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”
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In my opinion, Article 7 procedures of the TEU should not be put 
aside being completely ineffective,77 instead, they should be strength-
ened and underpinned with legal buttresses. And the European 
Union already has a legal means, first, its potencial accession to the 
ECHR, and second, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter).78 
The respect of fundamental rights and freedom is equally important 
value as the rule of law, thus their protection should go hand in 
hand.
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) contains the fun-
damental rights standard of the Union, the three pillars of which 
are constituted by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms79 (hereinafter ECHR), and the recognition of 
fundamental rights as general principles of the Union’s law. The 
fundamental rights standard is binding on both the institutions and 
member states of the Union. The definition of the pillars of funda-
mental rights protection of the EU is closely connected with the 
basic principles laid down in Article 2 TEU (especially with the 
requirements of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
dignity), the objectives set by Article 3 TEU and the democratic 
principles enumerated in Title II TEU. This definition is also inter-
linked with the accession criteria outlined in Article 49 TEU, as it 
serves as a clear-cut point of orientation for states wishing to ac-
cede. On the whole, it may be stated that Article 6 TEU gives expres-
sion to the “anthropocentric” dimension of the Union, restricts 
integrative power with regard to its content and vests the Union 
77  Balázs Fekete and Veronika Czina: Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union 
– is it really a nuclear weapon? http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/en/blog/2015/04/article-
7-of-the-treaty-on-european-union
78  András Jakab: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as the Most Promising 
Way of Enforcing the Rule of Law against EU Member States, in C. Closa and D. 
Kochenov (eds.): Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2017, 187.
79  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Rome, 4 November 1950. 
48 human rights in a multilevel constitutional area
with the modern attributes of material and constitutional rule of 
law. 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TL), on the one hand, 
satisfied the long-existing need of the integration to have – simi-
larly to its member states – its own binding catalogue of fundamen-
tal rights. On the other hand, it authorized the Union – also 
similarly to its member states – to become involved as a party in 
the rights protection mechanism of the ECHR. The provisions con-
tained in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 6 TEU appeared first in 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,80 which was ad-
opted in 2004 but did not come into effect in the lack of ratification 
by some of the member states, these provisions were raised to the 
level of primary legislation only on the entry into force of the TL. 
At the same time, paragraph (3) of Article 6 does have its anteced-
ents in primary legislation. 
Paragraph (3) is aimed at laying down – at the level of basic 
principle – that human rights shall form part of the Union’s law. 
Furthermore, it defines two factors that could serve as standards 
when defining the extent and content of human rights: the consti-
tutional traditions common to the member states and the ECHR.
Article 6 (3) appears first – in a somewhat different formulation 
– in the Single European Act81 (SEA) adopted in 1986, which, as 
regards its political and economic objectives, aimed to implement 
closer integration through the extensive transformation of the found-
ing treaties.  The Preamble to the SEA laid down member states’ 
commitment to fundamental rights by declaring that: the Single 
European Act was created in order that member states may “work 
together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental 
rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, 
in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, 
equality and social justice”. This text – in a similar formulation, but 
80  Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310, 16. 12. 2004, 1.
81  Effective from 1 January 1987.
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with extended content – became incorporated into the text of Point 
F of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, then – renumbered 
but in the same formulation – into the Treaty of Amsterdam, while 
its newest formulation forms part of the Lisbon Treaty as well. The 
original text of the paragraph reads as follows: “The Union shall 
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general 
principles of Community law.”
The Lisbon Treaty changed the above formulation only in one 
respect: instead of the expression “Community law” it uses the 
term “Union’s law”. This is explained by the fact that the Euro-
pean Union, vested with legal personality on the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, has replaced and is a legal successor to the 
European Community, therefore, the expression “Community law” 
applied earlier has given way to the term “Union law”. However, 
an even more important change in content is that while on the 
basis of the earlier terminology the implementation of human 
rights was guaranteed only in the laws of the three European 
Communities (in other words, only in the former first pillar of the 
EU), the present formulation – due to the elimination of the ear-
lier pillar system by the Lisbon Treaty – extends this guarantee 
to the whole of the Union’s law (thus, to the areas of the former 
second and third pillars as well), that is to say, to all legal acts of 
the European Union. 
Two points of comparison with regard to the genesis of Article 6 
(3) are the constitutional traditions common to the member states 
and the provisions of the ECHR. Out of them, it was first the con-
stitutional traditions of Member States, then later the provisions of 
the ECHR that infiltrated the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ). The genesis of the paragraph dates back to 
the case-law accumulated by the ECJ in the 1960s. As the first mile-
stone of the first range – the constitutional traditions common to 
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the member states – one may mention the Stauder case,82 where 
the concept of fundamental rights serving as general principles of 
Community law appeared.  In this case the Court was to make a rul-
ing on a decision of the Commission.83 In accordance with the above-
mentioned decision, member states were entitled to sell butter to 
certain beneficiaries at a reduced price under certain welfare 
schemes. In order to prevent fraud, the decision prescribed the 
presentation of certain documents including – in accordance with 
the German translation – a “coupon indicating the name” of those 
concerned. A beneficiary claimed that this requirement was in con-
flict with the provision of the German Basic Law relating to human 
dignity and challenged the decision before the German Administra-
tive Court (Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart). After all, the Court did 
not consider the case from the aspect of conflict between Commu-
nity law and a fundamental right contained in the national constitu-
tion, but concluded that the Community legal rule had been 
erroneously translated and it was only the German version of the 
Commission decision that referred to the indication of the benefi-
ciary’s name, in other languages only reference to the identification 
of the person concerned was laid down. Therefore, in the Court’s 
opinion, the Community regulation did not contain a provision 
capable of prejudicing the fundamental rights of persons. However, 
the judgment also stated that fundamental rights of persons formed 
part of the general principles of Community law, respect for which 
shall be guaranteed by the Court. The application of the common 
constitutional traditions of member states as general principles is 
given an even more striking expression in the opinion of the Ad-
vocate-General connected with the judgment.84 In accordance with 
the opinion given by Advocate-General Roemer, “it is a view shared 
by numerous authors that general qualitative concepts of national 
82  Judgment of the Court of 12 November 1969 in Erich Stauder v Ville d’Ulm – 
Sozialamt. Case 29/69 [ECR (Collection of Supreme Court Decisions) 1969, 419].
83  Commission Decision (69/71/EEC) of 12 February 1969.
84  See Dirk Ehlers: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2007, 
12.
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constitutional law, in particular fundamental rights recognized by 
national law, must be ascertained by means of a comparative eval-
uation of laws, and such concepts, which form an unwritten con-
stituent part of Community law, must be observed in making 
secondary Community law.”85
As a next step – still preceding the Solange-I decision of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court, in the preliminary ruling procedure relat-
ing to the  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case86 – the Court 
held that the protection of fundamental rights inspired by the con-
stitutional traditions common to the member states must also be 
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community. According to the basic facts of the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case, a system of deposits was introduced by 
Community law with regard to the export of certain goods, in ac-
cordance with which if a licensee did not deliver the goods during 
the period of validity of the export licence, he would forfeit the 
deposit. The German Administrative Court held that the system of 
deposits ran counter to the principles of freedom of action and of 
disposition laid down by the German Basic Law, in its view, the 
Regulation of the Council and the Commission in question consti-
tuted excessive intervention in these freedoms. The Court held that 
the system of deposits was necessary for the proper calculability of 
export and import processes. Furthermore, the Court stated that 
the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Com-
munity can only be judged in the light of Community law; otherwise, 
the legal basis of the Community itself would be called in question. 
Despite the fact that the Court reiterated its statement made in the 
Stauder case (that fundamental rights formed part of the general 
legal principles of Community law), it pointed out that fundamen-
tal rights formulated by national law could not affect the validity of 
85  See Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer of 29 October 1969 in Erich Stauder 
v Ville d’Ulm – Sozialamt, Case 29/69 [ECR 1969, 419].
86  Judgment of the Court of 17 December 1970 in Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70 
[ECR 1970, 1125].
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Community law. At the same time, an examination should be made 
as to whether there exist any principles in Community law that are 
analogous to the national regulation in question, and protection of 
these rights should be derived from the constitutional traditions of 
the member state.
In connection with the maximum standard and regard for the 
constitution of a specific member state, mention should be made 
of the Hauer case.87 In Hauer the Court made a decision within the 
framework of a preliminary ruling procedure concerning the Coun-
cil Regulation regulating wine production. Under the regulation, 
national authorities were prohibited from granting authorization 
for new planting of vines on plots of land suitable for vine-growing. 
The claimant in the original case argued that the Community mea-
sure infringed the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade 
or profession guaranteed by the German Basic Law as it restricted 
them disproportionately. The Court reiterated its position expound-
ed in its previous judgments that fundamental rights form an inte-
gral part of the general principles of the law, the observance of which 
is ensured by the court. In safeguarding those rights, the latter is 
bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the member states, so that measures which are incompat-
ible with fundamental rights recognized by the constitutions of 
those states are unacceptable in the Community. It further confirmed 
that the court shall have regard to international treaties for the 
protection of human rights. At the same time it explained that the 
introduction of special criteria for assessment stemming from the 
legislation or constitutional law of a particular member state would, 
by damaging the substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, 
lead inevitably to the destruction of the unity of the common mar-
ket and the jeopardizing of the cohesion of the Community.88
87  Judgment of the Court of 13 December 1979 in Liselotte Hauer v Land Rhein-
land-Pfalz, Case 44/79 [ECR 1979, 3727].
88  A further example for defining standards and rejecting national constitutions 
is the Grogan case (Judgment of the Court of 4 October 1991 in The Society for 
the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others, 
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With regard to the other train of legal development – the ECHR 
– the Court primarily pointed out that in safeguarding fundamental 
rights, the Court must have regard to international treaties for the 
protection of human rights on which the member states have col-
laborated or of which they are signatories. Thus it defined the sec-
ond most important source in respect of the fundamental rights of 
the Community. This significant rule was laid down in the judgment 
in the Nold case.89 This judgment was passed within the framework 
of proceedings taken by a wholesale dealer in coal for the annul-
ment of a Commission decision,90 in which the applicant complained 
that the decision imposed unfavourably discriminatory conditions 
on him and violated his right to enterprise.  In its judgment the 
Court expounded, on the one hand, that besides the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states, international treaties for 
the protection of human rights – on which the member states have 
collaborated – can also supply guidelines which should be followed 
within the framework of protection of fundamental rights under 
Community law. On the other hand, it stressed that “the Court […] 
cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with 
fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions 
of those States”.91 This careful formulation gained more strength 
later on and expanded most vigorously in the direction of the ECHR. 
As a matter of course, in its judgment passed in the Rutili case,92 
the Court expressly and specifically referred to the ECHR in the 
range of international treaties.  By today, the recognition of inter-
C-159/90 [ECR 1991, I-4685]). For more detail, see Joseph Weiler: Fundamental 
Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: on Standards and Values in the Protection 
of Human Rights, in Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (eds.): The European 
Union and Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Boston, London, 1995, 
56–60.
89  Judgment of the Court of 14 May 1974 in Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhan-
dlung v Commission of the European Communities, Case 4/73 [ECR 1974, 491].
90  73/94/ECSC: Commission Decision of 21 December 1972 authorizing new 
terms of business of Ruhrkohle AG (OJ L 120, 7. 5. 1973, 14)
91  Ibid. Point 13
92  Judgment of the Court of 28 October 1975 in Roland Rutili v Ministre de 
l’intérieur, Case 36/75 [ECR 1975, 1219].
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national treaties has acquired the meaning of having extensive 
regard for the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
and adopting certain interpretational frameworks.93 The content 
and formulation of the Article is significant also because it becomes 
obvious on comparison with a review of case-law that it implements 
the codification of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union.94
1 Integration of European human rights standard  
    – the accession of EU to the ECHR
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) contains the fun-
damental rights standard of the Union, the three pillars of this stan-
dard are the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), and the recognition of fundamental rights as 
the general principle of Union law. The definition of the pillars of 
human rights protection of the EU is closely connected with the 
basic principles laid down in Article 2 of the TEU (especially with 
the requirements of democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
dignity), the objectives defined by Article 3 of the TEU and the 
democratic principles enumerated in Title II of the TEU. This defini-
tion is also interlinked with the accession criteria outlined in Article 
49 of the TEU, as they serve as unambiguous points of orientation 
for states wishing to accede. On the whole it may be stated that 
Article 6 of the TEU gives expression to an “antropo-centric” dimen-
sion of the Union, restricts integrative power with regard to its con-
tent and vests the Union with the modern attributes of material and 
constitutional rule of law. 
From the aspect of the development of the human rights standard, 
the accession of the Union to the ECHR is of great significance, as 
93  See Ehlers ‘Fundamental Rights’ 12.
94  See more in Márton Varju: European Union human rights law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2014.
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it realizes the integration of human rights protection in Europe. The 
accession is inevitable, because the Treaty on European Union in 
its Article 6 para. (2) stipulates the obligation (not just the possibil-
ity) for the Union to access. 
1.1 Antecedents of accession
1.1.1 The relationship between the case-law  
         of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts 
In the display of interaction between the ECHR and the human 
rights protection of the Union – both during the initial steps and at 
present - the case-law of the ECJ and the ECtHR have played a sig-
nificant role. Alongside the parallels between the judgments of the 
two courts, tensions may also arise between them, as it is of impor-
tance which court can exert a greater influence on the case-law of 
the other.95 
With regard to the two types of case-law, the ECJ was the first to 
take steps in the direction of having regard to the ECtHR with its 
longer past and considering it more and more the source of the 
“general principles of Community law” contained in the TEU.96 The 
approximation of the ECJ to the ECHR can be traced by providing 
95  Blutman László: Az Európai Unió joga a gyakorlatban, HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 
2010, 478–479. See also Chronowski Nóra, Drinóczi Tímea, Kocsis Miklós, Zel-
ler Judit: 6. cikk, in Osztovits András (ed.): Az Európai Unióról és az Európai Unió 
működéséről szóló szerződések magyarázata 1, Complex, Budapest, 2011, 46–78. 
96  Cf. Johan Callewaert: Unionisation vs. conventionisation. The Relationship 
between EU Law and the European Convention on Human Rights and its Impact 
on the Domestic Legal System of the EU Member States, in Conference on the 
Europeanisation of Public International Law: The Status of International Law in 
the EU and its Member States, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2005 September 2, 
Collection of Documents, 42., Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet: Konvergenz der Grund-
rechte und Grundfreiheiten in der Europäischen Union, in Chronowski Nóra 
(ed.): Adamante Notare – Essays in Honour of Antal Ádám on the Occasion of His 75th 
Birthday, PTE ÁJK, Pécs, 2005, 533.
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an overview of a number of cases. In the Carpenter case97 the ECJ, 
interpreting Community law expressly in the context of Article 8 of 
the ECHR, established the plaintiff’s right to respect for family life. 
As a further example one may cite the Connolly case,98 concerning 
which the ECJ defined the scope of Community level protection of 
the freedom of expression with reference to Article 10 of the ECHR 
and the case-law of the ECtHR.99 On the other hand, one may also 
find examples where the ECJ has left it for the national court to 
apply or adopt European Union law within the frames provided by 
the ECHR. Such examples include the Pupino case,100 which is also 
worth mentioning because the ECJ came to interesting conclusions 
about which legal documents were binding on member states in 
the spirit of loyalty to the Community (now the obligation of sincere 
cooperation contained in Article 4 para (3) of the TEU).101 The case 
of Pupino illustrated that the Court of Justice continues to adhere 
closely to Strasbourg case-law even in the new areas of European 
Union law covered by the former “third pillar” (Justice and Home 
Affairs).
Based on the above-mentioned cases one may draw the conclu-
sion that the ECJ has followed the case-law of the ECtHR,102 and 
concerning the definition of the content of fundamental rights of 
the Community (now European Union) it has attributed “special 
significance” to the ECHR.103 However, it should also be noted that, 
97  C-60/00. Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judg-
ment of the Court of 11 July 2002 [ECR 2002, I-6279]
98  C-274/99. Bernard Connolly v Commission of the European Communities, 
Judgment of the Court of 6 March 2001 [ECR 2001, I-1575]
99  Szalayné ‘Konvergenz’ 533–534.
100  C-105/03. Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 16 June 2005 [ECR 2005, I-5285]
101  Nikolaos Lavranos: UN Sanctions and Judicial Review, in Jan Wouters, André 
Nollkaemper and Erika de Wet (eds.): The Europeanisation of International Law, The 
Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States, T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague, 2008, 201. 
102  Blutman ‘Az Európai Unió joga’ 479.
103  Thus ECJ accorded special significance to the Convention amongst interna-
tional human rights treaties in Hauer case decided in 1979. See 44/79. Liselotte 
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although by the general principle of human rights protection the 
ECJ has recognized the rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the fact 
that the ECHR also forms part of the traditions of the member states, 
it has never declared that it would be bound by the ECHR or the 
case-law of the ECtHR before the accession.104
In connection with this, the question soon arose as to whether 
the rights guaranteed by the ECHR could be given the same inter-
pretation in the context of European Union law as in the context of 
international law. A difference in interpretation could not be con-
sidered lucky for several reasons. On the one hand, it would not be 
advantageous from a theoretical aspect, since in this case the content 
of rights and the scope of their protection would differ merely be-
cause of accidental circumstances (e.g. in the case of business un-
dertakings operating in the same state, the prohibition of cartels 
would be governed by the international law interpretation of the 
ECHR, while in the case of undertakings functioning in different 
states, the Union law interpretation would be applicable). On the 
other hand, there are also practical arguments in favour of parallel-
ism in so far as it would mean a much clearer situation concerning 
human rights if they were interpreted in one single way.105 
Judgments based on differing interpretations have resulted from, 
for instance, Article 6 of the ECHR, which lays down the guarantees 
of court procedures within the framework of the right to a fair trial. 
While in the Orkem case106 the ECJ did not regard the “right to 
silence”107 an element of guarantee, the ECtHR treated it as an in-
Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Judgment of the Court of 13 December 1979 [ECR 
1979, 3727]. This has been its consistent position since then. See e.g. C-94/00. 
Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation 
et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities, 
Judgment of the Court of 22 October 2002 [ECR 2002, I-9011] point 25.
104  Carl Lebeck: The European Court of Human Rights on the relation between 
ECHR and EC-law: the limits of constitutionalisation of public international law, 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht Vol. 62, 2007, 207.
105  Callewaert ‘Unionisation’ 44. 
106  374/87. Orkem v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of 
the Court of 18 October 1989 [ECR 1989, 3283.]
107  No one may be compelled to give evidence against himself.
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tegral part of Article 6.108 In this instance the ECJ subsequently re-
viewed its own case-law, approximating it to the interpretational 
frames of the ECtHR, therefore, the interpretational practice of the 
Strasbourg Court has an impact on Union law. Several judgments 
of the CJEU – cf. Roquette Fréres case,109 Booker Aquacultur case110 
– show that the CJEU emphatically did not deviate from the inter-
pretation given by the ECtHR because of the “special significance” 
attributed to it.111
The steps taken by the CJEU have been answered by the ECtHR 
too, since in several cases one may observe the approximation of 
the ECtHR to the case-law of the CJEU and the approximation of 
the ECHR to the Charter. One may cite as an example the Goodwin 
case112, concerning which the ECtHR ensured a greater degree of 
protection to the marriage of transsexuals than contained in Article 
12 of the ECHR with express reference to Article 9 of the Charter.113 
Mention should also be made of the Pellegrin case,114 concerning 
which the ECtHR interpreted the right to a fair process citing the 
case-law of the Court of Justice.115 Article 12 of the ECHR on the 
pro hibition of discrimination is another example relating to law-
making, which was clearly affected by the ongoing preparations for 
the Charter.116
In connection with the above, the essential question arises as to 
what extent the human rights jurisdiction of the ECtHR can be 
108  Cf. Funke v. France Judgment of 25 February 1993 Series A no. 256
109  C-94/00. Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la 
consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European 
Communities, Judgment of the Court of 22 October 2002 [ECR 2002, I-9011]
110  C-20/00. and C-64/00. Booker Aquacultur Ltd (C-20/00.) and Hydro Seafood 
GSP Ltd (C-64/00.) v The Scottish Ministers joint cases, Judgment of the Court 
of 10 July 2003 [ECR 2003, I-7411]
111  See more in Blutman ‘Az Európai Unió joga’ 478–479.
112  Goodwin v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, ECHR 2002-VI.
113  By doing so, the ECtHR was the first European court referring specifically to 
the provisions of the Charter. See Callewaert ‘Unionisation’ 49-50.
114  Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999-VIII
115  Szalayné ‘Konvergenz’ 533.
116  Callewaert ‘Unionisation’ 50. 
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recognized over Union legislation prior to the Union’s accession to 
the ECHR. Since the end of the 1990s several cases have arisen 
which show readiness on the part of the ECtHR to scrutinize Union 
law applying the standard of the ECHR. Such cases include the 
Matthews case117 and the Cantoni case118 as well as the Bosphorus 
case.119 Concerning the latter the ECtHR affirmed the scrutiny of 
Union law from the point of view of human rights; at the same time, 
it also admitted that it applied the ECHR as a standard with respect 
to Union law only insofar as there were deficiencies in the Union’s 
own provisions or practice relating to human rights protection. 
Having regard to this latter decision, if drawing a parallel, one may 
speak of a “Solange”-type decision on the part of the ECtHR, as it 
steps up as a protector of human rights only if the protection pro-
vided by Union law is insufficient.120 
In the Bosphorus case the ECtHR reiterated that states participat-
ing in the ECHR were entitled to transfer specific powers falling 
within the scope of their sovereignty to international and suprana-
tional organizations. The supranational organization on which the 
power has been conferred is not accountable under the ECHR until 
it also becomes a party to it.121 Under Article 1 of the ECHR, a con-
tracting party is accountable for all acts and omissions of its respon-
sible organs, regardless of whether the act or omission in question 
occurred based on the party’s national law or because of the need 
to comply with its international obligations. The ECtHR has point-
ed out that the exemption of contracting parties from responsibil-
ity as a result of the transfer of competences in the areas concerned 
117  24833/94. Matthews v. United Kingdom Reports 1999-I. See also case of Senator 
Lines GmbH v. The 15 Member States of the European Union, Admissibility Decision 
of 10 March 2004 no. 56672/00
118  Cantoni v. France Judgment of 15 November 1996 no. 17862/91, Reports 1996, 
1617. 
119  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticared Antonim Sirketi v. Ireland [GC], 
no.45036/98, ECHR 2005-IV.
120  Lavranos ‘UN Sanctions’ 202. 
121  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticared Antonim Sirketi v. Ireland [GC], 
no.45036/98, ECHR 2005-IV. 152., see also Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], 
no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I. 32.
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would be incompatible with the aim and subject-matter of the Con-
vention, because it would endanger the application and effectiveness 
of the guarantees contained in the ECHR.122 “In the Court’s view, 
State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is jus-
tified as long as the relevant organisation [EC/EU] is considered to 
protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guar-
antees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, 
in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for 
which the Convention provides […]. By »equivalent« the Court 
means »comparable«: any requirement that the organisation’s pro-
tection be »identical« could run counter to the interest of interna-
tional co-operation pursued […]. However, any such finding of 
equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review 
in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights’ protection. 
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the 
[international or supranational] organisation, the presumption will 
be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Con-
vention when it does no more than implement legal obligations 
flowing from its membership of the organisation. However, any 
such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights 
was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of internation-
al co-operation would be outweighed by the Convention’s role as 
a »constitutional instrument of European public order« in the field 
of human rights […].”123
Concerning the case the ECtHR reviewed the development of 
fundamental rights protection by the Community (now Union), its 
substantive legal guarantees and the applicability of the Commu-
nity (Union) control mechanism from the aspect of the protection 
of individual rights. In consideration of all of the above, the ECtHR 
found, that “the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can be 
122  Bosphorus ibid. 153. 
123  Bosphorus ibid. 155–156. 
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considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, »equivalent« 
[…] to that of the Convention system.”124
In summary, it may be stated that the relationship between the 
two Courts in the field of human rights protection was characterised 
by close cooperation even before the accession. The ECJ conceded 
that the ECtHR shall have the final say concerning the interpretation 
of human rights laid down by the ECHR. At the same time, the 
ECtHR established the presumption (subject to rebuttal in indi-
vidual cases) that the level of protection provided to fundamental 
rights by Union law could be considered equivalent to the level of 
protection ensured by the ECHR.125 
1.1.2 The development of primary legal foundations
The accession has been discussed in Europe since 1979, when the 
European Commission first presented a memorandum on the ac-
cession of the EC to the ECHR.126 In 1982 and in 1985 the European 
Parliament asked the Commission to start formal negotiations on 
the accession. On neither occasion however did the Commission 
receive the support of all the EC Members to do so, that is why fi-
nally submitted a formal proposal to the Council in 1990. The Coun-
cil asked the Court of Justice to give its opinion127 on whether 
accession was in conformity with the Treaty on the European Com-
munity. In 1996 the Court found that the European Community 
lacked authority to join the ECHR.128
124  Bosphorus ibid. 165. 
125  Egbert Myjer: Csatlakozhat-e az Európai Unió az Emberi jogok és alapvető 
szabadságok védelméről szóló Európa Tanács-i Egyezményhez? Magyar Jog № 3, 
2007, 174.
126  European Commission – Memorandum on the accession of the European 
Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (4 April 1979), Bulletin of the European Communi-
ties, Supplement 2/79.
127  See TFEU Art. 218(11) [TEC Art. 300(6)].
128  Opinion 2/94 of the Court on Accession by the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (28 
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The ECJ ruled, that 
principle of conferred powers must be respected in both the internal action 
and the international action of the Community. […] No Treaty provision con-
fers on the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human 
rights or to conclude international conventions in this field. […] Accession to 
the Convention would […] entail a substantial change in the […] Community 
system for the protection of human rights in that it would entail the entry of 
the Community into a distinct international institutional system as well as 
integration of all the provisions of the Convention into the Community legal 
order. Such a modification of the system for the protection of human rights in 
the Community, with equally fundamental institutional implications for the 
Community and for the Member States, would be of constitutional significance 
and would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235. It could 
be brought about only by way of Treaty amendment.129
The consequences of the EC becoming a member of another inter-
national organization were presumably regarded as problematic by 
the Court of Justice; therefore, it ruled that Article 235 of the TEC 
[later Article 308, now Article 352 of the TFEU] did not constitute 
a suitable legal basis for accession.130
Then it was more than half a decade later, during the process of 
Union constitution-making, that the Working Group of the Euro-
pean Convention (February 2002- July 2003) in charge of matters 
relating to fundamental rights formulated the idea that the Conven-
tion should make a political decision on the need to accede. The 
main political and legal arguments in favour of accession – also 
debated during European constitution-making – included the fol-
lowing: 
(1) As the Union reaffirms its own values through its Charter, its 
accession to the ECHR would give a strong political signal of the 
coherence between the Union and the European human rights 
system taken in a wider sense. (2) Accession to the ECHR would 
March 1996) [ECR 1996, I-1759]
129  Opinion 2/94 of the Court on Accession by the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (28 
March 1996) [ECR 1996, I-1759] points 24, 27, 34. and 35.
130  Blutman ‘Az Európai Unió joga’ 484.
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give citizens an analogous protection vis-à-vis acts of the Union as 
they presently enjoy vis-à-vis all the member states, which is par-
ticularly justified by the fact that member states have transferred 
substantial competences to the Union. (3) Accession would be the 
ideal tool to ensure a harmonious development of the case law of 
the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts in human rights matters.131 
It would not affect the autonomy of Community (or Union) law or 
the authority of the European Court of Justice, nor would it lead to 
hierarchical relations between the two Courts, since the Luxembourg 
Court would remain the sole supreme arbiter of questions relating 
to the Community (Union) legal order and the ECtHR, as a special-
ised court, would exercise some type of external control over the 
international law obligations of the Union resulting from accession 
to the ECHR. Consequently, the position of the Court of Justice 
would be analogous to that of national constitutional or supreme 
courts in relation to the Strasbourg Court at present. However, when 
analysing the relationship between the two courts, the question of 
hierarchical relations between the CJEU and ECtHR cannot be 
avoided. This is so because if Union citizens are not granted the 
required rights protection in proceedings before the CJEU – simi-
larly to the situation when they are not granted adequate rights 
protection by their member states – nothing will prevent them from 
having recourse to the Strasbourg Court with reference to the ECHR. 
Since the Union would be bound by the ECHR, the interpretation 
of the ECtHR would also be binding on it. All this would eventu-
ally result in the human rights case-law of the ECtHR taking prece-
dence over the respective case-law of the CJEU; therefore, a process 
of unification would be likely to take place in European human 
rights protection. Naturally, homogenization would have positive 
131  Callewaert emphasized relate to harmony, that the effectiveness of funda-
mental rights must not be reduced by needlessly increasing the plurality and 
relativism of their definition and content. Legal uncertainty is incompatible with 
the notion of fundamental rights. Johan Callewaert: The European Convention 
on Human Rights and European Union Law: A Long Way to Harmony, European 
Human Rights Law Review № 6, 2009, 783.
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effects on human rights protection, at the same time, it would elim-
inate from human rights jurisdiction the phenomenon best described 
as “integration sensitivity”, which has always characterised the ju-
risprudence of the CJEU. During the interpretation of fundamental 
rights, the ECtHR would not be able to have regard to the Union’s 
current objectives and structure (which are – conspicuously – ac-
corded a significant role in the practice of the CJEU) or the degree 
of integration, since the very same human rights standard should 
be applicable to the Union and other contracting states of the ECHR. 
However, all these problems could be solved by the provision of 
the Charter referring to interpretation in conformity with the ECHR, 
which allows derogation from the requirement of identical content 
and scope of fundamental rights only in a positive direction: only 
insofar as the Union acquis guarantees a higher level of protection. 
(4) Beyond the direct relationship, the Union will also be able to 
appear as a party in proceedings conducted before the ECtHR in 
Strasbourg in cases indirectly connected with Community (or Union) 
law, in other words, in connection with member states’ compliance 
with their obligations relating to the Community (Union). 
On the other hand, the problem was also raised that the opening 
of the Strasbourg Court would have two practical-technical draw-
backs: the prolongation of proceedings and the excessive workload 
of the ECtHR. As a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain, which opened 
up the possibility of legal remedy to the citizens of former Com-
munist states as well, the Strasbourg Court has clearly come close 
to the limits of its capacity. The possibility of referring Union pro-
ceedings to the ECtHR would render the situation even more com-
plicated.132 In spite of all this – in view of the long past the ECtHR 
can look back on in matters relating to the protection and interpre-
tation of fundamental rights – Strasbourg could make a significant 
contribution to the Union’s system of fundamental rights protection 
and connect it into the European system. 
132  Edgar Stieglitz: Allgemeine Lehren im Grundrechtsverständnis nach der EMRK 
und der Grundrechtsjudikatur des EuGH, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 
2002, 227.
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In consideration of all of the above, on the recommendation of 
the Convention, the EU Constitution also laid down the authorisation 
enabling the Union to accede to the ECHR.133 As a result, at the time 
of signing the EU Constitution in 2004, it became clear that because 
all member states of the Union were parties to the ECHR, accession 
– alongside the recognition of the legally binding force of the Char-
ter – would be the most obvious possibility to improve human rights 
protection.  
1.1.3 Preparation by the Council of Europe for the  
         EU’s accession 
Right from the beginning it was clear that the actual realization of 
accession was a political issue falling within the competence of the 
Council of Europe and it required unanimity with regard to the 
conditions and reservations. In order to accomplish it, the ECHR 
itself had to be amended because in accordance with its provisions 
only states were allowed to accede to it. At the time of the creation 
of the ECHR there were no prospects of the participation of a su-
pranational organization.  
The Steering Committee for Human Rights of the CE, (hereinaf-
ter referred to as CDDH) summarized the legal and technical ques-
tions of EC/EU accession in a  study as early as 2002.134 The 
Committee expressly refrained from taking a political position on 
the accession and also avoided the examination of questions falling 
within the decision-making competence of the EC/EU.  The study 
distinguished between three levels of provisions to be amended: 
(a) amendments to the text of provisions already contained in the 
133  Treaty Establishing the Constitution for the Eurpean Union Art. I-9(2) and 
Protocol 32.
134  Study of technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights. Report adopted by the Steering Committee for 
Human Rights (CDDH) at its 53rd meeting (25-28 June 2002) DG-II(2002)006 
[CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2]
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ECHR and its additional Protocols, (b) supplementary provisions, 
the interpretation or content of which would change (e.g. national 
or citizen), and (c) any technical and administrative changes not 
pertaining to the text of the Convention (such as the budgetary 
contribution of the EC/EU). Apart from the above, the study also 
made mention of the ancillary agreements that would be affected 
by the accession (e.g. the European Agreement relating to Persons 
Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Sixth Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Council of Europe.)135 The questions of a new 
additional protocol to be attached to the ECHR and of an accession 
treaty to be concluded between the EC/EU and the CE member 
states were still regarded as alternatives by the CDDH study. The 
Committee would have preferred the latter with a view to avoiding 
the lengthiness of the double procedure and ratification. (However, 
bearing in mind the excessive workload of the ECtHR and the need 
for procedural reform, it subsequently realized that adopting a new 
additional protocol would be inevitable.) In 2002 it was still uncer-
tain whether the EC or the EU would accede to the ECHR, therefore, 
the study reckoned with both possibilities, at the same time, it made 
a reference to the Laeken Declaration, which, at the time of the 
definition of the mandate of the European Convention, provided 
for the establishment of the EU as a legal person in international 
law. In other words, during the preparatory process the CE tried to 
comment continuously on the trends of development of the EU and 
of human rights protection in the Union. 
From the point of view of the modification of the text of the ECHR 
the primary question was Article 59, which enabled only states to 
ratify the Convention. Furthermore, provisions of the ECHR refer-
ring to a state or states also needed to be changed.136 It also had to 
be clarified in what way the EC/EU was to participate in the Com-
mittee of Ministers supervising the enforcement of the judgments 
135  DG-II(2002)006 [CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2] Chapter I point I. 2-3.
136  ECHR Arts. 10(1), 11(2), 17, 27(2)-(3), 38(1.a), 56(1) and (4), 57(1)
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of the ECtHR.137 A question of even greater significance was that 
after the accession, apart from the possibility of the EC/EU being 
sued independently before the ECtHR, based on what procedure 
the EC/EU should intervene in proceedings taken against its mem-
ber state(s), and how the EC/EU could later become involved as 
co-defendant in the proceedings of the ECtHR. As for inter-state 
affairs (Article 33 of the ECHR), the question arose as to whether 
this procedure could be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing 
Article 7 of the TEU (namely, where a member state has seriously 
infringed the principles of democracy, rule of law, liberty or respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms). According to the 
study, in the final analysis, this decision depends on the agreement 
reached between the EC/EU and its member states.138 Finally, men-
tion should be made of the fact that the CDDH study considered it 
desirable to set up the office of a Strasbourg judge representing the 
EC/EU, because it would be advantageous from the point of view 
of equal representation of each legal system and legitimacy of deci-
sions. In consideration of the above reasons, it is not possible to 
support the theoretical counter-argument claiming that there would 
be no need for a judge elected in respect of the EC/EU as there were 
judges on the Court elected in respect of each of the member states. 
Similarly, ad hoc participation by the EC/EU in the work of the 
Strasbourg Court does not seem a good solution either (ad hoc EC/
EU judge), regarding the fact that a) it would have to be decided 
for each case whether it involved Community law or not, which 
may cause difficulties in practice, b) ad hoc appointments would 
complicate the Court’s procedure and they would be an extra bur-
den for the Court, c) as ad hoc judges are not elected by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly, there would be a problem of legitimacy with 
respect to the EC/EU judge. The CDDH also thought that consid-
eration should also be given to the question of whether it would be 
necessary to introduce a special procedure under which the ECJ 
137  DG-II(2002)006 [CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2] Chapter II part A)
138  DG-II(2002)006 [CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2] Chapter II part B)
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would be authorised to request a preliminary ruling on the inter-
pretation of the ECHR from the European Court of Human Rights. 
An advantage of this would be that it would assist in avoiding di-
vergences in case-law. On the other hand, it would have the disad-
vantage of creating an imbalance between the EC/EU and the other 
Contracting Parties to the Convention, the supreme courts of which 
would not be able to benefit from a system of references, furthermore 
– and this is an even more powerful counter-argument – it would 
lead to a prolongation of the proceedings.139 
Based on the preparatory work of the CDDH, the Committee of 
Ministers of the EC adopted numerous measures in order to ensure 
the effective implementation of the ECHR both at the national and 
European levels. Protocol № 14 of the ECHR was prepared within 
this framework. It inserted a new paragraph 2 in Article 59 of the 
Convention stating that the European Union was allowed to accede 
to the Convention. This concise “opening clause” became included 
in the ECHR through Protocol № 14 with a view to the draft Con-
stitution of the EU in response to the “enabling authorisation” for-
mulated by the European Convention. However, “opening up” the 
ECHR to the EU is only the starting point of the accession process. 
In order to achieve this aim, there is a need to further modify the 
ECHR and to sign an accession treaty with the EU. At the time of 
the formulation of Protocol № 14 it was still not possible to conduct 
talks on questions of detail relating to the accession, since the EU 
had no authority to do so.140 Due to the failure to ratify the Consti-
tution of the EU, the elaboration and adoption of the Luxembourg 
Treaty and the prolonged ratification of Protocol № 14 of the ECHR 
(as a result of which it entered into force only on 1 June 2010), the 
CDDH was not able to continue work relating to the preparation 
of the accession until 2010. Accession talks began on 15 March 2011. 
139  DG-II(2002)006 [CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2] Chapter II part C) 
140  Myjer ‘Csatlakozhat-e’ 170–171.
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1.2 The legal basis of the accession
EU accession to the ECHR had two conditions in public interna-
tional law. One was the authorisation of the EU enabling it to accede 
to the Convention, in other words, ensuring a legal basis for this in 
the founding treaty, which in turn was preconditioned on the EU 
being a legal person in international law [The last sentence of para-
graph 3 of Article 1 of the TEU states: “The Union shall replace and 
succeed the European Community.”]  Article 6 of the Constitution 
of the European Union explicitly laid down the EU’s legal personal-
ity and the Lisbon Treaty adopted this solution: Article 47 of the 
TEU declares that the Union shall have legal personality. 
In accordance with para 2 of Article 6 of the TEU, the EU, being 
a legal person, may accede to the ECHR, so, the authorisation does 
not enable it to become a member of the Council of Europe. This 
one-sided authorisation imposes an obligation on the Union and 
its institutions; at the same time, it does not enable the ECtHR to 
check on the decisions of the ECJ, since this will become possible 
only following the formal accession.141 The conditions pertaining 
to the accession are specified in the Protocol (№ 8) attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty.
The other condition was the amendment of the ECHR in order 
to enable the EU to accede to it, since under the original version 
only states could become parties to the ECHR. This obstacle was 
removed by Protocol № 14 of the ECHR, which entered into force 
on 1 June 2010. In addition, Protocol № 14 also carries out the reform 
of the ECtHR, which, in spite of not being a comprehensive reform, 
renders the control mechanism sustainable in the medium run.142 
141  Rainer Arnold: Fundamental Rights in the European Union, in Nadiezda 
Siskova (ed.): The Process of Constitutionalisation of the EU and Related Issues, Eu-
ropa Law Publishing, Amsterdam, Groningen, 2008, 37.
142  On the reform see Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet: Új távlatok az európai alap-
jogvédelemben, Hatályba lépett az Egyezmény 14. Kiegészítő Jegyzőkönyve, 
Közjogi Szemle № 3, 2010, 33. 
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1.2.1 The accession process 
In accordance with Article 1 of Protocol № 8 attached to the Lisbon 
Treaty,143 the agreement relating to the accession of the Union to 
the ECHR provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union shall make provision for preserving the specific characteris-
tics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to: (a) the 
specific arrangements for the Union’s possible participation in the 
control bodies of the European Convention; (b) the mechanisms 
necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-member states and 
that individual applications are correctly addressed to member 
states and/or the Union as appropriate. 
According to Articles 2-3 of the Protocol, the agreement shall 
ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competenc-
es of the Union or the powers of its institutions. Furthermore, it 
shall ensure that nothing contained in the agreement affects the 
situation of member states in relation to the European Convention, 
in particular in relation to the Protocols attached to it, measures 
taken by member states derogating from the European Convention 
in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention and reservations 
to the European Convention made by member states in accordance 
with Article 57 of the Convention. None of the provisions mentioned 
in Article 1 affect Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
European Union, under which EU member states undertake not to 
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for 
in the Treaties. Consequently, it is not possible to resort to Article 
33 of the ECHR pertaining to inter-state affairs. 
The above were confirmed by member states in the Declaration 
on Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union.144 The declaration 
states: “The Conference agrees that the Union’s accession to the 
143  Protocol (№ 8) Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on 
the Accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
144  Declaration 2 on Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms should be arranged in such a way as to preserve 
the specific features of Union law. In this connection, the Conference 
notes the existence of a regular dialogue between the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights; such dialogue could be reinforced when the Union accedes 
to that Convention.”
On 7 July 2010, official talks began between the European Com-
mission and the Council of Europe on the European Union’s acces-
sion to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. The negotiators of the European Com-
mission and the members of the ad hoc Working Group of the Steer-
ing Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
(CDDH-UE) have conducted regular talks since 7 July 2010 in order 
to elaborate the accession treaty. The Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe has appointed 30 June 2011 as the final date for 
concluding talks.145
Theoretical and technical questions to be clarified during the 
accession process – on the basis of Protocol № 8, Declaration № 2 
and the CDDH study of 2002 – include which Protocols of the Con-
vention the EU is going to join, in what form the EU will participate 
in the organs of the Council of Europe, what will characterize the 
relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR, the basic principle of 
which is co-ordination. The specific features of Union law must be 
preserved, and dialogue and cooperation must prevail in legislation 
and the application of law. Furthermore, it must be ensured that 
accession would not affect the relationship of member states to the 
ECHR, the competences of the European Union and in particular, 
the ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction to interpret EU law and also that, if 
necessary, both the EU and the member state would be enabled to 
appear as parties before the ECtHR (co-defendants, joinder of 
parties).146
145  Szalayné ‘Új távlatok’ 36., 39. On the deadline see also the document of CDDH 
№ (2010)008. on 3 June 2010. 
146  See more Szalayné ‘Új távlatok’ 36–37.
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After the end of this process the accession treaty shall be signed 
by the 47 Contracting States of the ECHR and the EU and it will be 
ratified by the member states of the Council of Europe (including 
EU member states) in accordance with Article 59 (1) of the Conven-
tion.
In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 218 (8) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Union’s 
accession to the ECHR requires a unanimous decision of the Coun-
cil and the consent of the European Parliament [Point a) ii of Article 
218 (6)]. The decision concluding this agreement shall enter into 
force after it has been approved by the member states in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements [second subpara-
graph of Article 218 (8)].147
1.2.2 The position taken by the CJEU and the ECtHR  
          concerning accession 
During the process of direct preparations for the accession, the 
CJEU emphasized the following.148 The accession of the EU, being 
a regional integration organization, may take place in special cir-
cumstances that are different from the conditions laid down for the 
accession of states. In accordance with Article 6 of the TEU, acces-
sion cannot extend the competences of the Union, and having re-
gard to Protocol № 8, which has a binding force equivalent to that 
of the Treaties, the accession treaty must provide for preserving the 
special features of the Union and Union law. A special feature of 
the Union and its legal order is that, as a general rule, it affects in-
dividuals only through interposed national means of implementa-
147  Szalayné ‘Új távlatok’ 39.
148  Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain 
aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Luxembourg, 5 May 
2010. curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_
en_2010-05-21_12-10-16_272.pdf
73european challenges of human rights protection 
tion and application of law. Therefore individuals who wish to have 
their fundamental rights protected against the acts of the Union 
must usually apply to the national authorities and, in particular, to 
the courts of the member states. If in a specific case the individual 
is not satisfied with the protection ensured at the national level, on 
having exhausted the possibilities of application for legal remedy 
at the national level, he may take action against the member state 
concerned before the ECtHR. Through such an action an individ-
ual can also indirectly challenge a Union act when challenging the 
national provision implementing it. With regard to the Union’s ac-
cession to the ECHR, this special feature of the Union legal system 
must be considered in the context of the principles governing the 
functioning of the control mechanism established by the ECHR, 
having particular attention to the principle of subsidiarity. 
In January 2011 the presidents of the ECtHR and the Luxembourg 
Court made the first joint communication on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR.149 In the communication the presidents of the two Courts 
confirmed the above. They stressed that the preliminary ruling 
procedure under Article 267 of the TFEU could not be regarded 
a legal remedy to be exhausted before the applicant was allowed 
to apply to the ECHR. They also emphasized that such procedure 
should be put in place which did not require the amendment of the 
ECHR and took account of the characteristics of the two judicial 
systems. As the presidents of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts 
stated in their joint communication, “it is guaranteed that the review 
exercised by the ECHR will be preceded by the internal review car-
ried out by the CJEU and that subsidiarity will be respected”. They 
took the view that the results of their discussion can usefully be 
made known in the context of the negotiations on accession ongo-
ing between the Council of Europe and the EU. The courts are de-
termined to continue their dialogue on these questions which are 
149  See www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/02164A4C-0B63-44C3-80C7-FC594 
EE16297/0/2011 Communication_CEDHCJUE_EN.pdf
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of considerable importance for the quality and coherence of the 
case-law on the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. 
1.3 Draft Accession Agreement and the CJEU
As the final report on the negotiations150 summarizes: 
The CDDH-UE held in total eight working meetings with the European Com-
mission between July 2010 and June 2011. The CDDH submitted a report to 
the Committee of Ministers on the work carried out by the CDDH-UE, with 
draft legal instruments appended, on 14 October 2011. 
On 13 June 2012, the Committee of Ministers gave a new mandate to the CDDH 
to pursue negotiations with the EU, in an ad hoc group (“47+1”), with a view 
to finalising the legal instruments setting out the modalities of accession of 
the EU to the Convention.
The “47+1” group held five negotiation meetings with the European Commis-
sion. At the 5th negotiation meeting, the participants agreed on the draft revised 
instruments at the  negotiators’ level.
The draft revised instruments on the accession of the EU to the ECHR consist 
of a draft Agreement on the accession,151 a draft declaration by the EU, a draft 
rule to be added to the Rules of Committee of Ministers for the supervision of 
the execution of the judgments, and of the terms of friendly settlements in 
cases to which the EU is a party, a draft Model of Memorandum of Understand-
ing, and a draft explanatory report to the Accession Agreement. They all form 
a package and are equally necessary for the accession.
Firstly, before signature, an opinion of the CJEU would be sought on the com-
patibility of the draft agreement with the EU Treaties. 
150  Fifth negotiation meeting between the CDDH ad hoc negotiation group and 
the European Commission on the accession of the European Union to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 47+1(2013)008rev2, Strasbourg, 10 June 2013, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/UE_Report_CDDH_ENG.pdf
151  Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 47 + 
1(2013)008rev2
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To bothersome surprise and disappointment of many, the main 
findings of the CJEU in Opinion 2/13152 were the following:153
1. The review which the Court of Justice is called upon to carry out in the 
context of the Opinion procedure is closely circumscribed by the Treaties; 
therefore, if it is not to encroach on the competences of the other institu-
tions responsible for drawing up the internal rules necessary in order to 
make an accession agreement operational, the Court must confine itself to 
examining the compatibility of that agreement with the Treaties and sat-
isfy itself not only that it does not infringe any provision of primary law but 
also that it contains every provision that primary law may require. It follows 
from this that the assessments relating to those internal rules are irrelevant 
to the examination of a request for an Opinion and do not therefore call 
into question the admissibility of that request.
2. The fact that the European Union has a new kind of legal order, the nature 
of which is peculiar to the European Union, its own constitutional framework 
and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure 
and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, has consequences as 
regards the procedure for and conditions of accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is pre-
cisely in order to ensure that that situation is taken into account that the 
Treaties, notably Article 6(2) TEU, Protocol No 8 relating to Article 6(2) TEU 
on the accession of the Union to the ECHR, and the Declaration on Ar-
ticle 6(2) TEU, make accession subject to compliance with various condi-
tions. In performing the task conferred on it by the first subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU, the Court of Justice must review, in the light, in particu-
lar, of those provisions, whether the legal arrangements proposed in respect 
of the European Union’s accession to the ECHR are in conformity with the 
requirements laid down and, more generally, with the basic constitutional 
charter, the Treaties. For the purposes of that review, it must be noted that 
the conditions to which accession is subject under the Treaties are intend-
ed, particularly, to ensure that accession does not affect the specific char-
acteristics of the European Union and EU law.
152  CJEU 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
153  Summary — Opinion of the Court (Full Court), 18 December 2014, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62013CV0002_
SUM&from=EN
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3. The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) as envisaged by the draft agreement is liable ad-
versely to affect the specific characteristics of EU law and its autonomy.
 In the first place, in so far as Article 53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the 
power of the High Contracting Parties to lay down higher standards of 
protection of fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the ECHR, that 
provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, 
so that the power granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is 
limited — with respect to the rights recognised by the Charter that corre-
spond to those guaranteed by the ECHR — to that which is necessary to 
ensure that the level of protection provided for by the Charter and the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised. However, 
there is no provision in the agreement envisaged to ensure such coordina-
tion.
 In the second place, the approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, 
which is to treat the European Union as a State and to give it a role identi-
cal in every respect to that of any other Contracting Party, disregards the 
intrinsic nature of the European Union. In so far as the ECHR would, in 
requiring the European Union and the Member States to be considered 
Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which 
are not Member States of the European Union but also in their relations 
with each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, 
require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed 
fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual 
trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset the under-
lying balance of the European Union and undermine the autonomy of EU 
law.
 In the third place, by failing to make any provision in respect of the relation-
ship between the mechanism established by Protocol No 16 to the ECHR 
(which permits the highest courts and tribunals of the Member States to 
request the European Court of Human Rights to give advisory opinions on 
questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR or the protocols thereto) and 
the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, the 
agreement envisaged is liable adversely to affect the autonomy and effec-
tiveness of the latter procedure. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that 
a request for an advisory opinion made pursuant to Protocol No 16 by 
a court or tribunal of a Member State that has acceded to that protocol could 
trigger the procedure for the prior involvement of the Court of Justice, thus 
creating a risk that the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Arti-
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cle 267 TFEU might be circumvented, a procedure which is the keystone of 
the judicial system established by the Treaties.
4. The envisaged agreement on the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is liable to affect Article 344 
TFEU. The procedure for the resolution of disputes provided for in Article 33 
of the ECHR could apply to any High Contracting Party and, therefore, also 
to disputes between the Member States, or between those Member States 
and the European Union, even though it is EU law that is in issue. The fact 
that Article 5 of the draft agreement provides that proceedings before the 
Court of Justice are not to be regarded as a means of dispute settlement 
which the Contracting Parties have agreed to forgo in accordance with 
Article 55 of the ECHR is not sufficient to preserve the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice, given that Article 5 of the draft agreement merely 
reduces the scope of the obligation laid down by Article 55 of the ECHR, 
but still allows for the possibility that the European Union or Member States 
might submit an application to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), under Article 33 of the ECHR, concerning an alleged violation 
thereof by a  Member State or the European Union, respectively, in 
conjunction with EU law. Thus, the fact that Member States or the European 
Union are able to submit an application to the ECtHR is liable in itself to 
undermine the objective of Article 344 TFEU and, moreover, goes against 
the very nature of EU law, which requires that relations between the Member 
States be governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any 
other law. In those circumstances, only the express exclusion of the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction under Article 33 of the ECHR over disputes between Member 
States or between Member States and the European Union in relation to 
the application of the ECHR within the scope ratione materiae of EU law 
would be compatible with Article 344 TFEU.
5. The arrangements for the operation of the co-respondent mechanism laid 
down by the envisaged agreement on the accession of the European Union 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) do not ensure that 
the specific characteristics of the European Union and EU law are preserved.
 First, the draft agreement provides that if the European Union or Member 
States request leave to intervene as co-respondents in a case before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), they must give reasons from 
which it can be established that the conditions for their participation in the 
procedure are met, and the ECtHR is to decide on that request in the light 
of the plausibility of those reasons. In carrying out that review, the ECtHR 
would be required to assess the rules of EU law governing the division of 
powers between the European Union and its Member States as well as the 
criteria for the attribution of their acts or omissions, in order to adopt a final 
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decision in that regard which would be binding both on the Member States 
and on the European Union. Such a review would be liable to interfere with 
the division of powers between the European Union and its Member States.
 Secondly, the draft agreement provides that if the violation in respect of 
which a High Contracting Party is a co-respondent to the proceedings is 
established, the respondent and the co-respondent are to be jointly respon-
sible for that violation. That provision does not preclude a Member State 
from being held responsible, together with the European Union, for the 
violation of a provision of the ECHR in respect of which that Member State 
may have made a reservation in accordance with Article 57 of the ECHR. Such 
a consequence is at odds with Article 2 of Protocol No 8 relating to Arti-
cle 6(2) TEU on the accession of the Union to the ECHR, according to which 
the accession agreement is to ensure that nothing therein affects the situ-
ation of Member States in relation to the ECHR, in particular in relation to 
reservations thereto.
 Thirdly, the draft agreement provides for an exception to the general rule 
that the respondent and co-respondent are to be jointly responsible for 
a violation established, by virtue of which the ECtHR may decide that only 
one of them is to be held responsible for that violation. A decision on the 
apportionment as between the European Union and its Member States of 
responsibility for an act or omission constituting a violation of the ECHR 
established by the ECtHR is also one that is based on an assessment of the 
rules of EU law governing the division of powers between the European 
Union and its Member States and the attributability of that act or omission. 
Accordingly, to permit the ECtHR to adopt such a decision would also risk 
adversely affecting the division of powers between the European Union 
and its Member States.
6. The arrangements for the operation of the procedure for the prior involve-
ment of the Court of Justice provided for by the envisaged agreement on 
the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) do not enable the specific characteristics of the European 
Union and EU law to be preserved.
 In the first place, it is necessary for the question whether the Court of 
Justice has already given a ruling on the same question of law as that at 
issue in the proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) to be resolved only by the competent EU institution, whose deci-
sion should bind the ECtHR. To permit the ECtHR to rule on such a ques-
tion would be tantamount to conferring on it jurisdiction to interpret the 
case-law of the Court of Justice. Yet the draft agreement does not contain 
anything to suggest that that possibility is excluded.
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bringing a matter before the Court of Justice in order for it to rule on a ques-
tion of interpretation of secondary law by means of the prior involvement 
procedure. If the Court of Justice were not allowed to provide the definitive 
interpretation of secondary law, and if the ECtHR, in considering whether 
that law is consistent with the ECHR, had itself to provide a particular in-
terpretation from among the plausible options, there would most certainly 
be a breach of the principle that the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the definitive interpretation of EU law. Accordingly, limiting the 
scope of the prior involvement procedure, in the case of secondary law, 
solely to questions of validity adversely affects the competences of the 
European Union and the powers of the Court of Justice in that it does not 
allow the Court to provide a definitive interpretation of secondary law in 
the light of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR.
7. The envisaged agreement on the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) fails to have regard to the 
specific characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial review of acts, 
actions or omissions on the part of the European Union in common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) matters. As EU law now stands, certain acts 
adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review 
by the Court of Justice. That situation is inherent to the way in which the 
Court’s powers are structured by the Treaties, and, as such, can only be 
explained by reference to EU law alone. Nevertheless, on the basis of ac-
cession as provided for by the agreement envisaged, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) would be empowered to rule on the compatibil-
ity with the ECHR of certain acts, actions or omissions performed in the 
context of the CFSP, and notably of those whose legality the Court of Justice 
cannot, for want of jurisdiction, review in the light of fundamental rights. 
Such a situation would effectively entrust the judicial review of those acts, 
actions or omissions on the part of the European Union exclusively to 
a non-EU body, albeit that any such review would be limited to compliance 
with the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. Jurisdiction to carry out a judicial 
review of acts, actions or omissions on the part of the European Union, 
including in the light of fundamental rights, cannot be conferred exclu-
sively on an international court which is outside the institutional and judi-
cial framework of the European Union.
8. The agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights is not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or 
with Protocol No 8 relating to Article 6(2) TEU on the accession of the Union 
to the European Convention on Human Rights.
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1.4 Conclusion
After the landmark opinion of the CJEU, many commentators still 
call for the accession. According to Besselink, Claes and Reest-
man: “And yet it is fully within the Court’s powers to give a nega-
tive opinion. It is, however, not in the power of the Court to decide 
what to do next. So, the decision whether to accede to the ECHR 
is not for the Court to determine. This is ultimately for the mem-
ber states to decide, either qua members of the Council as the EU 
treaty-making power, or qua member states as masters of the EU 
Treaties in the framework of the amendment procedure – this 
follows from Article 218(11) TFEU (though the European Parlia-
ment and Commission will inevitably be involved in both 
instances).”154
But – as usual – there are less optimistic commentaries as well.155 
Tobias Lock explains: “the Court of Justice’s demands will not be 
easily satisfied and if they are, the question arises of whether the 
concessions that would have to be made might result in exactly the 
opposite of what accession was originally meant to achieve: a reduc-
tion in the human rights protection in Europe. Thus it is appropriate 
to ask whether accession is still desirable in light of Opinion 2/13.”156
However, the overwhelming crisis-argumentation (i.e. refugee-, 
Brexit- and rule of law crisis) pushed the question to the background 
of the European political agenda, I am still hopeful that the acces-
sion will proceed. The Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for 
a satisfactory solution to the problem of the relationship between 
the Charter and the ECHR. The Charter takes the Convention as 
setting out the minimum level of protection, while making it clear 
154  Leonard Besselink, Monica Claes and Jan-Herman Reestman: A Constitutio-
nal moment: Acceding to the ECHR (or not), European Constitutional Law Review 
Vol. 11, № 1, 2015, 2–12, 2.
155  S. Peers: The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare, 
German Law Journal Vol. 16, 2015, 222.
156  Tobias Lock: The future of the European Union’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: is it still possible and is it still 
desirable? European Constitutional Law Review Vol. 11, № 2, 2015, 239–273, at 267.
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that the Charter itself may provide for a more extensive level of 
protection. That solution is compatible with the Convention and 
reflects the principle of subsidiarity governing the relationship be-
tween the Convention and the national legal systems. It is further-
more intended to promote harmony between the two instruments 
and to avoid competition between them. The Charter expressly 
states that the meaning and scope of the Charter rights correspond-
ing to the rights guaranteed by the Convention should be inter-
preted consistently with Convention rights.157 Article 53 of the 
Charter contains a “horizontal” clause on non-reversal, which in-
volves the recognition of the other legal mechanisms, in particular 
national constitutions and the international texts on the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, from the time that they 
are ratified by the member states. On the basis of this recognition, 
the principle used is that of the most favourable provision: the level 
of protection guaranteed by the Charter may not be lower than the 
level offered by the provisions of the texts cited, within their respec-
tive fields of application.
These provisions of the Charter and the approximated case law 
of the two European Courts trigger the integration of the European 
human rights standard. The common standards of human rights 
protection result a European network of human rights producing 
network-effects (the more users the more utility, and the more util-
ity is attempting to other potential users). The mutual dialogue of 
judges leads to the constitutional borrowing and migration in the 
field of the fundamental rights cases. The multilevel protection and 
interpretation of generic rights may lead to a race to the top and the 
beneficiaries of the system are the individuals. 
157  Jean-Paul Costa: The Relationship between the European Convention on 
Human Rights and European Union Law – A Jurisprudential Dialogue between 
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, Lecture 
at the King’s College London, 7 October 2008, in Background Documentation, 
Fundamental Rights Protection in EU Law under the Lisbon Treaty, ERA, Trier, 
22-23 April 2010.
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2 Fully binding EU Bill of Rights for the member states  
     – a potential tool in constitutional crisis management
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has 
become part of the primary sources of Union law based on Article 
6 (1) TEU. This reform has been of key importance from the aspect 
of the (constitutional) development of the Union. Ensuring the legal 
binding force of the Charter did not mean a change in the division 
of competences between the Union and the member states. This 
follows, on the one hand, from the guarantees relating to the field 
of application defined in Article 51 of the Charter and, on the other 
hand, from the statement made by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU) that fundamental rights protection guaranteed 
by the Union cannot have the effect of extending the competences 
of the Community defined by the founding treaties,158 which was 
also reinforced by the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the 
TEU. Thus to date the Charter does not replace the national systems 
for fundamental rights protection, instead it just complements them. 
The Charter addresses first and foremost the EU institutions. Mem-
ber states are subject to their own constitutional bill of rights, and 
they have to respect the Charter only insofar as they apply Union 
law. This logic system is challenged sometimes by the CJEU on the 
one hand, by the ambiguous interpretation of the “acting within the 
scope of” criterion, and on the other hand by national courts whose 
questions in the preliminary ruling procedures seem to indicate an 
existing need for enhancing the scope of the Charter beyond the 
application of Union law. However, this soft, case law based expan-
sion of scope is somehow uncertain.159 Thus, the EU law still does 
158  Judgment of the Court of 17 February 1998 in Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-
West Trains Ltd., C-249/96 [ECR 1998, I-621]
159  Michael Dougan: Judicial review of Member State action under the general 
principles and the Charter: defining the “scope of Union law”, Common Market Law 
Review Vol. 52, 2015, 1201–1246.; Bernhard Schima: EU fundamental rights and 
Member State action after Lisbon: putting the ECJ’s case law in its context, Fordham 
International Law Journal Vol. 38,  2015, 1097, 1113–1114. 
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not contain effective mechanism to compel member states to re-
spect fundamental rights in general.
It is worth to mention that already in November 2013 the Euro-
pean Commission started to collect impulses and ideas which may 
contribute to shaping of the European Union’s justice policy over 
the coming years. The forum of the debate on EU justice policies 
was the Assises de la Justice, and the discourse encompassed the 
potential development of civil, criminal and administrative law, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU.160 To stimulate the 
debate five discussion papers were made available. Discussion paper 
on Fundamental Rights posed the question whether the rights guar-
anteed in the Charter should be directly applicable in the member 
states in all cases, by abolishing the limitations of Article 51 of the 
Charter.161 That time I already welcomed and urged the direct ap-
plicability of the Charter in the member states.162 Amongst the in-
terventions of the dialogue one can find the outlines of the rule of 
law mechanism, but the full direct effect of the Charter was not 
fostered.163, 164
Thus in the present contribution I emphasise again the impor-
tance of the direct applicability by collecting some new arguments 
and taking into consideration the deepening constitutional crisis 
in Central Europe.
160  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/discussion_papers_
en.htm
161  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/fundamental_
rights_en.pdf
162  Nóra Chronowski: Enhancing the scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
– problems of the limitations and advantages of directly applicable Charter rights 
with regard to the recent case law developments of the European Court of Justice 
and national courts, Discussion paper, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assis-
es-justice-2013/files/contributions/36.hungarianacademyofsciences__prelimi-
nary_contribution_assises_cfr_chronowski_en.pdf
163  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/interventions_en.htm
164  For a federal approach see Csongor István Nagy: Est-ce que l’union européenne 
devrait avoir le pouvoir de forcer les états membres à respecter les droits de 
l’homme? Une analyse prospective relative à l’application de la charte des droits 
fondamentaux aux états membres, Revue de droit international et de droit comparé № 
3, 2017, 505-522.
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First I outline what I mean by the limited effect and scope of the 
Charter regarding its legislative effect and applicability. In the second 
part I argue for the removal of the legal limitations from the way of 
direct application, taking also its difficulties into account.
2.1 Limited effects and scope of the Charter
Despite its clear significance acknowledged by the jurisprudence, 
the Charter is not able to fulfil its task completely, unless it fully 
contributes to and serves as a basis for the harmonisation of com-
mon European standards of fundamental rights protection. 
2.1.1 Limited legislative effect 
Considering the limitations of the Article 6(1) second sentence of 
the TEU,165 and Article 51(2) of the Charter166 – which are in compli-
ance with the liberal constitutional concept that fundamental rights 
norms do not attribute power, but merely limit the exercise of pow-
ers – the Union cannot directly influence the formation of the com-
mon standards, i.e. it has no legislative competences except of the 
treaty-based rights. In other words, the Commission can propose 
EU legislation that gives concrete effect to the rights and principles 
of the Charter only where the EU has competence to act under the 
TEU or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (here-
inafter: TFEU). This results that the Union content, effect and pro-
tection level of Treaty rights and Charter rights has been developed 
differently – in the former case by secondary legislation and by 
judicial way, in the latter only by case law. 
165  Article 6(1) second sentence of the TEU: “The provisions of the Charter shall 
not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.”
166  Article 51(2) of the Charter: “The Charter does not extend the field of applica-
tion of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power 
or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.”
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The restrictive provisions contained in Article 6(1) of the TEU 
and Article 51(2) of the Charter give expression to the requirement 
that the Charter shall not extend the competences of the Union; in 
other words, Union legislation relating to fundamental rights shall 
continue to be based on specific legal grounds provided in the TEU 
or TFEU, the fundamental rights character of which is merely rein-
forced by the provisions of the Charter.  
The second sentence of Article 6(1) confirms the conviction (or 
phobia in the case of some member states) that the restrictive in-
terpretation of EU competences shall continue to be ensured. Reg-
ulation of such content may be found, for instance, in Article 4(1), 
Article 5(2), Article 6(2) second sentence of the TEU as well as in 
Protocol № 8167 and the – legally non-binding – Declarations 1 and 
2.168 At the same time, the requirement of restrictive interpretation 
relating to Union competences and the exercise of these compe-
tences is unambiguously expressed and reinforced in the principle 
of transferred competences or subsidiarity (in particular Articles 
4-5), therefore, it would not require further repetition. According 
to Pernice, the emphasis on restriction is surprising in the context 
of Article 6 also for the reason that fundamental rights, by their 
nature, are not of power-transferring but rather restrictive character, 
in other words, as regards their content, they appear as limiting the 
exercise of transferred competences (the power-restricting role of 
fundamental rights). This may also be formulated in the way that 
in so far as fundamental rights norms exclude the interference of 
public authorities with particular individual rights and freedoms, 
167  Protocol (№ 8) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon relating to Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Conven-
tion on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (OJ C 83, 30. 
3. 2010, 273)
168  Declaration № 1 concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union and Declaration № 2 on Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, 
annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ C 83, 30. 3. 2010, 337)
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they constitute negative competences for the institutions con-
cerned.169
2.1.2 Uncertain and limited horizontal effect 
The limited effect of the Charter as a legal instrument has also led 
to differences in respect of vertical and horizontal effect of the Char-
ter rights. The vertical effect of the fundamental rights stems from 
the historical function of the rights, which is to protect the indi-
viduals against the state organs and limit the public power. The 
horizontal effect of fundamental rights means that they prevail also 
between individuals; and influence or determine the legal relations 
of private actors. This horizontal or third party effect can be direct 
or indirect. According to the theory of indirect horizontal effect, the 
fundamental rights norm of the constitution is not applicable di-
rectly in private law relations; it is only used as an interpretative 
guide to determine private law relations among individuals inter 
se. The theory of direct horizontal effect represents that the funda-
mental rights enshrined in the constitution are applicable in the 
private relations of the individuals. This results that private or la-
bour law contracts infringing fundamental rights are invalid. This 
idea would however transform the private law claims into human 
rights disputes, and the private law regulation would lose its func-
tion.170 
Naturally it is true, that even in the member states’ constitutional 
practice only the vertical effect of rights is inevitable and in the field 
of the horizontal effect the indirect version is accepted by most ju-
169  I. Pernice: The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights, in S. Griller and 
J. Ziller (eds.): The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional 
Treaty? Springer Verlag, Wien, 2008, 244. 
170  E. Engle ‘Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights’ 165–166., Verica Trstenjak: 
General Report: The Influence of Human Rights and Basic Rights in Private Law, 
in Verica Trstenjak and Petra Weingerl (eds.): The Influence of Human Rights and 
Basic Rights in Private Law, Springer International, Heidelberg, New York, Dord-
recht, London, 2016, 8–9.
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risdictions. Only the Portuguese and Greek constitutions allow direct 
horizontal effect. The European constitutional case law seems to 
differentiate between rights in respect of their direct or indirect 
horizontal effect.171 It is worth to mention that the courts, even the 
CJEU are very careful with the recognition of indirect horizontal 
effect. See e.g. Viking, Laval (on right to collective action, allowing 
indirect horizontal effect) and Dominguez (on right to paid annual 
leave, not granting clearly the horizontal effect) cases,172 or the more 
recent AMS case (on worker’s right to information).173 Although 
certain rulings of the CJEU contain light indications of direct ap-
plicability of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, and 
do not exclude the applicability of the rights “in all situations gov-
erned by EU law”, the potential horizontal effect of Charter rights 
remains an open question.174 Why would it be so important to give 
the chance to EU courts to clarify the horizontal effect of the Charter 
rights by making them fully binding? The EU has strongly commit-
ted175 itself to promote the United Nations Framework Programme 
and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,176 but in the 
absence of a generally applicable bill of rights, the EU courts remain 
171  L.F.M. Besselink ‘General Report’ 91–93.
172  See e.g. Viking, Laval and Dominguez cases (C-438/05 International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ 
Viking Line Eesti, Judgment of the Court of 11 December 2007; C-341/05 Laval 
un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsar-
betareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, Judg-
ment of the Court of 18 December 2007; C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre 
informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre, Judgment 
of the Court of 24 January 2012).
173  In AMS case concerned the question of potential horizontal effect of the work-
ers’ right to information and consultation enshrined in Article 27 of the Charter. 
Against the opinion by Advocate General Cruz Villalón, the Court did not grant 
Article 27 and such effect. C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale v Union 
locale des syndicats CGT and Others, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 
of 15 January 2014.
174  Trstenjak ‘The Influence of Human Rights’ 9.
175  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-
responsibility/index_en.htm
176  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Repre-
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without means to contribute to the effective remedy system against 
the human rights violations of powerful private actors. 
2.2 ‘Within the scope of’ practice
The EU institutions are clearly bound by the Charter,177 thus the 
CJEU has inevitable role in controlling the EU legislature’s compli-
ance with fundamental rights.178 
The idea that member states are bound by the rights, freedoms 
and principles laid down by the Article 51(1) of the Charter179 is 
implemented principally in the ‘agency-situation’ elaborated by the 
CJEU, at two levels: in a normative and administrative dimension. 
The normative level means the dimension when, during the trans-
position – or omitting the transposition – of Union law (directives) 
into the national law, the member state is bound by the fundamen-
tal rights during the adoption of normative decisions. The admin-
istrative level appears in the case of directly applicable Union law 
(regulations): in such a case the law of Union content is regarded 
formally as domestic law right away.180 Furthermore, the respect of 
Charter rights has also been held by the CJEU to apply when a mem-
sentative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 21 March 2011.
177  Article 51(1) of the Charter: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to 
the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity (…)”
178  E.g. C-92/09 and C-93/09. Volker joint cases, Judgment of the Court of 9 
November 2010
179  Article 51(1) of the Charter: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed (…) 
to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall 
therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application 
thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of 
the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.”
180  M. Borowsky: Kapitel VII, Allgemeine Bestimmungen, in J. Meyer (ed.): Kom-
mentar zur Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
2003, 567–572.
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ber state derogates from a fundamental economic freedom guaran-
teed under EU law.181
Considering the CJEU case law related to Article 51(1) of the 
Charter, it is not clear, however, whether the phrase ‘implementing 
Union law’ has got a different meaning from ‘acting within the scope 
of Union law’ thus the margins of member states’ obligation to apply 
the Charter rights remained ambiguous. In other words, the Char-
ter binds the member states as well ‘when implementing Union 
law’, however, the CJEU understands this in a wider sense: member 
states have to respect the fundamental rights ‘acting within the scope 
of’ Union law.182 Thus on the basis of the preliminary ruling of the 
CJEU (Aziz Melki/Sélim Abdeli), seemingly national courts of law 
may apply the Charter directly,183 but only in those cases where any 
Union legal act is concerned. In purely domestic cases the national 
courts apply the bill of rights enshrined in the national constitution, 
and / or international human rights obligations of the given state. 
The extent and intensity of the latter activity is dependent on the 
monist or dualist approach of the national legal system. To date, the 
condition of the direct application of the Charter is the application 
of another Union legal norm.184 
181  See, inter alia, C260/89 ERT, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panel-
linia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and 
Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, Judgment of the Court of 18 
June 1991, para. 42 et seq.; C112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Trans-
porte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, Judgment of the Court of 12 June 2003, 
para 75.; and C36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v 
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Judgment of the Court of 14 October 
2004, paras. 30–31
182  K.L. Mathisen: The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular Article 6 TEU, 
on Member States’ obligations with respect to the protection of fundamental 
rights, University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper Series, Paper № 2010-01, 29 July, 
2010, 20.
183  C-188/10 and C-189/10. Aziz Melki (C-188/10) and Sélim Abdeli (C-189/10) 
joint cases, Judgment of the Court of 22 June 2010 
184  As Rosas pointed out, “(…) the real problem is not so much the applicability 
of the Charter as such but rather the applicability of another norm of Union law.” 
A. Rosas: When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at National 
Level? Jurisprudence Vol. 19, № 4, 2012, 1269–1288.
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In the Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni cases185 the Court has even 
equated ‘implementation’ and ‘acting within the scope of’ Union law, 
and has gone far beyond the textual meaning of ‘implementation’, 
but still remained in the framework of the wide literal interpretation. 
However, according to Lavranos, in these judgments “the ECJ inter-
prets the scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
in particular Articles 51 and 53 of the Charter in a very extensive 
way. The judgments establish the supremacy of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights over national (constitutional) law and the ECHR, 
thereby positioning the ECJ as the «Supreme Court of Fundamental 
Rights» in Europe.”186 Anyway, according to the commentaries, these 
were “ground-braking” decisions,187 triggering the academic debate 
on the scope of the Charter and the role of the EU in the framework 
of the European fundamental rights protection. As to the limitations 
set up in Article 51(1)-(2) of the Charter, the CJEU ruled,
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied 
with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, 
situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law 
without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of Euro-
pean Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the Charter.188
Where, on the other hand, a legal situation does not come within the scope 
of European Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and 
any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis 
for such jurisdiction (…).189
Where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether funda-
mental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in 
a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by 
185  C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of the Court of 26 
February 2013; C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, Judgment of the 
Court of 26 February 2013
186  N. Lavranos: The ECJ’s Judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson: Une 
ménage à trois difficulté, European Law Reporter № 4, 2013, 133.
187  D. Sarmiento: Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National 
Courts and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 
Common Market Law Review Vol. 50, 2013, 1268.
188  C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 21.
189  C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 22.
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European Union law, implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of 
the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national stan-
dards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection 
provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity 
and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised.190
In these judgments the Court declared the effet utile of the Charter, 
and limited the choices of national courts, because they shall com-
pare the national fundamental rights standards with the Charter 
standard even in those situations where the links to the Union law 
are indirect and partial. After all, this judge-made basis created by 
the CJEU is still fragile and uncertain, furthermore, it triggers the 
debate on the borderlines of the application of EU fundamental 
rights and their relations with the national fundamental rights pro-
tection systems.191 The case by case elaborated scope of the Charter 
vis-à-vis member states creates even tensions between the CJEU 
and national constitutional courts, for whom the interpretation of 
fundamental rights is a cherished area and some of them clearly 
indicated the willingness for scrutinizing EU law in the protection 
of domestic standards and constitutional identity. The German Con-
stitutional Court almost immediately and unanimously ruled that 
the Åkerberg Fransson judgment of the CJEU neither changes the 
status quo in respect the scope of the Charter, nor expresses a gen-
eral view.192 The statements of the CJEU’s decision shall be based 
on the distinctive features of the case, otherwise presumably it were 
considered ultra vires by the Constitutional Court.193
190  C-399/11 Melloni, para. 60., Åkerberg Fransson, para. 29.
191  S.I. Sánches: The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights, Common Market 
Law Review Vol. 49, № 5, 2012, 1582.
192  I. Cs. Nagy also shares this view: “Although in the case of Åkerberg Fransson 
the CJEU interpreted the ‘implementation of Union law’ in an extensive sense, 
the principle fundamental constitutional architecture of the EU has not been 
challenged.” Nagy ‘Est-ce que l’union européenne devrait’ 511.
193  On the limits of the scope of application of EU fundamental rights see the 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 24 April 2013 on Counter-Ter-
rorism Database Act (1 BvR 1215/07). See also Sarmiento ‘Who’s Afraid’ 1268., 
Schima ‘EU fundamental rights’ 1106. and D. Thym: Separation versus Fusion – or: 
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The possibilities of the national courts are also limited under the 
present formulation of Article 51(1), although – considering the 
increasing number of references to the Charter in preliminary rul-
ings194 – they would be willing to apply the Charter rights in a broad-
er scope.195 It is worthwhile to add that not all of the constitutional 
courts are reticent with the application of the Charter.196
Against this background, about one year after Åkerberg Fransson 
the CJEU tightened its former interpretation by re-setting a number 
of criteria that should be examined to establish whether national 
legislation “involves the implementation of EU law for the pur-
poses of Article 51 of the Charter” in Siragusa case.197 By doing so, 
the Court became cautious again and showed due deference towards 
national courts and national fundamental rights protection. The 
CJEU ruled, that
[i]n order to determine whether national legislation involves the implementa-
tion of EU law for the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, some of the points 
to be determined are whether that legislation is intended to implement a pro-
How to Accommodate National Autonomy and the Charter? Diverging Visions 
of the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, European 
Constitutional Law Review Vol. 9, № 3, 2013, 395–398.
194  The Commission stated: “The important implications of the Charter are to be 
seen in the increasing number of requests for a preliminary ruling of national 
jurisdictions received by the Court.” COM(2013) 271 final, 2012 Report on the 
Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 7.
195  Besselink admitted that “… in some Member States the courts have referred 
to the Charter with such enthusiasm as to disregard whether the Charter could 
at all be considered applicable”. Besselink ‘General Report’ 108.
196  The Austrian Constitutional Court “concluded that, based on the domestic 
legal situation, it follows from the equivalence principle that the rights guaranteed 
by the [Charter] may also be invoked as constitutionally guaranteed rights (…) 
and they constitute a standard of review in general judicial review proceedings 
in the scope of application of the Charter”. Thus the alleged violation of the Char-
ter may give rise to the competence of the Constitutional Court. U 466/11-18, U 
1836/11-13, Austrian Constitutional Court Judgment of 14 March 2012, point 35. 
See to this Attila Vincze: Az osztrák Alkotmánybíróság döntése az Alapjogi Char-
ta alkalmazandóságáról, Alkotmánybírósági Szemle Vol. 3, № 1, 2013, 126–132.
197  C-206/13. Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Cul-
turali e Ambientali di Palermo, Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 6 March 
2014
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vision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives 
other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting 
EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or 
capable of affecting it.198
Regarding the EU fundamental rights protection, the CJEU clarified 
that it is not an objective in itself, but it has to serve the unity of EU 
law. In other words, the ground for fundamental rights protection 
is their basic value-character but to preserve the primacy of EU 
law.199 Thus the Court refrained from connecting its rights protec-
tion activity with Article 2 TEU, and despite the clarifications the 
judgment clearly shows the fragility of the case law based scope of 
protection.
As to the way ahead, it is still worthwhile to consider Advocate 
General Sharpston’s suggestion, which was formulated in his opinion 
to Zambrano case,
Transparency and clarity require that one be able to identify with certainty 
what ‘the scope of Union law’ means for the purposes of EU fundamental rights 
protection. It seems to me that, in the long run, the clearest rule would be one 
that made the availability of EU fundamental rights protection dependent 
neither on whether a Treaty provision was directly applicable nor on whether 
secondary legislation had been enacted, but rather on the existence and scope of 
a material EU competence. To put the point another way: the rule would be that, 
provided that the EU had competence (whether exclusive or shared) in a par-
ticular area of law, EU fundamental rights should protect the citizen of the EU 
even if such competence has not yet been exercised.200
198  C-206/13. Siragusa, para 25
199  “It is also important to consider the objective of protecting fundamental rights 
in EU law, which is to ensure that those rights are not infringed in areas of EU ac-
tivity, whether through action at EU level or through the implementation of EU 
law by the Member States. The reason for pursuing that objective is the need to 
avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies 
according to the national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, 
primacy and effectiveness of EU law.” C-206/13. Siragusa, paras 31–32.
200  C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM), Opin-
ion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 30 September 2010, para 163.
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2.3 Should the Charter bind the member states fully? 
In this part, the difficulties and advantages of the direct applicabil-
ity of the Charter shall be measured. Eliminating the limitations on 
the Union’s competences and amending the scope of the Charter, 
the British and Polish ‘opt-outs’ from, and other member states con-
cerns about the Charter – especially the fears for the constitutional 
identity and the level of national protection – must be considered. 
The respect of constitutional identity of the member states was im-
plicitly confirmed by the CJEU,201 but the member states may expect 
more explicit guaranties. However, clear advantages of these steps 
would be that (i) the Union could assume a more definite role in 
developing the common standards on fundamental rights,202 (ii) re-
nitent member states endangering these standards might be con-
trolled more effectively even directly by their national courts,203 and 
(iii) they could evolve the effect of Article 2 TEU, or moreover, it can 
contribute to the reform of Article 7 TEU, which remained a kind of 
political – and practically inapplicable – sanction of violating the 
Union values. The Charter with direct applicability beyond the scope 
of EU law – being the part of the primary sources of EU law – will 
201  See to this e.g. the Omega-judgment (C-36/02. Omega Spielhallen- und Au-
tomatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Judg-
ment of the Court of 14 October 2004) and the Sayn-Wittgenstein judgment 
(C-208/09. Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgment 
of the Court of 22 December 2010)
202  As Bogdandy suggests, “the core idea of European law is no longer more and 
more integration (ever closer union) but to provide a common legal space that 
advances common aims under common values”. (Armin von Bogdandy: Euro-
pean Law Beyond ‘Ever Closer Union’ – Repositioning the Concept, its Thrust, 
and the ECJ’s Comparative Methodology, European Law Journal Vol. 22, № 3, 2016, 
519–538.) Still, the common standards of fundamental rights protection are ex-
actly such aims and values that Union and member states laws shall equally 
protect.
203  See the actions taken by the Commission to ensure the respect of the Charter 
by Hungary, especially C-286/12 European Commission v Hungary, Judgment of 
the Court of 6 November 2012 (compulsory retirement of judges, prosecutors and 
notaries), where the national constitutional court avoided the application of the 
Charter.
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have much stronger position than the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) whose applicability is dependent 
on the monist or dualist approach of the member states to interna-
tional law. It could contribute to the creation of a European Funda-
mental Rights Area and guarantee the Union citizens an equal and 
calculable level of protection.204
2.3.1 Difficulties – are they really significant? 
To make the Charter generally binding on member states and di-
rectly applicable by national courts, definitely an explicit amend-
ment is necessary.205 Viviane Reding, former Vice-President of the 
European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner also admitted, 
A very ambitious Treaty amendment – which I would personally favour for 
the next round of Treaty change – would be abolishing Article 51 of our Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights, so as to make all fundamental rights directly ap-
plicable in the Member States, including the right to effective judicial review 
(Article 47 of the Charter). (…)This would open up the possibility for the 
Commission to bring infringement actions for violations of fundamental rights 
by Member States even if they are not acting in the implementation of EU law. 
I admit that this would be a very big federalising step. It took the United States 
more than 100 years until the first ten amendments started to be applied to 
the states by the Supreme Court.206 
204  A. Jakab: Supremacy of the EU Charter in National Courts in Purely Domestic 
Cases, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/ungarn-was-tun-andras-jakab/#.Un-
652RAtb5R 
205  It is worth to note that the Charter is not part of the treaty, thus the formal 
amendment procedure is open to discussion. Sándor-Szalay and Mohay suggests 
the convention method for the amendment, which is defined by Article 48 of TFEU. 
Á. Mohay and E. Sándor-Szalay: Hungary, in J. Laffranque (ed.): The Protection of 
Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon: The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National 
Constitutions, Tartu University Press, Tallinn, 2012, 520.
206  European Commission – SPEECH/13/67704/09/2013, The EU and the Rule 
of Law – What next? http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-677_en.htm
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At this point it cannot be suppressed that serious concerns were 
raised on the scope of the Charter during the debate of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Member states offering the most active resistance were the 
Czech Republic, Poland and the United Kingdom. Finally, in a Pro-
tocol annexed to the Lisbon Treaty (to simplify: the Opt-Out 
Protocol),207 the UK and Poland were granted exemption from re-
spect for certain rights and principles. The real opt-out nature of 
this exemption is, however, questionable both from the aspects of 
form and content. From a formal aspect its authenticity is doubtful 
because the Opt-Out Protocol, itself, declares: the Charter reaffirms 
the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in the Union and 
makes those rights more visible, but does not create new rights or 
principles. Therefore, there is no regulative content from which 
exemption could be granted, since in a legal sense the Charter does 
not add new rights to the range of earlier rights and obligations.208 
On this basis, the opt-out does not have a genuine legal effect; it 
rather has the character of a clarification.209 From the aspect of con-
tent the most important question is in what situations national 
courts or the CJEU may establish that the national law is in conflict 
with the fundamental rights of the Union. For instance, shall the 
CJEU be entitled to question the validity of a piece of legislation of 
a member state with reference to conflict with the Charter and the 
violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by it? It is clear that the 
Court cannot annul laws of the member states; only national courts 
(constitutional courts) are competent to do so. At the same time, 
the CJEU may find – in proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation 
or in the preliminary ruling procedure (Articles 258 and 267 TFEU) 
– that the national law is in conflict with Union law. The Czech 
207  Protocol (№ 30) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon on the Application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the Unit-
ed Kingdom (OJ C 83, 30. 3. 2010, 313)
208  Pernice ‘The Treaty of Lisbon’ 245. 
209  C. Barnard: The ‘Opt-out’ for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights: Triumph or Rhetoric over the Reality, in S. Griller – J. Ziller 
(eds.): The Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? Sprin-
ger Verlag, 2008, 276.
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Republic annexed a Declaration to the Treaties,210 in which it em-
phasizes the limited binding force of the Charter on member states, 
the prohibition of extending the Union’s competences and the im-
portance of constitutional traditions common to the member states 
and that of international agreements. The similar declarations by 
Poland concern legislation relating to the sphere of family, public 
morality, family law, as well as the protection of human dignity and 
human integrity.211 These declarations have no binding force, i.e., 
they do not grant exemption from the effect of the Charter in the 
way that the Opt-Out Protocol does. Altogether – even if the above 
reflected protocol and declarations are not completely convincing, 
they clearly indicate that – an amendment for enhancing the scope 
of the Charter is expected to be a harshly debated step by certain 
member states, thus cautious political preparation is necessary. 
However, after the Brexit referendum in the UK – may decide its 
people either remain or leave – a treaty reform seems to be inevi-
table, which may reopen the debate on the scope of the Charter.
The constitutional identity of the member states is also a strong 
argument in the dispute on federal development of the EU. It might 
be a point of reference during the discussions that the extension of 
the scope of the Charter undermines the constitutional identity of 
the member states. However, besides affirming the shared values, 
the TEU also declares that the Union shall respect the national 
identities of its member states, as inherent part of their political and 
constitutional structures.212 The definition emphasises the consti-
210  Declaration № 53 by the Czech republic on the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. 
211  Declaration № 61 – Declaration by the Republic of Poland on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Declaration № 62 – Declaration by 
the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relation to Poland and the Unit-
ed Kingdom.
212  Article 4(2) of the TEU: “The Union shall respect the equality of member states 
before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamen-
tal structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential state functions, including ensuring the 
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tutional, political and state aspects, thus in this context the nation-
al identity can be understood (much more) as constitutional (than 
as a cultural) identity. One of the legally relevant questions in this 
respect is who will decide on the content of the constitutional iden-
tity of a member state and on the acts or measures of Union affect-
ing or infringing that constitutional identity. It is clear that 
a relationship of cooperation between the national (constitutional) 
courts and the CJEU is necessary in case of such conflicts, the first 
to determine the constitutional identity case by case, and the latter 
to decide on the meaning of the relevant EU law in dispute. As it is 
based on the case law, the margin of appreciation is given on both 
sides, but the CJEU has confirmed in the Omega judgment the re-
spect of the constitutional identity, when it gave preference to the 
German concept of human dignity against the freedom of servic-
es.213 The obligation to respect the constitutional identity of the 
member states may even mean the restriction of a certain funda-
mental right, as it happened in the Sayn-Wittgenstein case, in which 
the republican identity of Austria was considered stronger value 
than the free movement of citizens in respect of carrying the noble 
title.214
As a result of the multilevel European constitutional development, 
the constitutional traditions of the member states converged in their 
respective content and interpretation, while the single States man-
aged to preserve their own constitutional identity. An EU member 
state is henceforth to a great extent free to decide on its own consti-
tutional structure, which is the basis of its constitutional identity.
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding na-
tional security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each member state.” 
213  See to the Omega-judgment of the CJEU (Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- 
und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn) 
and the Lisbon-judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, 
Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juni 2009, 2 BvE 2/08), and Besselink ‘General 
Report’ 72.
214  See the Sayn-Wittgenstein judgment (C-208/09. Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v 
Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgment of the Court of 22 December 2010) and 
Besselink ‘General Report’ 72.
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The introduction of the direct application of the Charter may reopen 
the debate on the relation of the Charter and the ECHR, the Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg courts. Analysing the existing text of the 
Charter, it can be stated that it provides for a satisfactory solution 
to this problem. The Charter takes the Convention as setting out 
the minimum level of protection, while making it clear that the 
Charter itself may provide for a more extensive level of protection. 
That solution is compatible with the Convention and reflects the 
principle of subsidiarity governing the relationship between the 
Convention and the national legal systems. It is furthermore in-
tended to promote harmony between the two instruments and to 
avoid competition between them. The Charter expressly states that 
the meaning and scope of the Charter rights corresponding to the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention should be interpreted consis-
tently with Convention rights.215 Article 53 of the Charter contains 
a ‘horizontal’ clause on non-reversal,216 which involves the recogni-
tion of the other legal mechanisms, in particular national constitu-
tions and the international texts on the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, from the time that they are ratified by 
the member states. On the basis of this recognition, the principle 
used is that of the most favourable provision: the level of protection 
guaranteed by the Charter may not be lower than the level offered 
by the provisions of the texts cited, within their respective fields of 
application. These provisions of the Charter and the approximated 
case law of the two European Courts trigger the integration of the 
European human rights standard. 
Although the CJEU in opinion 2/2013 rejected the draft agree-
ment on the accession of the EU to the ECHR presuming that it 
215  Costa ‘The Relationship’ 12.
216  Article 53 of the Charter: “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as re-
stricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as rec-
ognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international 
law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States 
are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.”
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would “upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the 
autonomy of EU law”,217 the Strasbourg court in 2016 proved its 
openness to dialogue again, and in Avotiņš judgment218 for the first 
time applied the Bosphorus-presumption219 to a case concerning 
obligations of mutual recognition under EU law. This suggests that 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is still confident in 
the development of the European human rights area.
2.3.2 Advantages
The discussion paper suggests the direct applicability of the Char-
ter by the national courts ‘outside the scope’ of the Union law. Thus 
the national courts can apply – and parties can refer to – the Char-
ter even in purely domestic cases, independently from the applica-
tion of another EU norm. There are two potential versions for the 
extension of the scope of the Charter. The modest version is – in 
accordance with Advocate General Sharpston’s cited proposal – to 
prescribe that member states have to apply the Charter in all fields 
where the Union has competence to act, irrespectively to the fact 
whether the competence was exercised by the Union or not. Of 
course, this version might re-open the debate on the exact division 
of competences between the EU and the member states. A bolder 
step would be the removal of any limitation and creating the full 
217  Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 on the Accession 
of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Compatibility of the draft agreement with 
the EU and FEU Treaties.
218  Avotiņš v. Latvia (Application no. 17502/07) Judgment of 23 May 2016. See 
also Stian Øby Johansen: EU law and the ECHR: the Bosphorus presumption is 
still alive and kicking – the case of Avotiņš v. Latvia, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.
hu/2016/05/eu-law-and-echr-bosphorus-presumption.html
219  The presumption of equivalent protection of ECHR rights by the EU, even 
though the EU is not a party to the ECHR, in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve 
Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (Application no. 45036/98) Judgment of 30 June 
2005.
101european challenges of human rights protection 
direct applicability of the Charter in any situations where Union 
citizens are concerned. 
By the extension of its scope, the Charter norms will acquire 
inevitable and full primary law character, as it reads from Article 
6(1) of the TEU. It does not mean that the individuals would get 
direct access to the CJEU in fundamental rights cases, i.e. the direct 
applicability of the Charter would neither create a rival human rights 
jurisdiction parallel to the ECtHR, nor allow this way a potential 
forum shopping. The amendment of the competences and procedure 
of the CJEU is not necessary. The elimination of the “only when 
they are implementing Union law” criterion simply means that the 
national courts have to apply beyond their domestic bill of rights 
the Charter as well, seek a harmonised interpretation and can ask 
for a preliminary ruling under the Article 267 of the TFEU. As it was 
mentioned above, the level of protection is provided for by the 
guarantees of Article 53 of the Charter, which refers – amongst 
other legal sources – in particular to the constitutions of the mem-
ber states. As Sarmiento demonstrates, it is more than a simple 
minimum standard clause, because the CJEU has construed it as 
a kind of conflict of laws rule for those cases in which both EU and 
domestic fundamental rights can be applicable.220
The preliminary rulings on Charter rights may be useful on the 
one hand even to the ECtHR when it interprets the ECHR in com-
parison with the Charter. On the other hand these kind of judgments 
of the CJEU may serve as a legal evidence to the European Com-
mission when it enters into a treaty infringement procedure or con-
siders the application of Article 7 of the TEU. To date Article 7 is 
a harshly criticized as practically inapplicable norm, because it calls 
for the clear and present danger of the violence of the EU values 
for the initiation of the Council’s procedure and decision. It can be 
presumed that in practice it would mean multitudinous or at least 
numerous proceedings and/or omissions leading to foreseeable 
and certain violation of Article 2 of TEU in a given member state. 
220  Sarmiento ‘Who’s Afraid’ 1288–1289.
102 human rights in a multilevel constitutional area
As Article 7 has never been applied, it also allows the presumption 
that the actors are very cautious and circumspect with initiating 
such procedure, because it cannot be legally supported sufficiently 
when exactly the violation happens, i.e. there is no due evidence 
procedure prescribed by the primary law. The number of preliminary 
ruling procedures, content of the questions put by the national 
courts and the decisions of the CJEU related to the Charter rights 
and the domestic law may clearly indicate if the respect of common 
EU values become doubtful in a certain member state. Hungarian 
and Polish constitutional crises point that despite a range of Venice 
Commission opinions and ECtHR judgments the EU is still not able 
and willing to intervene in the absence of legal basis.
* * *
This short proposal can of course be criticized for being utopian or 
fairly illusory, and can even be labelled as completely unrealistic to 
date. One must however bear in mind that the EU sometimes did 
not spare the efforts to enter into projects surrounded by scepticism. 
In the early 1990’s no one thought that a decade later a convention 
would be called with the mandate of creating a constitution for 
Europe. The Treaty on the European Constitution failed, but sev-
eral of its achievements has survived and has been introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty in a more or less modest way. The Charter is 
definitely the part of the last decades of the evolution of EU law as 
it conceived in June 1999 by the decision of Cologne European 
Council,221 lived its foetal life during the work of Fundamental 
Rights Convention and was born on 7 December 2000, when the 
Presidents of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission pro-
claimed it as an inter-institutional document. The European courts 
started to bring up the child, but it still lives its childhood. I do not 
think that by acquiring the legally binding force under the present 
221  150/99 REV 1 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 2-4 June 
1999, point 44–45.
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formulation the Charter’s evolution came to an end. It is more like 
a beginning, and it is never in vain thinking ahead for Europe and 
on rendering the existing fundamental rights more effective for the 
benefit of individuals.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES  
IN HUNGARY
Introduction – 2010/11 constitution making in Hungary
In Hungary a new constitution, the Fundamental Law (hereinafter 
FL) was promulgated on 25 April 2011 and came into force on 1 
January 2012.222 Its drafting rose to prominence in Europe and 
was severely criticized both by domestic experts223 and Venice 
Commission. After the 2010 parliamentary elections, political 
forces forming a parliamentary majority – possessing two-thirds 
of the seats – have expressed their intention to create a new con-
stitution. In the course of “replacing the old with new” the devel-
opment of another constitutional regime and the writing of the 
FL came about in parallel with the devastation of the previous 
constitutional order with permanent amendments to the former 
Constitution.224 In the background of this policy the unequal fight 
of the Constitutional Court and the governing majority took place 
which might be summarised in the question of ‘who is the final 
arbiter in constitutional matters’,225 and ended in the partial inca-
pacitating of the Constitutional Court by weakening it as a coun-
terbalance of the executive and legislative powers.226 Until the 
Fourth Amendment the Court made cautious efforts to strike 
222  For the official English translation of the Fundamental Law (consolidated 
version with six amendments), see http://www.kormany.hu/download/a/68/ 
11000/The_Fundamental_Law_of_Hungary_01072016.pdf.
223  A. Vincze and M. Varju: Hungary: the New Fundamental Law, European Pub-
lic Law Vol. 18, № 3, 2012, 437–453. 
224  Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary as revised in 
1989–90, in force until 31 December 2011; hereinafter former Constitution.
225  Nóra Chronowski and Márton Varju: Two Eras of Hungarian Constitutionalism: 
From the Rule of Law to Rule by Law, Hague J Rule Law Vol. 8, № 2, 2016, 281–282.
226  See also Zoltán Szente: The Decline of Constitutional Review in Hungary – 
Towards a Partisan Constitutional Court? in Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent 
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down the strivings of the supermajority government acting in the 
parliament.227 Since then and especially after the failed Seventh 
Amendment – as the institutional and competence changes had 
their effect – the Court gives a helping hand to the constitution 
maker, and it is even ready to substitute the constituent will along 
the intents of the government.228
As to the antecedent circumstances of the Hungarian constitution 
making, the political situation was overloaded with the effects of 
the economic world crisis229 and domestic tensions – „cold civil 
war”, „prime minister lied 2006”, „social” referendum 2008 (against 
health system reform and tuition fee), minority government, „expert” 
government for crisis management – thus after an ‘altogether con-
stitutional but unsuccessful governance’ the society was deeply 
divided for the time of 2010 elections. The newly elected two-third 
majority government blamed the past for all the difficulties and the 
former Constitution became one of the scapegoats, which was not 
worth to respect any more.230
Before overviewing ‘the replacement of the old with new’, it is 
worthwhile to report about the constitutional background: how 
does the Hungarian constitutional law regulate the constitution 
making and amending process.
Hungarian Constitutional Development (eds. Zoltán Szente, Fanni Mandák and 
Zsuzsanna Fejes), L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015, 192–196.
227  See to this Nóra Chronowski: The Fundamental Law Within the Network of 
Multilevel European Constitutionalism, in Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent 
Hungarian Constitutional Development (eds. Zoltán Szente, Fanni Mandák and 
Zsuzsanna Fejes), L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015, 223–240.
228  See below the story of the failed Seventh Amendment, and to the role of the 
Constitutional Court Chronowski Nóra and Vincze Attila: Önazonosság és európai 
integráció – az Alkotmánybíróság az identitáskeresés útján, Jogtudományi Közlöny 
Vol. 72, № 3, 2017. 117–132.
229  Zoltán Szente: Breaking and making constitutional rules, The constitutional 
effects of the world economic and financial crisis in Hungary, in Xenophon Con-
tiades (ed.): Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis, 
Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, 245–262.
230  See also Halmai ‘Perspectives’ 121–155.
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Article S of the FL prescribes the rules of constitution making 
and amending. Paragraph (1) stipulates the initiation – in the same 
way as in case of legislative initiatives: “A proposal for the adop-
tion of a new Fundamental Law or for the amendment of the Fun-
damental Law may be submitted by the President of the Republic, 
the Government, any parliamentary committee or any Member 
of the National Assembly.” Paragraph (2) sets down the adoption, 
which does not differ from the majority required by the former 
Hungarian constitution (Act XX of 1949): “For the adoption of 
a new Fundamental Law or the amendment of the Fundamental 
Law, the votes of two-thirds of the Members of the National As-
sembly shall be required.” This – together with Article 1 paragraph 
(2) point a) – expresses that the adoption and the amendment of 
the constitution is the exclusive competence of the National As-
sembly, the supreme organ of popular representation. It is worth-
while to add here, that Article 8 on national referendum in its 
paragraph (3) point a) stipulates: “[n]o national referendum may 
be held on any matter aimed at the amendment of the Fundamen-
tal Law”, thus the electorate is not involved into constitutional 
matters. The people of Hungary may exercise its constitution 
making power stemming from popular sovereignty only indi-
rectly, through the parliament.231
Paragraph (3) of Article S was revised by the Fourth Amendment 
of the FL in 2013, and now it clarifies that in the course of consti-
tution making and constitution amending the head of state (i) 
cannot exercise political veto (i.e. he cannot send back the con-
stitution or the amendment to the parliament for consideration), 
and (ii) his constitutional veto is limited to the initiation of the 
constitutional review of procedural requirements (validity)232 thus 
the substantive constitutional review of the constitution or its 
amendment is excluded: “The Speaker of the National Assembly 
shall sign the adopted Fundamental Law or the adopted amend-
231  Petrétei József: Magyarország alkotmányjoga I, Alapvetés, alkotmányos intézmények, 
Kodifikátor Alapítvány, Pécs, 2013, 132.
232  Ibid.
108 human rights in a multilevel constitutional area
ment of the Fundamental Law within five days and shall send it 
to the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic 
shall sign the Fundamental Law or the amendment of the Funda-
mental Law sent to him within five days of receipt and shall order 
its promulgation in the official gazette. If the President of the Re-
public finds that any procedural requirement laid down in the 
Fundamental Law with respect to adoption of the Fundamental 
Law or the amendment of the Fundamental Law has not been met, 
he or she shall request the Constitutional Court to examine the 
issue. Should the examination by the Constitutional Court not 
establish the violation of such requirements, the President of the 
Republic shall immediately sign the Fundamental Law or the 
amendment of the Fundamental Law, and shall order its promul-
gation in the official gazette.” The formal constitutional review 
(regarding the procedural requirements of the adoption) of the 
FL or its amendment may take place subsequently as well – ac-
cording to Article 24 paragraph (5) point b) – upon the request of 
the Government, one-fourth of the Members of the National As-
sembly, the President of the Curia [Supreme Court of Hungary], 
the Prosecutor General or the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights, but only within thirty days of promulgation. 
Paragraph (4) of Article S provides for the special denotation of 
amendments, which is different from that of legislative acts of par-
liament as the FL and its amendments do not belong to the legal 
acts enumerated in Article T, instead they are special, independent 
and original233 source of law: “The designation of the amendment 
of the FL in its promulgation shall include the title, the serial num-
ber of the amendment and the day of promulgation.”
After the 2010 parliamentary elections, parallel with the declara-
tion of creating a brand new constitution, the permanent amend-
ments of the old Constitution also commenced. These amendments 
can be grouped into two types, one of them are ‘normal’ modifica-
tions and the others are ‘demolishing’ amendments. The ‘normal’ 
233  Petrétei ‘Magyarország alkotmányjoga’ 131.
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modifications are justified, because any new government is au-
thorised to constitutional reforms on the basis of its electoral pro-
gram and experiences of the constitutional practise. However, 
only the minority of the 2010-11 amendments belonged to this 
group:
1. seats in the parliament were reduced to 200 instead of 386,234
2. position of deputy prime minister was introduced,235
3. status of deputy major, other organs of local governments, and 
the transfer of state administration competencies were 
modified,236 
4. clarifications on the legal system, legal acts, rules of ex ante 
norm control were set down,237
5. status of the prosecutor general was reformed to increase its 
independence,238
6. Supervisory Authority of Financial Organisations239 and Na-
tional Media Authority became constitutional organs.240
The subject matters of the ‘demolishing’ amendments were as fol-
lows:
1. nomination of Constitutional Court judges,241
2. freedom of press – creating constitutional basis for a new media 
legislation,242 
234  Act of 25 May 2010 (not exactly this solution was maintained in the FL).
235  Act of 25 May 2010
236  Act/1 of 6 July 2010
237  Act CXIII of 2010 (published on 16 November 2010).
238  Act CXIII of 2010 (published on 16 November 2010).
239  Act CXIII of 2010 (published on 16 November 2010, it was not maintained in 
the FL).
240  Act CLXIII of 2010 (it was not maintained in the FL).
241  Act of 5 July 2010, authorised the governing majority in the parliament to 
nominate the judges unilaterally, without the consent of the opposition.
242  Act/2 of 6 July 2010
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3. judiciary: allowing court clerks to act as judge in certain 
cases,243 
4. special tax on severance pay against bona fides (morals) in pub-
lic service,244
5. limitations on right to be elected for officials of armed 
forces,245
6. limitation of the Constitutional Court’s competence regarding the 
review of acts concerning public finances,246
7. special tax on severance pay – retroactive legislation back to 
five years,247
8. basis for changing pension system in order to get rid of early 
retirement benefits,248
9. nationalisation of local governments’ property,249
10. judiciary: president of the Kúria (Supreme Court) shall be 
elected until 31. December 2011,250
11. president of the Constitutional Court shall be elected by the par-
liament instead of the court itself, and 15 instead of 11 judges 
shall be elected.251 
A pretty clear line of threatening (constitutional) judiciary and un-
dermining rule of law can be observed in this group of amendments, 
243  Act/2 of 11 August 2010
244  Act/2 of 11 August 2010
245  Act/1 of 11 August 2010 (it was not maintained in the FL).
246  Act CXIX of 2010 (published on 19 November 2010, it was announced as 
a temporary limitation, but the FL has maintained).
247  Act CXIX of 2010 (published on 19 November 2010).
248  Act LXI of 2011 (published on 14 June 2011).
249  Act CXLVI of 2011 (published on 14 November 2011).
250  Act CLIX of 2011 (published on 1 December 2011; with the intention to remove 
the acting president, András Baka; later the European Court of Human Rights 
stated the violation of the Convention, see Baka v. Hungary, Judgment of 27 May 
2014, no. 20261/12.) See about the case Attila Vincze: Dismissal of the President 
of the Hungarian Supreme Court: ECtHR Judgment Baka v. Hungary, European 
Public Law Vol. 21, № 3, 2015, 445–456.
251  Act LXI of 2011 (published on 14 June 2011).
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while the supermajority strived to eliminate the constitutional im-
pediments of economic governance and policy-making as well.252
In the meantime, after the announcement of constitution mak-
ing intentions a parliamentary ad hoc committee responsible for 
preparing the constitution was set up in June, and started its work 
in September 2010. The composition of the committee reflected 
the parliamentary proportions of the party fractions. The prepa-
ratory activity was not intensive in 2010. During July and August 
some invited expert teams from universities and research insti-
tutes, as well as representative organizations of the civil society 
had the chance to share with the committee their recommenda-
tions to the constitution making. At this stage the expert and 
interest groups received no feedbacks from the parliamentary ad 
hoc committee, and their substantive participation was not pro-
vided for.
For a variety of reasons, the opposition left the preparatory com-
mittee, and then in December 2010 the concept of the new consti-
tution was endorsed only by the representatives of the ruling 
coalition in the ad hoc committee. Finally on the basis of this concept 
no draft was elaborated, instead, the concept was put aside and all 
the parliamentary fractions were given the chance to submit their 
own draft constitutions. 
In early March of 2011 two bills were lodged to the parliament, 
one of them by the governing party alliance and the other by an 
independent MP. They were parallel discussed from 21 March, and 
after 9 effective days of parliamentary debate on 18 April 2011 the 
bill of the governing parties was endorsed with the two-third major-
ity of votes of the MPs. No opposition MPs voted for the bill. This 
short summary clearly shows that the actual and effective constitu-
tion-making was really quick but not transparent at all. The gen-
eral public had only five weeks to evaluate the text, and the scope 
of the actors with effective influence on the formulation of the draft 
252  Márton Varju and Nóra Chronowski: Constitutional backsliding in Hungary, 
TvCR № 4, 2015, 298.
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remained secret. Academic institutions, expert organizations, civil-
ians, minorities and other groups of the society had no role in the 
process, and the preparatory committee in the parliament was also 
just the part of the scenery.
Assuming and accepting that the constitution making power is 
an original political will, which may adopt any kind of constitution, 
the process itself cannot be criticized. However, if one refuses this 
Schmittian approach,253 and if the final goal is the creation of a dem-
ocratic constitution integrating the society and meeting with the 
expectations of the international community, especially those of 
the European Union and the Council of Europe whom Hungary is 
a member state, then it is no wonder that the parallel methods of 
destruction and construction raised severe domestic and interna-
tional criticism.
The Venice Commission issued two opinions during the narrow 
sense Hungarian constitution making, first upon the request of the 
253  Carl Schmitt: Constitutional Theory (transl. and ed. Jeffrey Seitzer), Duke 
University Press, Durnham, London, 2008, 125. Dozens of essays challenge 
the Schmittian concept of constitution making power, trying to justify that 
under democratic developments this power cannot be formulated as an unlim-
ited, pure political will. There are steady efforts in the academic discourse to 
distinguish the primary and secondary constitution making power, identify 
the limits of constituent power and constitution amending power. Georges 
Burdeau: Essai d’une théorie de la révision des lois constitutionnelles en droit français 
(Thèse pour le doctorat en droit, Faculté de droit de Paris), Macon, Paris, 1930; An-
tonio Negri: Le pouvoir constituent: essai sur les alternatives de la modernité, Press-
es Universitaires de France, Paris, 1997; Giovanni Bianco: Brevi note su potere 
costituente e storia, in Studi in onore di Pietro Rescigno, Giuffrè, Milan, 1999; 
Kemal Gözler: Pouvoir constituant, Editions Ekin Kitabevi, Bursa [Turquie], 
1999; H.P. Schneider: Die verfassunggebende Gewalt, in Handbuch des Staats-
rechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band VII (hrsg. J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof), 
C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, 1992; E.W. Böckenförde: Die verfassungsge-
bende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, in E.W. 
Böckenförde: Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie – Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und 
zum Verfassungsrecht, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1991; Yaniv Roznai: 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, The Limits of Amendment Powers, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 
67–80.; Csink Lóránt: Mozaikok a hatalommegosztáshoz, Pázmány Press, Budapest, 
2014., Kukorelli István: Hány éves az Alaptörvény? A régi-új kérdése az Alap-
törvényben, Iustum Aequum Salutare № 4, 2016, 47–49.
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Hungarian government254 (March 2011),255 and second upon the 
request of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly CE (June 2011).
It must be noted that the draft of the new constitution was not 
sent to the Venice Commission on time, thus the first opinion of 28 
March 2011 contained general comments and not evaluated any 
particular provisions of the draft constitutional text.
The Venice Commission in its second opinion, which was pub-
lished on 20 June 2011, examining the final text revealed several 
criticalities that should be eliminated by utilising the common Eu-
ropean values during the interpretation.256 Although the commission 
welcomed the youngest European constitution, it also formulated 
important concerns and critics regarding the (i) procedure of draft-
ing, deliberating and adopting without the opposition and the wider 
public, (ii) the high number of cardinal (organic) laws, especially 
254  The Venice Commission was addressed three legal questions by the Deputy 
Prime-Minister and Minister of Public Administration and Justice of Hungary. The 
three questions: (i) ‘To what extent may the incorporation in the new Constitution 
of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights enhance the protection of 
fundamental rights in Hungary and thereby also contribute to strengthening the 
common European protection of these rights?’, (ii) The role and significance of 
the preliminary (ex ante) review among the competences of the Constitutional 
Court. In particular, two questions should be addressed: Who is entitled to submit 
a request for preliminary review? What is the effect of a decision passed by the 
Constitutional Court in a preliminary review procedure on the legislative com-
petence of the Parliament? (iii) The role and significance of the actio popularis in 
ex post constitutional review. What is the state of play in Europe as regards the 
availability of actio popularis in matters of constitutionality? Could it be considered 
as an infringement of the European constitutional heritage (acquis) if the main 
focus of the Constitutional Court’s activity was to shift from the posterior review, 
carried out on the basis of an actio popularis, to the examination of specific con-
stitutional complaints? 
255  European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 
Opinion № 614/2011, Strasbourg 28 March 2011, Opinion on Three Legal Ques-
tions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution of Hungary, Avail-
able at tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/2011/opinion_on_hungarian_constitutional_ 
questions_enhu_0.pdf.
256  Venice Commission, Opinion № 621/2011, Strasbourg 20 June 2011, Opinion 
on the New Constitution of Hungary, www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
CDL-AD%282011%29016-E.aspx.
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in the fields of family legislation, social and taxation policy, which 
are typically simple majority decisions of any government, (iii) the 
concept of ‘historical constitution’ as rule of interpretation, (iv) the 
wording of preamble, (v) the provisions related to Hungarians liv-
ing beyond the borders, (vi) the constitutional obligations with 
uncertain content, (vii) the lack of explicit reference to abolition of 
death penalty, (viii) the limitation of the Constitutional Court’s 
competence.
However, the Hungarian constituent power circumvented the 
recommended way of interpretation and insisted on the challenged 
solutions. Parliament has modified the FL six times (not considering 
the transitional provisions of unique status and history) since its 
entry into force, and has, inter alia, cemented the model of limited 
constitutional judicature, attempted to break constitutional continu-
ity, to restrict the exercise of the right to vote and freedom of expres-
sion and perpetuated the practice of overruling the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court.257
1 To what extent does the Hungarian Fundamental Law 
    defy EU values after its amendments?
This chapter analyses the relationship between the FL and the nor-
mative values of the European Union with special regard to the 
legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights that articulates the 
general values into individual rights.
To ground this comparison and evaluation, the notion of EU 
values will be clarified and their impact on member states’ constitu-
tion making will be outlined.
257  See also Pál Sonnevend, András Jakab and Lóránt Csink: The Constitution as 
an Instrument of Everyday Party Politics: The Basic Law of Hungary, in Constitu-
tional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area, Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary 
and Romania (eds. Armin von Bogdandy – Pál Sonnevend), C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 
Oxford, Portland, Oregon, 2015, 52–63.
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After this short introduction, the chapter focuses on the question, 
to what extent the new FL is compatible with the shared values of 
the European Union, with special regard to its fundamental rights 
standard.
The ensuing analysis is twofold: on the one hand it compares 
the provisions of the FL with the norms of the former Constitution 
and tries to evaluate the changes. On the other hand, it also consid-
ers the relevant rules of the FL in the light of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and other Union values such as rule of law, 
democracy and loyal cooperation. Because of its frequent amend-
ments, the FL is time to time in the centre of international and 
European attention, and raises concerns of EU institutions and other 
human rights watchdogs,258 thus this part tries to explain the process 
258  On 8 February 2013, members of the governing coalition, having two thirds of 
the seats in the Hungarian Parliament, submitted a proposal to amend the FL. The 
Parliament adopted the amendment on 11 March 2013. It was published in the 
official journal on 1 April 2013. In March 2013, in the course of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the FL, the Council of Europe, the UN High Commissioner, the President 
of the European Commission, Hungarian human rights associations and scholars 
voiced concerns over the changes. See e.g. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 
europe-21740743>,<http://livewire.amnesty.org/2013/03/12/hungarys-constitu-
tional-undermining-of-internationally-protected-human-rights/>, <http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44389&Cr=judiciary&Cr1#.UUOI7jdMcY6>, 
<http://www.politics.hu/20130311/ex-president-solyom-urges-successor-to- 
veto-constitutional-changes-slams-fidesz-use-of-basic-law-for-daily-political-goals/>, 
<http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/guest-post-the-fog-of-amend-
ment/>
For joint expert opinion of Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Eötvös Károly 
Policy Institute and Hungarian Civil Liberties Union on Fourth Amendment, see: 
<http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Appendix_1_Main_concerns_regard-
ing_the_4th_Amendment_to_the_Fundamental_Law_of_Hungary.pdf>. Unofficial 
translation of the Fourth Amendment is available at <http://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/Appendix_2_Fourth_Amendment_to_the_Fundamental_Law_
Unofficial_translation.pdf>. The amendment was firmly criticised by the Venice 
Commission, see Opinion № 720/2013 of the Venice Commission on the Fourth 
Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Strasbourg 17 June 2013, http://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282013%29012-e.
For academic evaluation, see Judit Zeller: Nichts ist so beständig… Die jüngs-
ten Novellen des Grundgesetzes Ungarns im Kontext der Entscheidungen des 
Verfassungsgerichts, Osteuropa Recht Vol. 59, № 3, 2013, 307–320.
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of dismantling of rule of law and legal certainty that seems to deep-
en the gap between EU values and Hungarian constitutional archi-
tecture.
1.1 EU normative constraints and national  
      constitution-making
The multilevel constitutional system of the Union is based on the 
national constitutional traditions in the field of fundamental rights 
and basic constitutional principles. It is important, however, that 
its basis is the common constitutional traditions as a whole, not any 
single tradition of a certain State.259 These common traditions are 
recognised by Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (here-
inafter: TEU) as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (hereinafter: TL), 
which establishes the common values as legitimating source of the 
polities forming a union: ‘The Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member 
states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ 
Although Article 2 formulates values, these can be considered as 
basic principles260 of the Union, because they produce legal conse-
259  See John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez: The Constitution’s Gift? 
A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European 
Union, European Law Journal Vol. 11, № 4, 2005, 380, 390–391.
260  Principles command, values recommend. Principles are legal norms that 
regulate substantive components of the legal order. Values have moral character, 
and they can be conceptualised as normative objectives. See more in Jürgen 
Habermas: Between Facts and Norms. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. 255., and Armin 
von Bogdandy: Doctrine of Principles, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series 9/03, 2003, 
10., available at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/ 
030901-01.pdf>
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quences.261 Thus, they influence the objectives of the Union,262 their 
infringement is sanctioned,263 and their respect is one of the condi-
tions for EU membership.264 As Bogdandy stated, the values of Ar-
ticle 2 are to be understood as legal norms, and since they are 
overarching and constitutive, they are founding principles.265 The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) for the 
first time referred to these values – enshrined at that time in Article 
6(1) of the TEU pre-Lisbon – in its famous decision in Kadi, as 
principles that cannot be derogated by any acts of the Union even 
by those based on international law.266 Besselink pointed out, that 
261  See e.g. Articles 3(1), 7 and 49 of the TEU.
262  Article 3(1) of the TEU: The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and 
the well-being of its peoples.
263  Article 7(1)-(3) of the TEU: ‘On a reasoned proposal by one third of the mem-
ber states, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the 
Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of 
a serious breach by a member state of the values referred to in Article 2. … The 
European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the member 
states or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by 
a member state of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the member 
state in question to submit its observations. … [T]he Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application 
of the Treaties to the member state in question, including the voting rights of the 
representative of the government of that member state in the Council.’
264  Article 49 of the TEU: ‘Any European State which respects the values referred 
to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a mem-
ber of the Union.’
265  Armin von Bogdandy: Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and 
Doctrinal Sketch, European Law Journal Vol. 16, № 2, 2010, 95, 106.
266  Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-06351, §303: ‘Th[e EC Trea-
ty] provisions [on the direct effect and priority of international law, in particular 
the obligations member states have accepted for the purpose of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security] cannot, however, be understood to authorise any 
derogation from the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Art. 6(1) EU as a foundation of the Union.’
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this judgment was the full recognition of the values shared by the 
Union and the member states.267
Besides affirming the shared values, the TEU also declares that 
the Union shall respect the national identities of its member states, 
defined by the TL as inherent part of their political and constitu-
tional structures.268 The definition emphasises the constitutional, 
political and state aspects, thus in this context the national identity 
can be understood (much more) as constitutional (than as a cul-
tural) identity. One of the legally relevant questions in this respect 
is who will decide on the content of the constitutional identity of 
a member state and on the acts or measures of Union affecting or 
infringing that constitutional identity. It can be supposed that a re-
lationship of cooperation between the national (constitutional) 
Courts and the CJEU is necessary in case of such conflicts, the first 
to determine the constitutional identity case by case, and the latter 
to decide on the meaning of the relevant EU law in dispute.269
As a result of the multilevel European constitutional develop-
ment, the constitutional traditions of the member states converged 
in their respective content and interpretation, while the single States 
267  Leonard F.M. Besselink: National and constitutional identity before and after 
Lisbon, Utrecht Law Review Vol. 6, № 3, 2010, 36, 41.
268  Article 4(2) TEU: ‘The Union shall respect the equality of member states before 
the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-govern-
ment. It shall respect their essential state functions, including ensuring the ter-
ritorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility 
of each member state.’ According to Besselink, the plural in the first sentence of 
Article 4(2) may refer to the fact that the national identity does not mean merely 
state identity, instead, the TEU acknowledges the potential multinational charac-
ter of member states, where the – national, ethnic, cultural etc – diversity is part 
of the constitutional structure. See Besselink ‘National and constitutional iden-
tity’ 43–44.
269  Besselink ‘National and constitutional identity’ 45. See to this e.g. the Omega-
judgment of the CJEU (Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstel-
lungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609]) 
and the Lisbon-judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, 
Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juni 2009 [2 BvE 2/08]).
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managed to preserve their own constitutional identity. An EU mem-
ber state is henceforth to a great extent free to decide on its own 
constitutional structure, which is the basis of its constitutional iden-
tity. It is clear, however, that the functions of the constitution (inte-
gration of society, division of public power, ensuring human rights 
etc.) shall be taken into account during the constitution making, 
and formally the international obligations – unless the state intends 
to abrogate them – limit this freedom.270 In other words, some 
manifestations of this “constituent freedom” may lead to break with 
the community of states, and result in withdrawal or exclusion. 
Taking into consideration the global tendencies of constitutionalism 
as well, it is worth to mention that the national constitutional de-
velopment of democratic States converge since the 1950’s in three 
features: (i) supremacy of the legislation is refused and judicial 
(constitutional) review is emerging,271 (ii) States are committed to 
the protection of fundamental rights and basic freedoms prescribing 
explicit – sometimes implicit – limitation clauses with respect to 
the principle of proportionality, (iii) States are committed to the 
respect of guarantees of the rule of law.272
If a state wishes to remain the member of the Union, it cannot 
disregard membership criteria, and must not deny the primacy of 
the Union law in its national constitution. The first hypothesis 
270  Constitution-making power is original as it is not bound by the former Con-
stitution and determines the procedural frameworks itself. However, it does not 
mean, that this power would be unlimited. Constitution-making takes place in 
a particular political community and in a particular situation. If it aims at creating 
a democratic constitution, this objective limits the scope, content and procedure 
of the constitution-making. International obligations of the State and respected 
international and European standards are viewed also as external legal limits 
during constitution-making. See Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 75–78.
271  As Klug pointed out, while before 1989, in about 10 countries was an effective 
method for constitutional review applied, a decade later in 70 countries continued 
the (constitutional) Courts substantive norm control. Heinz Klug: Constitu-
tional Transformations: Universal Values and the Politics of Constitutional Un-
derstanding, in Charles Sampford and Tom Round (eds): Beyond the Republic, 
Meeting the Global Challenges to Constitutionalism, Leichhardt, NSW, The Federation 
Press, 2001, 192.
272  Tushnet ‘The Inevitable Globalization’ 985, 985–986.
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arises if a member state tries to abolish democracy, or gives up the 
essential elements of the rule of law. Different forms of democracy 
or the rule of law, however, are still possible. The second hypoth-
esis occurs if a state declares in its constitution that the domestic 
law and national legislation overrides EU law. In any other cases 
– that is, if the government is committed to membership in the EU 
– the freedom of constitution making is not complete, since the 
implementation of EU law is the duty of domestic public administra-
tions and national Courts in the first place. Therefore, the system 
and functioning of national Courts and public administration is not 
indifferent to the EU. EU membership sets certain requirements for 
state organisation and the national legal system, in particular to 
ensure the uniform and effective application of EU law. If the rel-
evant rules of organisation, responsibility and procedure are laid 
down by the national constitution, then to that extent it also shall 
correspond to the EU requirements.273
1.2 Compatibility of the new Hungarian Constitution  
       with the Charter of Fundamental Rights
In Pernice’s opinion, the Charter in particular explains and specifies 
what the common values referred to in Article 2 of the TEU as the 
foundation of the Union may really mean. The Charter rights may 
be invoked both in political processes (i.e. against adopted legisla-
tion) and as individual actions for judicial review.274 The respect of 
the Charter as legally binding instrument creates a direct legal re-
lationship between the citizens and those who exercise the power 
for and on behalf of them in the EU. Thus the Charter makes it clear 
that the Union is different from any other international organisa-
tion, since it is the Union of citizens, not simply that of member 
273  Dieter Grimm: Zur Bedeutung nationaler Verfassungen in einem vereinten 
Europa in Detlef Merten and Hans-Jürgen Papier (eds), Handbuch der Grundrech-
te in Deutschland und Europa, Vol. VI/2 § 168 RN 59, C.F. Müller, 2009, 26.
274  Pernice ‘The Treaty of Lisbon’ 252.
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states.275 The Charter fully respects the implementation of subsidiar-
ity, as it contains many references to national law and practice, and 
as primarily the EU institutions are bound by it – the member states 
only when implementing Union law. However, it is worth mention-
ing that the Charter has codified the CJEU case law, which is based 
on the constitutional traditions of the member states.276 As it was 
already explained, the Charter contains a “horizontal” clause on 
non-reversal,277 which involves the recognition of other legal mech-
anisms, in particular national constitutions and the international 
texts on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
from the time that they are ratified by the member states. On the 
basis of this recognition, the principle used is that of the most fa-
vourable provision: the level of protection guaranteed by the Char-
ter may not be lower than the level offered by the provisions of the 
texts cited, within their respective fields of application.278 The Char-
ter binds the member states as well ‘when implementing Union 
law’, however, the CJEU understands this in a wider sense: member 
states have to respect the fundamental rights ‘acting within the 
scope of’ Union law.279 Thus on the basis of the preliminary ruling 
of the CJEU, national Courts of law may apply the Charter direct-
ly.280
275  Pernice stated: ‘The new reference in Article 6, para. 1 TEU-L underlines that 
the Treaty establishes a direct relationship between the citizens and those who 
are exercising power on their behalf and upon them. I am not aware of any other 
treaty or international instrument with this specific feature. It does constitute, I 
submit, the basis of what we call in French terms the contrat social.’ Pernice ‘The 
Treaty of Lisbon’ 236.
276  László Blutman: Az alkotmányos és európai alapjogok viszonya, in László 
Bodnár (ed.): EU-csatlakozás és alkotmányozás, SZTE ÁJK Nemzetközi Jogi 
Tanszék, Szeged, 2001, 38., and Nóra Chronowski: “Integrálódó” alkotmányjog, 
Dialóg Campus, Budapest-Pécs, 2005, 66.
277  Article 53 of the Charter.
278  See Nóra Chronowski: Integration of European Human Rights Standard – the 
Accession of EU to the ECHR, in Jerzy Jaskiernia (ed.): Efektywność europejskiego sys-
temu ochrony praw człowieka, Adam Marszałek, 2012, 974–975.
279  Mathisen ‘The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty’ 20. 
280  Joined Cases C-188/10 Aziz Melki and C-189/10 Sélim Abdeli [2010] I-05667.
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During the Hungarian constitution making in 2011 it occurred 
– and the Hungarian Government inquired from the Venice Com-
mission281 – whether and to what extent it was necessary to incor-
porate the Charter rights into the national constitution. The Venice 
Commission emphasised ‘that up-dating the scope of human rights 
protection and seeking to adequately reflect, in the new Constitu-
tion, the most recent developments in the field of human rights 
protection, as articulated in the EU Charter, is a legitimate aim and 
a signal of loyalty towards European values.’ However, the Com-
mission also underlined that the incorporation of the Charter as 
a whole or of some parts of it could lead to legal complications. 
Thus, as the Commission suggested, it should be taken into account 
that the interpretation of the EU Charter by the CJEU might deviate 
from the one provided by the Constitutional Court of Hungary; the 
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the EU Charter is 
dependent on the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR; in the case 
law of the ordinary domestic Courts it might lead to problems that 
they should distinguish between the application of the Charter 
within and outside the scope of Union law. All these may lead to 
the erosion of constitutional autonomy of the member state. The 
Venice Commission recommended ‘that it would be more advisable 
(…) to consider the EU Charter as a starting point or a point of 
reference and source of inspiration in drafting the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms chapter of the new Constitution.’282
281  The Venice Commission was addressed three legal questions by the Deputy 
Prime-Minister and Minister of Public Administration and Justice of Hungary. 
One of the questions was the following: ‘To what extent may the incorporation 
in the new Constitution of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights en-
hance the protection of fundamental rights in Hungary and thereby also contrib-
ute to strengthening the common European protection of these rights?’ See also 
above, note 254.
282  European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 
Opinion № 614/2011, Strasbourg 28 March 2011, Opinion on Three Legal Ques-
tions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution of Hungary, points 
21., 25-28., 32. Available at <http://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/2011/opinion_on_hun-
garian_constitutional_questions_enhu_0.pdf>.
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It must be noted that the draft of the new Constitution was not 
sent to the Venice Commission on time, thus the Opinion of 28 
March 2011 contained general comments and not evaluated any 
particular provisions of the draft constitutional text. Meanwhile the 
governing party alliance published (on 7 March 2011) and submit-
ted to the Parliament (on 15 March) a draft, which originally did 
not follow precisely the spirit and the content of the Charter. After 
a short – approximately one month – parliamentary debate, the 
adopted FL contains ‘almost’ the same rights as the Charter in its 
relevant Chapter (“Freedom and Responsibility”), and some sen-
tences of the Charter were finally incorporated, but – compared to 
the Charter – the content of the rights enumerated by the FL is less 
detailed and the text raises the possibility of wider limitation of 
rights. The Venice Commission in its second opinion, which was 
given upon the request of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe and was published on 20 June 2011, examining the 
final text revealed several criticalities that should be eliminated by 
utilising the common European values during the interpretation.283
1.2.1 General remarks 
The FL under the title ‘Freedom and Responsibility’ lists in 28 articles 
the catalogue of fundamental rights (Articles II-XXIX). These articles 
contain partly constitutional rights (amongst which compared to the 
former Constitution new ones are the right to good administration,284 
some social rights of the employees,285 right to self defence286), part-
ly prohibitions (new ones are the ne bis in idem,287 the non-
283  European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 
Opinion № 621/2011, Strasbourg 20 June 2011, Opinion on the New Constitution 
of Hungary, <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD% 
282011%29016-E.aspx>.
284  Article XXIV of the FL.
285  Article XVII of the FL.
286  Article V of the FL.
287  Article XXVIII of the FL.
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refoulement,288 the biomedicine prohibitions289), principles (new 
ones are equality before the law290 or the social responsibility for 
property291), and in the field of social rights constitutional objectives 
(the protection of elderly and persons living with disabilities,292 striv-
ing to provide decent housing,293 the use of technological solutions 
and scientific achievements294). Some of the new rights were defi-
nitely inspired by the Charter and are in line with the global devel-
opment.295 Several provisions of the FL, however, regulate moral 
duties, the legal content of which has not been clarified yet, and the 
interpretation of which may influence also the content of certain 
fundamental rights. Of course it is not useless to write into the con-
stitution some basic duties, and with regard to the consequences of 
globalisation, and common safety, environmental, health risks of 
the mankind the scope of the duties can be widened in the course 
of constitution making.296 The former Constitution also declared as 
a basic duty to obey the constitution and legal provisions, the lawful 
action against the effort to obtain power with violent means or hold 
possession of power exclusively, contribution to rates and taxes in 
accordance to income and wealth, general and free compulsory 
288  Article XIV of the FL.
289  Article III of the FL.
290  Article XV of the FL.
291  Article XIII of the FL.
292  Article XV of the FL.
293  Article XXII of the FL.
294  Article XXVI of the FL.
295  The number of the fundamental rights, prohibitions and principles is in line 
with the ‘global average’, which might be the effect of the European human rights 
regime. According to Law’s and Versteeg’s rights index the most popular rights 
and principles are the freedom of religion, the freedom of expression and/or press, 
equality rights, the right to private property, the right to private life, the habeas 
corpus, the right to assembly, the right to association, women’s rights, freedom 
of movement, right of access to Court, prohibition of torture, right to vote, right 
to work, positive right to education at state expense, judicial review, prohibition 
of ex post facto laws. See more in Law and Versteeg ‘The Evolution and Ideology’ 
1163, 1190, 1200–1201.
296  Antal Ádám: On novel goals and tasks of the public power, in Bogusław Bana-
szak (ed.): Festschrift für Professor Kazimierz Działocha, University of Wroczlaw, 
Wroczlaw, 2012.
125constitutional challenges in Hungary 
school attendance, military defence obligation, and parents and 
guardians have the obligation of seeing to the education of minor 
children.297 However, it is not accidental that there is no interna-
tional convention on the basic human duties yet, as such an inter-
national obligation presumably would cause more damage than 
advantage to human rights law, providing governments with ex-
cuses to limit the exercise of human rights.298 Unfortunately, sev-
eral of the basic duties in the FL are of indefinite content, they have 
not been adequately defined (for example, contribution to the “com-
munity’s enrichment” with work; or the method and extent of con-
tribution to state and community tasks; connections between the 
contribution to satisfying community needs and contribution capa-
bilities etc.). All this leaves wide scope for action of legislature in 
specifying these communitarian obligations, and the directions are 
unpredictable yet.
It is worth referring also to the preamble of the FL, according to 
which ‘individual freedom can only be complete in cooperation 
with others.’ The Charter applies a completely different approach, 
and emphasises in its preamble that the Union ‘places the indi-
vidual at the heart of its activities.’ It raises the individuals’ respon-
297  As opposed to the six explicit basic duties contained in the former Constitu-
tion, the FL lays down twelve: action against arbitrary power [Article C(2)], con-
tribution to the performance of state and community tasks [Article O], the 
protection, sustenance and preservation of the environment – in particular natu-
ral resources, biodiversity, cultural assets – for future generations [Article P], the 
obligations relating to law-abidance and interpretation [Article R(2)-(3)], respect 
for fundamental rights [Article I(1)], obligation to work [Article XII(1)], parents’ 
obligation to look after and provide schooling for their children [Article XVI(3)], 
adult children’s obligation toward their parents [Article XVI(4)], employers’ and 
employees’ obligation to cooperate with each other [Article XVII], contribution 
to satisfying community needs [Article XXX], obligation to defend the country 
[Article XXXI], obligation to appear before a parliamentary committee (regulated 
by a cardinal Act) [Article 7(3)].
298  In 2003, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights received a draft 
declaration on human social responsibilities, but the Human Rights Council has 
not considered them. See John H. Knox: Horizontal Human Rights Law, The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 102, № 1, 2008, 1–3.
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sibility only in connection with the enjoyment of rights.299 While 
the approach of the FL – taking also into consideration the numer-
ous basic obligations – is communitarian, the Charter focuses on 
the philosophy of individual freedom.300
1.2.2 Dignity
The following points set out some ambiguities by comparing the 
Charter rights with FL regulation in the fields of dignity, freedom 
and solidarity. However, it is worth to note that the level of protec-
tion of the specific rights will depend on the interpretation given 
to the text.
Although the value of human dignity is recognized in the pre-
amble301 and in Article II of FL,302 the rights connected with the right 
to life and human dignity might be interpreted restrictively. Just 
a few examples to highlight, that protection of foetal life from the 
moment of conception allows in principle the restriction of the right 
299 Charter Preamble: ‘Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties 
with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations.’
300 Also refers to this the Opinion no. 621/2011 of the Venice Commission, 
point 57.
301  ‘We hold that human existence is based on human dignity.’ This sentence 
more or less expresses that human life and human dignity indivisible values 
creating a unity. Thus also in the future the monist approach based on the unity 
of body and soul prevails, which was elaborated by the Constitutional Court in 
1990. ‘Human life and human dignity form an inseparable unity and have a great-
er value than anything else. The rights to human life and human dignity form an 
indivisible and unrestrainable fundamental right which is the source of and the 
condition for several additional fundamental rights. The constitutional state shall 
regulate fundamental rights stemming from the unity of human life and dignity 
with a view to the relevant international treaties and fundamental legal principles 
in the service of public and private interests defined by the constitution. The rights 
to human life and dignity as an absolute value create a limitation upon the crim-
inal jurisdiction of the State.’ HCC Decision 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB, point V.2.
302  Article II of the FL: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. Every human being 
shall have the right to life and human dignity; embryonic and foetal life shall be 
subject to protection from the moment of conception.’
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to abortion and the women’s right to self-determination.303 Article 
IV(2) of the FL – uniquely in international comparison – allows the 
life sentence; however, without proper guaranties for judicial review 
it may risk to violate human dignity and to contradict the prohibi-
tion of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.304 Article XIX(3) also gives reason for concern from the 
viewpoint of equal dignity, as it contains the new measure of ‘use-
fulness of activity to the community’, which may be taken into ac-
count in deciding on the nature and extent of social aids. It is also 
regrettable that Article II does not contain explicitly the complete 
abolition of death penalty.305 It would have been reasonable to men-
tion, because the Republic of Hungary committed itself internation-
ally to that prohibition,306 and the Charter also reaffirms the 
abolition.
A new rule is contradicting the principle of dignity after the Fourth 
Amendment: it is the issue of criminalizing homelessness. Article 
XXII(3) of the FL reeds as follow: ‘In order to protect public order, 
public security, public health and cultural values, an Act of Parlia-
ment or a local ordinance may declare illegal staying in a public 
area as a permanent abode with respect to a specific part of such 
303  However, the FL does not declare the positive right to life of the foetus, just 
declares the protection of foetal life by the State. It does not necessarily imply an 
obligation for the State to penalise abortion. See also Opinion № 621/2011 of the 
Venice Commission, points 66–67.
304  Article IV(2) of the FL: ‘No person shall be deprived of his or her liberty except 
for statutory reasons or as a result of a statutory procedure. Life imprisonment 
without parole shall only be imposed in relation to the commission of wilful and 
violent offences.’ See also the concerns of the Venice Commission: ‘By admitting 
the life imprisonment without parole, be it only in relation to the commission of 
wilful and violent offences, Article IV of the new Hungarian Constitution fails to 
comply with the European human rights standards if it is understood as excluding 
the possibility to reduce, de facto and de jure, a life sentence.’ The Venice Com-
mission also reminded of the case law of the ECtHR (Kafkaris v Cyprus, App. № 
21906/04, 12 February 2008). Opinion № 621/2011 of the Venice Commission, 
points 69–70.
305  Similarly, see the Opinion № 621/2011 of the Venice Commission, point 68.
306  See the 6th and the 13th Protocols of the ECHR – promulgated by Acts XXXI 
of 1993 and III of 2004.
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public area.’ The amendment was a reaction to the former decision 
of the Constitutional Court on the Petty Offence Act,307 in which 
the Court stated that the punishment of unavoidable living in a pub-
lic area fails to meet the requirement of the protection of human 
dignity. The Venice Commission criticized the constitutional rank 
of the regulation, because it aims to prevent the review by the Con-
stitutional Court.
1.2.3 Freedom 
As to the rights related to freedom, the regulation in the FL also 
raises some problems. The habeas corpus provision which is part 
of the right to personal freedom and security was not developed 
during constitution-making, thus it is formulated also in the future 
as the duty of authorities, not as an individual right to the judicial 
review of an arrest.308 The term ‘as soon as possible’ was not speci-
fied in connection with the bringing before a judge either.309 By 
307  HCC Decision 38/2012. (XI. 14.) AB, see the press release, http://hunconcourt.
hu/sajto/news/provisions-of-the-act-on-contraventions-criminalizing-people-
living-at-public-areas-permanently-are-against-fundamental-law.
308  Article IV(3) of the FL: ‘Any person suspected of and arrested for committing 
any offence shall either be released or brought before a Court as soon as possible. 
The Court shall be obliged to give such person a hearing and to immediately make 
a decision with a written justification on his or her acquittal or conviction.’ See 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR: ‘Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his 
detention shall be decided speedily by a Court and his release ordered if the 
detention is not lawful.’
309  This is particularly problematic, because Act LXXXIX of 2011 amending Act 
XIX of 1998 on Criminal Procedure allowed in criminal cases of special significance 
120 hours (5 days) of arrestment. It conflicts with the requirement of ‘reasonable 
time’ and with the case law of the ECHR. See McKay v the United Kingdom, App. 
№ 543/03, 3 October 2006, §47 (in the given case the ECHR has held 4 days at 
the longest as reasonable). See also Bence Mészáros: Kiemelt jelentőségű ügyek, 
alkotmányos aggályok – új különeljárás a büntetőeljárási törvényben, Közjogi 
Szemle № 3, 2011, 59, 62–63. The Constitutional Court found this provision on 
120 hours of arrestment unconstitutional in December 2011, see HCC Decision 
166/2011. (XII. 20.) AB.
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introducing the right to self-defence in the constitutional provisions, 
the boundaries of the individual and state responsibility become 
uncertain. The relationship between the new right and the mo-
nopoly of the State to enforce the constitution and the legislation 
as outlined in Article C(3) of FL remains an open question.310 It can 
be presupposed that the former is an exception to the latter rule, 
however, this solution is rather unfortunate in case of a constitu-
tional provision, because the constitutional text should be unam-
biguous, without exception rules. Furthermore, it is also open to 
debate, what the relationship between the right to self-defence and 
the norm on justified defence in the Criminal Code is.
The formulation of the individual freedom of conscience and 
religion311 is in line with the text of the Charter and the former 
Constitution. What changed, however, is that on the basis of con-
science the military service cannot be renounced, only unarmed 
military service can be chosen as an alternative,312 thus there is no 
possibility to choose civilian service outside the armed forces. Ar-
ticle 10(2) of the Charter explicitly recognises conscience objection. 
The Venice Commission also emphasised: ‘The exception for con-
scientious objectors may raise a specific problem. While it is true 
that the ECHR leaves it to the member states to decide whether to 
establish any obligation to perform armed services, the obligation 
to perform unarmed service in Article XXXI has to be interpreted 
using a systematic approach. Unarmed services should be performed 
outside the army in order to avoid potential conflicts with Article 
9 ECHR (the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion). 
This would resemble regulations in other European States and their 
handling of armed and unarmed services.’313 Unfortunately the new 
310  Article V of the FL: ‘Every person shall have the right to repel any unlawful 
attack against his or her person or property, or one that poses a direct threat to 
the same.’ Article C(3) of FL: ‘The State shall have the exclusive right to use co-
ercion in order to enforce the Fundamental Law and legislation.’
311  Article VII of the FL.
312  See Article XXXI of the FL.
313  Article 10(2) of the Charter: ‘The right to conscientious objection is recognised, 
in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right.’ See also 
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law of 2011 on national defence does not follow the mentioned case 
law and the recommendation of Venice Commission.314
An additional new constitutional rule is that under the FL the 
State and the churches shall cooperate for community goals, while 
they remain separate. Under the former constitutional regulation 
the independent Courts of law registered the churches and decided 
whether a religious community asking for the church status fulfilled 
the legal conditions. According to the Transitional Provisions of the 
FL315 (hereinafter TPFL) and the new cardinal act316 on churches, 
the Parliament decides on church status of applicant religious com-
munities. This procedure makes the separation of State and church-
es relative, and infringes the principle of division of powers.317 The 
Constitutional Court annulled the regulation of the TPFL and some 
provisions of the act on churches;318 however, the Fourth Amend-
Opinion № 621/2011 of the Venice Commission, point 84.
314  See Sections 4 and 9-10 of Act CXIII of 2011.
315  The Transitional Provisions were adopted by the Parliament on 30 December 
2011, published on 31 December 2011, and it came into force on 1 January 2012. 
The TPFL served the coming into force of the new Constitution. However, regard-
ing its content the TPFL was more like an amendment, as about half of its rules 
were not transitory at all. For a more detailed evaluation, see point 1.3.1 below. 
An unofficial translation of the TPFL by Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai and Kim 
Lane Scheppele is available at <http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/
The%20Act%20on%20the%20Transitional%20Provisions%20of%20the%20Fun-
damental%20Law.pdf>.
316  Cardinal act means organic law. The adoption requires two-third majority of 
the MPs present. See also Boldizsár Szentgáli-Tóth: The Scope of Qualified Law: 
Comparative Analysis, 22nd International Academic Conference, Proceedings, 
ISBN 978-80-87927-21-2, IISES, Lisbon, 22 March 2016, 271–273.
317  See Act CCVI of 2011 on right to freedom of conscience and religion, and on 
status of churches, religious denominations and communities. The relevant ar ticle 
of the TPFL was annulled by the Constitutional Court as non-transitional rule. 
See also Antal Ádám: Vallás, vallásszabadság és egyház Magyarország Alaptör-
vényének, továbbá „A lelkiismereti- és vallásszabadság jogáról, valamint az egy-
házak, vallásfelekezetek és vallási közösségek jogállásáról” szóló 2011. évi C. 
törvény figyelembe vételével, JURA Vol. 17, № 2, 2011, 7, 21–22. <http://jura.ajk.
pte.hu/JURA_2011_2.pdf>. See also the Amicus Brief by Halmai, Scheppele (eds.), 
cit. 25–29.
318  HCC Decision 6/2013. (III. 1.) AB, press release: ‘The Constitutional Court, 
during the examination of the regulations of Act on Churches, has declared that 
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ment319 of the FL incorporated the repealed TPFL rules into the text 
of the constitution. Under the modified regulation, all religious 
communities (churches) may operate freely, but those of them seek-
ing further cooperation with the State must be voted for by the 
Parliament, thus receiving “established” or “accepted” church status. 
This solution also erodes secularism and leaves room for political 
considerations in the recognition of churches.
Among the rights guaranteeing free communication, the freedom 
to express one’s opinion originally was formulated in the FL simi-
larly to the former Constitution, but the Fourth Amendment of the 
FL introduced serious bans on speeches violating human dignity, 
the dignity of the Hungarian nation or minority groups.320 Even the 
Venice Commission found it contradicting European standards, 
because ‘the provisions on the dignity of communities are too vague 
and the specific protection of the “dignity of the Hungarian nation” 
creates the risk that freedom of speech in Hungary could, in the 
future, be curtailed in order to protect Hungarian institutions and 
office holders.’321
the Act does not contain any obligation for detailed reasoning regarding the 
proposal or the decision which refuses the acknowledgement as a Church. The 
rejected religious communities do not get any official, written explanation which 
contains the reason why they could not get religious status or why they could not 
keep it. Furthermore, the Act does not contain any deadline for the Parliamen-
tary Committee to make a proposal or for the Parliament to make the decision 
and does not ensure possibility for legal remedy in case of the rejecting decision 
or the lack of the decision. The acknowledgement of religious status by the voting 
of the Parliament, the fact that it is the Parliament who decides on the status of 
churches, might result in decisions based on political aspects. The decision-mak-
ing in these individual cases, which should be assessed by legal discretion and 
which have fundamental legal aspects as well, should be dealt by the independent 
Courts and not transferred to the Parliament’s competence, which basically has 
political character, and so it is incompatible with the Fundamental Law.’ http://
hunconcourt.hu/sajto/news/press-release-regarding-the-constitutional-review-
of-the-act-on-churches. 
319  See Art. 4 of the Fourth Amendment.
320  See Art. 5 of the Fourth Amendment.
321  Opinion № 720/2013 of the Venice Commission, point 141.
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The State also recognises and defends the freedom and diver-
sity of the press (see Article IX). The FL does not contain the pro-
hibition of censorship, and does not formulate such guarantees as 
the Charter or the ECHR for precluding any interference by public 
authorities.
1.2.4 Solidarity
Solidarity rights were codified by the EU Fundamental Rights Con-
vention in 2000 with regard to their close connection to the value 
of dignity. The principle of social solidarity also appeared in the 
case law of the CJEU as the foundation of social welfare system.322 
Solidarity in the European Union is a common value recognised 
also by the preamble of the Charter and Articles 2-3 of the TEU, 
which can be considered as an identity-forming feature and so-
cially it may serve the supranational community-building.323
Article XVII of the FL regulates solidarity in more details in the 
world of employment than the former Constitution did, and for that 
purpose the Charter was taken as a basis. The FL ensures fair and 
just working conditions for the employees, and guarantees a right 
to employees, employers and their representatives ‘to bargain and 
to conclude collective agreements, and to take any joint actions.’ 
The employees have the right to hold strikes in defence of their 
interests.
Article XVII(1) prescribes the obligation of employees and em-
ployers to cooperate, and the purpose of this cooperation (ensuring 
jobs, making the national economy sustainable and other commu-
nity goals), but does not mention either the social dialogue, or the 
322  Alexander Somek: Solidarity Decomposed, Being and time in European citi-
zenship, University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper 07-13, 2007, 4. Available 
at ssrn.com/abstract=987346.
323  Juliane Ottmann: The Concept of Solidarity in National and European Law: 
The Welfare State and the European Social Model, Vienna Journal on International 
Constitutional Law – www.icl-journal.com Vol. 1, 2008, 36, 43–44. 
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system of social and economic interest reconciliation, or the work-
ers right to information and consultation within the undertaking 
(cf. the latter with Article 27 of the Charter). The FL does not contain 
either the protection in the event of unjustified dismissal324 (cf. with 
Article 30 of the Charter), or any guarantees to reconcile family and 
professional life (cf. with Article 33 of the Charter, containing the 
right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with ma-
ternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave 
following the birth or adoption of a child). Article XVII(2) of the FL 
although refers to the protection of parents in the workplace, but 
the level of this protection depends on the measures adopted by 
the State, thus it is not a fundamental right.
Social security does not appear as a fundamental right in the FL, 
but merely as something the State “shall strive” for, thus it only ap-
pears to be a state goal, which can be evaluated as a step backward 
in comparison with the former Constitution. In Article XIX(1) of FL 
among the titles to statutory subsidies (within the group of people 
in need) old age is not listed; it appears alone, separately from the 
categories of neediness, in paragraph (4). Social insurance does not 
appear as a constitutional institution, instead, in Article XIX(2) the 
expression ‘a system of social institutions and measures’ is used as 
the means of achieving the defined state goal. The above already 
referred paragraph (3) of Article XIX raises serious concerns as it 
refers to uncertain measures: ‘The nature and extent of social mea-
sures may be determined by law in accordance with the usefulness 
to the community of the beneficiary’s activity.’ What is useful to the 
community and who decides on the usefulness in certain cases? 
Might the social support be withhold in the absence of “useful activ-
ity” on this constitutional bases, even if the person concerned is 
needy and the cause of the situation falls outside his or her own 
fault? The principle of “self-responsibility” is also weakened by the 
324  It is no surprise. Until 31 May 2011 the government officers and until 7 April 
2011 the public servants were dismissed without reasoning, by this time annulled 
the Constitutional Court the challenged laws. See HCC Decisions 8/2011. (II. 18.) 
AB and 29/2011. (IV. 7.) AB, in Magyar Közlöny, 2011/14, 2011/37.
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regulation of the FL relating to social security, especially by the 
obligation of the State to maintain a general state pension system 
based on social solidarity. As a basis for the state pension system 
(as a constitutional institution) the FL specifies exclusively social 
solidarity, although the system is based on individual financial con-
tribution, thus the right to property,325 and the principle of indi-
vidual responsibility should also be guaranteed. The member states 
has a wide margin of appreciation regarding their social security 
system, thus the new constitutional regulation does not breach the 
EU law directly, but it is worth to mention that the new Hungarian 
constitutional regulation on social security does not properly guar-
antee the equal dignity and the property protection.
1.3 Rule of law, democracy, international and EU obligations
1.3.1 Rule of law – “Rechtsstaat”
Rule of law principle has a rich content in constitutional theory, but 
at this point the aspects of legal security and division of powers 
doctrine will be highlighted by focusing on the characteristics of 
Hungarian constitution amending process and limitation of the 
Constitutional Court’s powers.
The rule of law enjoyed a paramount position among the norms 
which constituted the constitutional order of post-1989 Hungary. It 
was modelled almost exclusively on the German Rechtsstaat concept.326 
325  Cf. the first sentence of Article XIII(1) of the FL: ‘Every person shall have the 
right to property and inheritance.’
326  As László Sólyom, the first president of the Constitutional Court outlined 
‘Even the traditional difference between the formal and the substantial concepts 
of the Rechtsstaat (…) was revived and had to be reinterpreted. (…) The Court 
made both the politicians and the population conscious of the secure protection 
constitutional rights (…) and aware of one of the most important characteristic 
of the rule of law: political intentions can only be implemented lawfully and 
within the framework of the Constitution – not vice versa, as before, when the 
law was conceived as merely a political tool. (…) The Court, moreover, developed 
a moral explanation of its position. It introduced the paradoxical phrase “revolu-
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There is scholarly consensus327 that the incorporation of the sub-
stantive, structural and procedural components of the Rechtsstaat 
principle led to the anchoring in Hungarian constitutionalism of 
foundational ideas, such as the protection of fundamental rights, 
the separation of powers and limited government, the legality of 
public administration, legal certainty, the independence of the ju-
diciary and the right of access to justice. The influence of the 
Rechtstaat principle also meant that in Hungary the written consti-
tution enjoys the highest rank in the hierarchy of legal norms su-
perseding other pieces of legislation, which primacy is manifested 
primarily through the process of constitutional review exercised by 
the Constitutional Court. The jurisprudence developed by the Con-
stitutional Court in a long chain of constitutional review cases em-
phasized primarily the formal dimensions of the rule of law, 
especially the principle of legal certainty, and left the substantive 
aspects of the principle somewhat underdeveloped.328
The prominence of the rule of law among the principles of the 
constitution, which was matched only by the human dignity prin-
ciple, and the emphasis on its formal dimensions were thought to 
provide an essential guarantee for the successful completion of the 
post-1989 transition process.329 The rule of law offered that formal 
guarantee which was able to establish a boundary between the 
constitutional arrangements which had been in place before the 
regime change and the new constitutional order where public 
powers are subjected to genuine legal constraints. The position held 
on the rule of law by the Constitutional Court, the central architect 
tion under the rule of law”.’ László Sólyom: Introduction to the Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary, in L. Sólyom and G. Brunner 
(eds.): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy, The Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000, 1 et sqq., 38.
327  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 139–159.
328  Tamás Győrfi, András Jakab: Jogállamiság, in A. Jakab (ed.): Az Alkotmány 
kommentárja, Századvég, Budapest, 2009, 155 et sqq., 174.
329  László Sólyom: The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Culture in Hungary, 
in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.): Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2015, 5 et sqq., 6–7.
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of the novel constitutional order and a key actor in the process of 
political and legal transition, was simple, but effective: “the rule of 
law cannot be achieved against the rule of law”.330 This meant fore-
most that the Court systematically enforced the principle of legal 
certainty and applied the rule of law, which it aimed to interpret 
and develop as a neutral concept,331 as the fundamental benchmark 
of its constitutional control powers.332 It was interpreted as having 
a normative content independent from concrete constitutional pro-
vision the violation of which could give rise to protection before 
the Constitutional Court. The rule of law was also available to sup-
port as their conceptual basis more specific constitutional norms, 
and it provided a philosophical umbrella for the entire constitu-
tional order, the individual norms of which were in turn available 
to give effect in individual instances to the rule of law as a general 
principle.
In the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court under the 1989 
Constitution,333 the rule of law emerged as a self-standing normative 
principle, and it was used to provide the basis of other, more spe-
cific constitutional norms, such as legal certainty and the separation 
of powers.
The new FL accorded a position in Hungarian constitutionalism 
to the rule of law similar to that in the 1989 Constitution. Its Article 
B) recognised the rule of law and democracy as the foundational 
principles of the Hungarian republic. Article C) contains the now 
self-standing principle of the separation of powers, which principle 
continues to be expressed in the detailed constitutional provisions 
on the organisation and the functioning of the state. Beyond the 
constitutional text, there are, however, a number of systemic devel-
330  HCC Decision 11/1992. (III. 5.) AB.
331  Gábor Attila Tóth: Túl a szövegen, Értekezés a magyar alkotmányról, Osiris, Bu-
dapest, 2009, 147.
332  For example, the Constitutional Court never paid much attention to the con-
cept of democracy and to its relevance in constitutional interpretation, see minor-
ity opinion of Judge Kiss in HCC Decision 39/1999. (XII. 21.) AB.
333  Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary as revised in 
1989–90, in force until 31 December 2011.
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opments which raise doubts as to the commitment of the new con-
stitutional order, and of the political order which developed the 
new constitutional framework, to sustaining and building upon the 
legacy of post-1989 Hungarian constitutionalism which had placed 
the rule of law at the heart of the functions performed by the con-
stitution in the Hungarian political, economic and social order. 
These developments include the instability of the constitution which 
followed from its frequent, politically-driven modifications, the 
imposition of serious limitations on the constitutional review exer-
cised by the Constitutional Court, and the open struggle between 
the Constitutional Court and the government acting in parliament 
for the supreme constitutional authority in the country. The events 
of constitution-making after 2010 seem to contradict the iconic 
statement in the early jurisprudence offering the foundations of 
a culture of the rule of law in Hungary that “the rule of law cannot 
be achieved against the rule of law”.334
Article B of the FL also supports the most important principles of 
the former Constitution – these are rule of law and democracy – 
and, although not in the official name of the country, but at least 
regarding the form of State, Hungary remains a republic,335 thus the 
republican traditions and guarantees may prevail. Article C(1) of 
the FL explicitly provides the principle of division of powers, which 
is welcomed considering the fact that until now this significant 
principle appeared only in the preamble of the former act on Con-
stitutional Court336 and of course in the Constitutional Court’s case 
law. It is worth to mention, however, that the division of powers 
should also be reflected in the rules on state organs in the FL and 
in constitutional practice – the declaration of the principle in itself 
does not add anything to the more detailed provisions on the con-
stitutional architecture. At most it may serve as a point of reference 
for the constitutional court.
334  HCC Decision 11/1992 (III. 5.) AB.
335  Article B(1)-(2) of the FL.
336  Act XXXII of 1989, in force until 1 January 2012.
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In addition, it was an extremely alarming issue concerning the 
basic principles of the FL that the TPFL has constructed an un-
usual constitutional liability for the “communist past”, furthermore 
it has overruled some important statements of the constitutional 
court e.g. on the right to the lawful and impartial judge337 and un-
dermined some rules of the FL itself.338 According to the Commis-
sioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary, the TPFL ‘severely harms 
the principle of the rule of law, which may cause problems of inter-
pretation and may endanger the unity and operation of the legal 
system. The Ombudsman is concerned because the Transitional 
Provisions contain many rules obviously having not transitional 
character.’339 Thus the Ombudsman requested the Constitutional 
Court to examine whether the Transitional Provisions comply with 
the requirements of the rule of law laid down in the FL. After the 
Ombudsman’s initiative, the Parliament adopted the First Amend-
ment to the FL clarifying that the Transitional Provisions are part 
of the FL. By this amendment the governing majority intended to 
avoid the constitutional review of the TPFL, confirming its consti-
tutional rank.340 Despite this, the Constitutional Court ruled on the 
337  HCC Decision 166/2011 (XII. 20.) AB.
338  On the TPFL and other cardinal acts read more in Gábor Halmai, Kim Lane 
Scheppele (eds.): Amicus Brief for the Venice Commission on the Transitional 
Provisions of the Fundamental Law and the Key Cardinal Laws, February 2012, 
available at <http://halmaigabor.hu/dok/426_Amicus_Cardinal_Laws_final.pdf>.
339  On the petition of the Ombudsman lodged in March, 2012 to the Constitu-
tional Court concerning the TPFL see http://www.ajbh.hu/en/web/ajbh-en/
press-releases/-/content/ujPUErMfB9lw/petition-of-the-ombudsman-to-the-con-
stitutional-court-concerning-the-transitional-provisions-of-the-fundamental-law.
340  In April 2012 the Government of Hungary lodged a bill to the Parliament as 
the First Amendment of the FL of Hungary so as to clarify that the Transitional 
Provisions are the part of the FL. The First Amendment was adopted in June 2012. 
It added a new 5th point to the Closing Provisions of the FL: ‘5. The transitional 
provisions related to this Fundamental Law adopted according to point 3 (31 
December 2011) are part of the Fundamental Law.’ Other relevant points of the 
Closing provisions: ‘2. Parliament shall adopt this Fundamental Law according to 
point a) of subsection (3) of Section 19 and subsection (3) of Section 24 of Act XX 
of 1949. 3. The transitional provisions related to this Fundamental Act shall be 
adopted separately by Parliament according to the procedure referred to in point 
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Ombudsman’s petition declaring that all the provisions of the TPFL 
lacking transitory character are invalid.341 As a response, the govern-
ing majority adopted the Fourth Amendment of the FL, which in-
corporated into the Constitution most of the abolished articles, and 
overrode several former Constitutional Court decisions. The Venice 
Commission expressed its serious concerns about the systematic 
shielding ordinary law from the constitutional review. The reduction 
(budgetary matters) and in some cases complete removal (consti-
tutionalised matters) of the competence of the Court to review 
ordinary legislation undermines on the one hand the rule of law 
– as the constitutional protection of the standards of the FL became 
limited; on the other hand, infringes the democratic system of checks 
and balances – as the Constitutional Court lost its influence and is 
not able to provide effective control.342
Regarding the mechanism for safeguarding the constitution, one 
of the weaknesses is that the FL – similarly to the former Constitu-
tion – can be amended relatively easily, only two-third majority of 
2 above.’ (The FL was not in force yet when the Parliament adopted the Transi-
tional Provisions – that is the reason of the reference to the former Constitution).
341  The Constitutional Court annulled approximately half of the articles of the 
TPFL in its decision of 28 December 2012 (HCC Decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB). 
Press release: ‘The Constitutional Court has declared that the Hungarian Parlia-
ment exceeded its legislative authority, when enacted such regulations into the 
“Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law” that did not have transitional 
character. The Hungarian Parliament shall comply with the procedural require-
ments also when acting as constitution-maker, because the regulations that violate 
these requirements are invalid. Therefore, the Constitutional Court annulled the 
concerned regulations due to formal deficiencies. The Constitutional Court, re-
garding its consistent practice, did not examine the constitutionality of the content 
of the Fundamental Law and the Transitional Provisions’, available at http://
hunconcourt.hu/sajto/news/certain-parts-of-the-transitional-provisions-of-the-
fundametal-law-held-contrary-to-the-fundamental-law. It is worth to mention the 
governing party’s response, in which the faction leader immediately declared that 
the annulled provisions will be inserted into the FL.
See also Zoltán Szente: Az Alkotmánybíróság döntése Magyarország Alaptör-
vényének Átmeneti rendelkezései alkotmányosságáról: az Alaptörvény integ ritása 
és az alkotmányozó hatalom korlátai, Jogesetek Magyarázata Vol. 4,  № 1, 2013, 
11–21.
342  Opinion № 720/2013 of the Venice Commission, point 87.
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all MPs is needed. The constitution amending process that started 
in 2010 and led to the constant amendments of the former Consti-
tution based on ad hoc political interests, made it clear that more 
guarantees are necessary – e.g. unchangeable provisions (eternity 
clause), referendum on certain amendments, approval of two se-
quential parliaments – for a stable constitution. The overwhelming 
practice of amending the constitution is going on with the FL as 
well, because the governing majority adopts modifications again 
and again with the purpose of punishing the Constitutional Court 
for unfavourable decisions, overrule the Court’s judgments or to 
prevent constitutional review.
The other key institution in safeguarding the constitution is the 
Constitutional Court. In parliamentary governmental systems, if 
the government is supported by a wide parliamentary majority, 
constitutional jurisdiction counterbalancing the unity of action of 
parliament and government constitutes the guarantee for the sep-
aration of powers and the sovereignty of the law (constitution). The 
greater the unity of action between the parliament and government, 
the wider competence is needed for constitutional jurisdiction to 
maintain the balance. In respect of the principle of rule of law it is 
very harmful that the FL upholds for an indefinite time the restric-
tion of the supervision and annulment rights of the Constitutional 
Court that was introduced in November 2010.343 More specifically, 
Article 37(4) of the Chapter on Public Finances of the FL lays down 
that with regard to ex post norm control and constitutional complaint 
procedures, the Constitutional Court is prevented from reviewing 
343  Because of a constitutional amendment in November 2010, a serious limitation 
of the competences of the Constitutional Court was introduced. According to this 
amendment, the Constitutional Court may assess the constitutionality of Acts 
related to the state budget, central taxes, duties and contributions, custom duties 
and central conditions for local taxes exclusively relating to the rights to life and 
human dignity, the protection of personal data, the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion or with rights related to the Hungarian citizenship. Also, the Court 
may only annul these Acts in case of violation of the abovementioned rights. The 
restriction of the Constitutional Court’s competences was the answer of the alli-
ance of the governing parties to a Court decision, which annulled a law on a cer-
tain tax imposed with retroactive effect.
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the content of or annulling acts on public finances, with the excep-
tion of four “protected fundamental rights”, as long as state debt 
exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product.344 Thus, the power of 
annulment is curtailed by Article 37(4) of the FL, because it excludes 
the constitutional review and annulment of Acts relating to public 
finances from the side of content, apart from four exceptions. This 
is not rectified even by the fact that Acts relating to this subject-
matter may be annulled in case the requirements of the legislative 
process were not met (for formal reasons). Paradoxically, this way 
the FL also excludes the protection by the Constitutional Court of 
its own provisions relating to public finances, because the violation 
of rules relating to public finances contained in the FL is most like-
ly to occur by way of Acts relating to the state budget, taxes, customs 
duties etc., which are subject to ex post review by the Constitu-
tional Court only from the aspect of the four protected fields of 
fundamental rights. The TPFL upheld and extended the effect of 
the disputed limitation on constitutional review,345 and the Fourth 
Amendment incorporated it into the FL.346
The restriction of the Constitutional Court’s rights of review and 
annulment is not in conformity either with the principles of Euro-
pean constitutional achievements or the traditions of Hungarian 
constitutionalism and democratic political culture developed since 
344  ‘As long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, the Consti-
tutional Court may, within its competence set out in Article 24(2)b-e), only review 
the Acts on the State Budget and its implementation, the central tax type, duties, 
pension and healthcare contributions, customs and the central conditions for local 
taxes for conformity with the Fundamental Law or annul the preceding Acts due 
to violation of the right to life and human dignity, the right to the protection of 
personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and with the rights 
related to Hungarian citizenship. The Constitutional Court shall have the unre-
stricted right to annul the related Acts for non-compliance with the Fundamental 
Law’s procedural requirements for the drafting and publication of such legislation.’
345  Article 27 of the TPFL: ‘Article 37(4) of the Fundamental Law shall remain in 
force for Acts that were promulgated when the state debt to the Gross Domestic 
Product ratio exceeded 50% even if the ration no longer exceeds 50%.’ This Ar-
ticle was also annulled by the Constitutional Court in its HCC Decision 45/2012. 
(XII. 29.) AB.
346  See Art. 17 of the Fourth Amendment.
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1989-90. It violates the constitutional principles of the rule of law, 
legal security and separation of powers. Because of the restriction 
of the procedure of the Constitutional Court, numerous fundamen-
tal rights (especially, for example, the right to property, social rights, 
the freedom of enterprise, the right to a profession) become 
“defenceless”.347
The TPFL introduced further indirect constraints on the right to 
effective judicial protection. If the ruling of Constitutional Court or 
the CJEU results a debt obligation of the State, under certain cir-
cumstances a general contribution covering the common needs – i.e. 
extra tax – shall be adopted. It can be understood as an intention 
to sanction – at least indirectly – the lawsuits and complaints in 
cases of great economic significance.348 The Constitutional Court 
annulled this regulation; however, the Fourth Amendment349 of the 
FL incorporated it into the text of the Constitution. As the Euro-
pean Commission expressed its serious concerns about the confor-
mity with EU law of the new article on CJEU judgments entailing 
payment obligations, the Fifth Amendment350 repealed this rule.
347  See also Opinion № 621/2011 of the Venice Commission, points 91–101, 
120–127.
348  See Article 29 of TPFL: ‘As long as the public debt exceeds 50% of the GDP, if 
the Constitutional Court, the CJEU, other Court or other law applying that body’s 
decision requires the State to pay a fine, and the Act on the central budget does 
not contain necessary reserves to pay the fine, and the amount of the fine cannot 
be allocated from the budget without undermining a balanced management of the 
budget or no other item from the budget may be eliminated to provide for the fine, 
a general contribution covering the common needs must be specified that relates 
in its name and content exclusively and explicitly to the above fine.’ This Article 
was annulled by the Constitutional Court in HCC Decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB.
349  See Art. 17 of the Fourth Amendment.
350  The Fifth Amendment of the FL was adopted by the governing majority in 
September 2013 with the intention of ‘closing international debates’, however not 
all of the challenged articles were modified. It entered into force on 1 October 2013.
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1.3.2 Democracy
The democracy principle is undermined in the FL on the one hand 
by defining ambiguously the political community, and on the other 
hand by reducing the significance of future elections through the 
instrument and high number of cardinal acts in the field of simple 
majority policies.
It is problematic, from the perspective of the principle of democ-
racy, that the FL does not clearly identify the political community 
to which it shall be applied, because the use of the concepts of 
political nation and cultural nation is inconsistent and controversial 
in the constitutional text. Article B of FL refers to the ‘people’ as the 
source of public power, and the preamble is written on behalf of 
citizens – both sentences are the proofs of the political nation ap-
proach. At the same time, Article D of FL uses the expression of 
‘one single Hungarian nation’ and the preamble also refers to the 
‘intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart.’ This word-
ing seems to support the cultural nation concept.351 These contro-
versies are further outlined in the chapter on ethnicity.
The creation of democratic will is restricted by the fact that the 
FL stipulates that in many fields of public policy – from family and 
tax policy to pension policy – the detailed regulation shall be en-
acted in form of cardinal acts, the adoption and amendment of which 
requires a two-thirds majority of the votes of members of Parliament 
present. Thus the voters who are dissatisfied with the present gov-
ernment policy will hardly be able to achieve a change in the direc-
tion of governance, because future governments cannot shape in 
a more flexible manner, on the basis of a simple majority, their social 
and taxation policy. At this point it is worth to quote the criticism of 
the Venice Commission: ‘a too wide use of cardinal laws is problem-
351  See Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 186–187, Georg Brunner: Nation-
ality problems and minority conflicts in Eastern Europe: strategies for Europe, Gutersloh 
Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996, 9–10, András Jakab and Pál Sonnevend: 
Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hungary, European Constitu-
tional Law Review Vol. 9, № 1, 2013, 109–112.
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atic with regard to both the constitution and ordinary laws. In [the 
Commission’s] view, there are issues on which the Constitution 
should arguably be more specific. These include for example the 
judiciary. On the other hand, there are issues which should/could 
have been left to ordinary legislation and majoritarian politics, such 
as family legislation or social and taxation policy. The Venice Com-
mission considers that parliaments should be able to act in a flexible 
manner in order to adapt to new framework conditions and face 
new challenges within society. Functionality of a democratic system 
is rooted in its permanent ability to change. The more policy issues 
are transferred beyond the powers of simple majority, the less sig-
nificance will future elections have and the more possibilities does 
a two-third majority have of cementing its political preferences and 
the country’s legal order. Elections, which, according to Article 3 of 
the First Protocol to the ECHR, should guarantee the “expression of 
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislator”, would 
become meaningless if the legislator would not be able to change 
important aspects of the legislation that should have been enacted 
with a simple majority. When not only the fundamental principles 
but also very specific and “detailed rules” on certain issues will be 
enacted in cardinal laws, the principle of democracy itself is at risk.’352
The open regulation of right to vote also related to the problems 
of defining democratic principle. A strongly debated issue con-
nected to the right to vote was the introduction of the periodical 
electoral registration. In the past decades the electoral rolls were 
created by the authorities on the basis of the personal data and 
residence register and all the adult citizens with voting right and 
having residence in Hungary were enrolled automatically. While 
Article 2 of the FL declares universal and equal suffrage, the TPFL 
and the new act on electoral procedure adopted in November 2012 
prescribed the registration upon request as precondition of voting 
on any elections.353 The constitutionality of the new act on elec-
352  Opinion № 621/2011 of the Venice Commission, point 24.
353  The related provisions of the TPFL were annulled by the Constitutional Court 
in HCC Decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB. 
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toral procedure was judged in January 2013 by the Constitutional 
Court upon the request of the Head of State. The Court declared 
that certain provisions of the new act – on electoral registration and 
political campaign – are contrary to the FL.354 This Constitutional 
Court decision was partly successful because the governing major-
ity gave up the idea of the introduction of voters’ registration, but 
the bans on media campaign355 were inserted into the FL with the 
Fourth Amendment, overriding this way the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling. Finally the Fifth Amendment modified this ban, and at the 
moment the Constitution allows publishing political ads in all types 
of media, not just on public service broadcasts, but exclusively free 
of charge and with equal air time, or alternatively not at all. It is 
rather hypocritical solution, because if the commercial media is 
354  HCC Decision 1/2013. (I. 7.) AB. Press release: ‘The Constitutional Court has 
declared that in the Act additional conditions are defined: in order to practice the 
right to vote, a previous registration should be done. Regarding these provisions, 
the Constitutional Court has examined whether there is any constitutional reason 
for the previous registration. Taking the practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights into consideration, the Constitutional Court has declared that in case of 
citizens domiciled in Hungary, the mandatory registration disproportionately re-
stricted the right to vote without any reason, thus this is contrary to the Funda-
mental Law. (…) In connection with the rules of election campaign, the 
Constitutional Court has declared that the freedom of expression and the freedom 
of press are disproportionally limited, because according to the Act during the 
electoral campaign the publication of political advertisements is allowed only in 
the public media service, thus these rules are contrary to the Fundamental Law. 
The rules that ban the publication of public opinion polls regarding the elections 
within six days before the elections has also been found contrary to the Funda-
mental Law.’ Available at http://hunconcourt.hu/sajto/news/certain- 
provisions-of-the-act-on-election-procedure-held-contrary-to-the-fundamental-law.
355  Article IX(3) of the FL shall be replaced by the following provision: ‘For the 
dissemination of appropriate information required for the formation of demo-
cratic public opinion and to ensure the equality of opportunity, political advertise-
ments shall be published in media services, exclusively free of charge.’ In the 
campaign period prior to the election of members of Parliament and of Members 
of the European Parliament, political advertisements published by and in the 
interest of nominating organisations setting up country-wide candidacy lists for 
the general election of members of Parliament or candidacy lists for the election 
of Members of the European Parliament shall exclusively be published by way of 
public media services and under equal conditions, as determined by cardinal Act.
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prohibited to charge for political advertisements and has to guar-
antee equal air time for all qualified parties during the campaign, 
the more economic choice may be to refrain from this activity.
1.3.3 International and Union requirements
Loyal cooperation is one of the fundamental principles in the EU 
that ensures the functioning of its supranational architecture.356 The 
FL expresses the commitment to the international community and 
law (Article Q) and contains also a European clause mandating the 
cooperation in the EU (Article E). The function and the purpose of 
these articles are similar to the corresponding rules of the former 
Constitution.357
356  See Article 4(3) of the TEU.
357  FL Article Q(1) In order to create and maintain peace and security, and to 
achieve the sustainable development of humanity, Hungary shall strive for coop-
eration with every nation and country of the world. (2) Hungary shall ensure 
harmony between international law and Hungarian law in order to fulfil its obli-
gations under international law. (3) Hungary shall accept the generally recognised 
rules of international law. Other sources of international law shall become part 
of the Hungarian legal system by publication in the form of legislation.
FL Article E(1) In order to enhance the liberty, prosperity and security of Eu-
ropean nations, Hungary shall contribute to the creation of European unity. (2) 
With a view to participating in the European Union as a member state, Hungary 
may exercise some of its competences arising from the Fundamental Law jointly 
with other member states through the institutions of the European Union under 
an international agreement, to the extent required for the exercise of the rights 
and the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Founding Treaties. (3) The 
law of the European Union may stipulate a generally binding rule of conduct 
subject to the conditions set out in Paragraph (2). (4) The authorisation to recog-
nise the binding nature of an international agreement referred to in Paragraph 
(2) shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes of the members of Parliament.
Former Constitution art. 6 (1) The Republic of Hungary renounces war as 
a means of solving disputes between nations and shall refrain from the use of 
force and the threat thereof against the independence or territorial integrity of 
other states. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall endeavour to co-operate with all 
peoples and countries of the world. (4) The Republic of Hungary shall take an 
active part in establishing a European unity in order to achieve freedom, well-
being and security for the peoples of Europe. Art. 7 (1) The legal system of the 
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Article Q(1) FL differs from the former Constitution in as much as 
it does not contain the renouncement of war and the prohibition of 
the use of force based on Article 2(4) of United Nations Charter.358 
Instead, it positively formulates the aims of peace, security and sus-
tainable development in international cooperation. Thus it incorpo-
rates the minimised version of one of the Union objectives in Article 
3(5) of the TEU;359 however, the latter covers more aspects of par-
ticipation in international community. Unfortunately, the FL reduces 
the scope of cooperation to nations and countries and does not refer 
to other actors of the international community (e.g. international and 
transnational organisations). Article Q(2)-(3) of the FL regulates the 
relation between international and domestic law. It maintains the 
principle of harmony, and in respect of the ‘generally recognised rules 
of international law’ it retains the monist concept with adoption 
theory. In case of other sources then ‘generally recognised rules’ of 
Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized principles of international 
law, and shall harmonize the country’s domestic law with the obligations assumed 
under international law. Art. 2/A (1) By virtue of treaty, the Republic of Hungary, 
in its capacity as a member state of the European Union, may exercise certain 
constitutional powers jointly with other member states to the extent necessary 
in connection with the rights and obligations conferred by the treaties on the 
foundation of the European Union and the European Communities (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘European Union’); these powers may be exercised independently 
and by way of the institutions of the European Union. (2) The ratification and 
promulgation of the treaty referred to in Subsection (1) shall be subject to a two-
thirds majority vote of the Parliament.
358  Gábor Sulyok: 6. § [Nemzetközi kapcsolatok], in András Jakab (ed.): Az Alkot-
mány kommentárja, Századvég, 2009, mn. 16, 23. and Gábor Sulyok: A nemzetközi 
jog és a belső jog viszonyának alaptörvényi szabályozása, Jog Állam Politika № 1, 
2012, 17. For the detailed analysis of FL Article Q(2)-(3) see Gábor Sulyok: Incor-
poration of International Law into Domestic Law under the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary, in Péter Smuk (ed.): The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal System 
2010–2013, CompLex, 2013, 31–50.
359  Article 3(5) of the TEU: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall 
uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of 
its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of 
the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, erad-
ication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of 
the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of interna-
tional law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’
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international law (i.e., treaties and case law of international Courts) 
it supports the dualist model with transformation. It still does not 
express the priority of international law over domestic law.
To ensure ‘harmony’, the Constitutional Court under Article 24(2) 
point f) of the FL continues to review the conflict between domes-
tic legislation and international treaties in the future, but the FL 
does neither regulates who may initiate this procedure, nor refers 
to the possibility of ex officio revision. This is defined in the cardinal 
act on the Constitutional Court.360 It is not clear either, how ‘har-
mony’ shall be ensured, if a domestic legal act violates one of the 
‘generally recognised rules of international law’, thus – as hitherto 
– it can be answered by constitutional interpretation. The annul-
ment of the domestic legislation breaching an international treaty 
is optional under Article 24(3) point c) of FL, which weakens the 
effectiveness of the constitutional requirement of harmony. It would 
have been preferable to oblige the Constitutional Court in the FL 
to annul those domestic legislative acts that are at the same rank 
as, or lower rank than the act transposing the international treaty.361 
360  According to the Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court the revision 
either takes place ex officio, or upon the initiation of one-fourth of the MPs, the 
Government, the President of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Prosecutor, the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, or the judge of any Court of law if in 
a given case s/he shall apply a domestic legislative act conflicting with an inter-
national treaty.
361  Cf. with the former Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court. Under 
articles 44-47 the annulment was obligatory in such cases. The new Act CLI of 
2011 on the Constitutional Court is ambiguous at this point. Under art. 42(1) the 
Constitutional Court shall annul the domestic legal act conflicting with an inter-
national treaty, if the given domestic legal act may not conflict with the act pro-
mulgating the given international treaty according to the FL. I.e., if an 
international treaty is promulgated by an act of parliament, and the challenged 
domestic legal act is e.g. a government decree then the latter shall be annulled. 
Under art. 42(2) the Constitutional Court shall call the Government or the law-
maker to eliminate the conflict, if a domestic legal act conflicts with an interna-
tional treaty, and the act promulgating the given international treaty may not 
conflict with the concerned domestic legal act according to the FL. That is the 
case when an international treaty is promulgated by a government decree, and 
the domestic legal act conflicting with it is an act of parliament. The new regula-
tion does not answer the question of the same rank collisions, i.e. if the interna-
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The domestic legislation conflicting with TEU or TFEU should have 
been an exception to this rule. The breach of TEU or TFEU shall be 
established by the CJEU, thus it is an external limitation for the 
Constitutional Court’s competence.362
Article E(1) as the basis of the European and Union cooperation 
essentially follows word by word the §6(4) of former Constitution.363 
Thus the frame of interpretation remains unchanged;364 this objec-
tive expresses the commitment to each kind of European (interna-
tional or supranational) cooperation. The most intensive form of 
cooperation is within the framework of the European Union.365 
Article E paragraphs (2) and (4), with some simplification, adopts 
the rules of §2/A of the former Constitution; however, the formula-
tion differs at one point. The difference is that the two distinct 
clauses of §2/A(1) [‘exercise certain constitutional powers jointly 
with other member states (…); these powers may be exercised in-
dependently and by way of the institutions of the European Union’] 
have been merged in Article E(4) [‘jointly with other member states 
through the institutions of the European Union’]. However, in legal 
understanding, in the course of Union legislative processes the 
member states do not exercise the competences “jointly”, but those 
are exercised by the institutions.366 §2/A – which also uses inade-
quate terminology – defined the ‘way of institutions’ as one of the 
forms of joint exercising powers in the EU. In Article E of the FL, 
tional treaty is promulgated by the act of parliament, and the domestic legal act 
conflicting with it is also the act of parliament.
362  Tamás Molnár: Az új Alaptörvény rendelkezései a nemzetközi jog és a belső 
jog viszonyáról, in Tímea Drinóczi and András Jakab (eds.): Alkotmányozás Ma-
gyarországon 2010–2011, PPKE JÁK, PTE ÁJK, 2013.
363  See also András Bragyova: No New(s), Good News? The Fundamental Law 
and the European law, in Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.): Constitution for a disunited nation, 
CEU Press, 2012, 335–338.
364  See also László Blutman and Nóra Chronowski: Hungarian Constitutional 
Court: Keeping Aloof from European Union Law, International Constitutional Law Vol. 
5, № 3, 2011, 329.
365  László Blutman and Nóra Chronowski: Az Alkotmánybíróság és a közösségi 
jog: alkotmányjogi paradoxon csapdájában I, Európai Jog № 2, 2007,  8–9.
366  Blutman ‘Az Európai Unió joga’ 94.
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yet, the exercise of powers ‘through the institutions’ is referred to 
as joint exercise. While the Lisbon Treaty abolished the so-called 
pillar system, and created a single institutional system, the supra-
national (i.e., Community) method has not became automatically 
dominant. The Lisbon Treaty intended to integrate the perspectives 
of supranational and intergovernmental methods e.g. by respecting 
the constitutional identity of member states, the effective involve-
ment of national parliaments, the consolidation of member states’ 
initiative in respect of some competences.367 Strictly speaking the 
joint exercise of powers is not the same as the exercise through the 
institutions.368 All these would have been surmounted, if in the text 
of FL the ‘conferral’ of certain constitutional powers appeared in 
accordance with Article 5 of the TEU.
Article E contains only one new rule compared to §2/A of the 
former Constitution, in its paragraph (3) it states that ‘[t]he law of 
the European Union may stipulate a generally binding rule of con-
duct.’ From the domestic legal viewpoint, the ground for constitu-
tional validity of Union law becomes clearer than it used to be; 
however this paragraph still does not solve the problem of primacy, 
i.e. that the domestic legal act conflicting with an EU legal act is not 
applicable. The duty of the Courts of law to ensure the consistency 
of domestic and Union law still stems from EU Treaties (i.e., asking 
for preliminary ruling) and not from the constitution itself. Thus 
the position of international law in the domestic legal system is still 
better defined under Article Q of the FL by the harmony-requirement 
than the constitutional rank of Union law.
With respect to Articles Q and E of the FL, international agree-
ments continue to oblige Hungary to respect, protect and uphold 
the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. These obligations 
thus stem from the constitution itself. The above-mentioned provi-
sions – since they relate to the effect that the international and su-
367  Besselink ‘National and constitutional identity’ 38–41.
368  The Constitutional Court has also respected the relevance of the difference 
of exercising powers jointly and by the way of institutions. See the HCC Decision 
143/2010. (VII. 14.) AB on the Act promulgating the Lisbon Treaty.
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pranational laws governing nations have on Hungarian law – are 
valid in respect of the constitution (as prevailing at any time), and 
set requirements that broach no exceptions. The European national 
constitutions also contain similar provisions with the same functions, 
reaffirming the existence of multilevel and parallel constitutionalism 
in the European legal area. Thus these kinds of constitutional provi-
sions preliminary commit and restrain national governments for and 
by the international and common European values.369
Several provisions of the FL, however, can also be interpreted as 
permitting exceptions to the aforementioned European requirements 
– pertaining to democracy, the rule of law and the protection of 
fundamental rights – and as such they could come into conflict with 
international commitments.
1.4 Conclusion
It cannot be denied that the FL is an ideological constitution with 
nationalist-ethnocentric and communitarian features that diverges 
from the liberal trends of West European constitutional evolution.370 
It is also true that the amendments of the FL – especially the fourth 
one – raise criticalities again concerning the principle of rule of law, 
independence of Constitutional Court and judiciary, freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion, free movement of work, etc. Ulti-
mately, the direction of interpretation of these problematic provi-
sions depends on the Parliament,371 the Constitutional Court and 
the courts of law.
369  Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh and Zachary Elkins: Commitment and 
Diffusion: Why Constitutions Incorporate International Law, University of Illinois 
Law Review, 2008, 101. Available at <http://works.bepress.com/zachary_elkins/1>.
370  Vincze and Varju ‘Hungary: the New Fundamental Law’ 437-453.
371  It is worth to mention that the Hungarian Parliament – i.e. the two-third 
governing majority – in the First Amendment of the FL in June 2012 gave up its 
intention to change the constitutional status of the Central Bank by merging it 
with the authority supervising financial bodies. Thus it repealed Article 30 of the 
TPFL, which originally stated: ‘A cardinal act (…) may specify that a new organisa-
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The constitutional practice based on the FL could have been 
developed nevertheless in line with the Union values; at the most 
some provisions of the FL would have not been effective or remained 
empty declaration – and belonging to Europe is worth this price. 
It is the responsibility of the Hungarian State authorities interpret-
ing the FL, but first of all the duty of the Constitutional Court to 
take into consideration the international and especially EU obliga-
tions, if other state organs neglect them.372 Only a member state 
tion assume the tasks and jurisdiction of the organisation charged with Financial 
Supervisory Authority and the Hungarian National Bank.’ The rationale of this 
amendment can be found in the pressure from EU institutions, especially from 
ECB. Ironically – and contrary to the First Amendment – the Fifth Amendment 
reintroduced the constitutional basis for merging the authority supervising finan-
cial bodies and the National Bank. Later it led to transparency problems that the 
Constitutional Court partly resolved. See to this Emese Szilágyi: Hungarian Con-
stitutional Court: Transparency and Business Activities of the State, Vienna Journal 
on International Constitutional Law Vol. 10, № 3, 2016, 339–351.
The Parliament was also forced to change the regulation on early retirement 
of judges in 2012 after the decision of the Constitutional Court and CJEU. The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court declared the violation of the independence of 
judges in its HCC Decision 33/2012. (VII. 17.) AB. On the request of the Euro-
pean Commission the CJEU ruled in November 2012 that the abrupt and radical 
lowering of the retirement age for judges, prosecutors and notaries in Hungary 
violates EU equal treatment rules (Directive 2000/78/EC). According to the Court’s 
judgment (case C-286/12), the forced early retirement of hundreds of judges and 
prosecutors in the course of 2012 as well the notaries in 2014 under a new Hun-
garian law constitutes unjustified age discrimination. In fact, the court decisions 
were not able to reinstate the dismissed judges into their original position. See 
to this Attila Vincze: Der EuGH als Hüter der ungarischen Verfassung – An-
merkung zum Urteil des EuGH v. 6.11.2012, Rs. C-286/12 (Kommission/Ungarn), 
Europarecht Vol. 48, № 3, 2013, 323–333.
372  As it will be discussed below in this part at point 2.1., the Constitutional Court 
originally seemed to be open to this. In its landmark decision on the unconstitu-
tionality of TPFL the Court emphasised that the constitutional criteria of a demo-
cratic state governed by the rule of law are respected by the international 
community. They are reaffirmed by international treaties as values, principles and 
fundamental freedoms and some of them are part of the international ius cogens. 
These criteria must not be eroded or endangered. The Constitutional Court may 
keep under control whether the substantive guaranties and requirements of the 
democracy and rule of law prevail, and how they are incorporated into the con-
stitution. The Court criticized and condemned the constitutional practice of the 
Parliament that infringed the principle of rule of law by enacting the TPFL with 
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that sets aside constitutional fetishism and insists on its voluntary 
commitment to European integration and legal values can vindicate 
the ‘constitutional tolerance’373 implicitly enshrined among the 
Union values and principles.374
As the time goes by, however, fewer and fewer are the hopes that 
the EU values are enforceable in Hungary internally by the judi-
ciary as the system of checks and balances was weakened over the 
past years, and the governing majority listened to the European 
critics selectively without changing the status quo. Hungary has 
instituted sweeping and controversial changes, prompting the Eu-
ropean Commission and Council of Europe jointly to express con-
cern regarding the rule of law in Hungary. If political pressure has 
no effect, and Article 7 of the TEU is not applicable, there are still 
some financial and budgetary instruments for compelling a disobe-
dient member state in order to act in compliance with EU criteria 
system. It is clear however, that a more effective course of action 
– comprising political, legal and financial instruments – is necessary 
at EU level, because the respect of common European constitu-
tional traditions remains fragile in some countries of transition.
2 The Constitutional Court and the network of  
     multilevel European constitutionalism
To continue the former line of thoughts, this chapter analyses how 
effectively did – or did not – the Constitutional Court use interna-
tional and European values in its reasoning to protect the pre-2010 
constitutional traditions.
its controversial and non-transitional rules. The Court underpinned that TPFL is 
a slippery-act or chute-act, which is suitable to deprive the Court itself from its 
jurisdiction and to establish controversial provisions with constitutional rank 
outside the text of the FL. (HCC Decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB, points IV.7-8).
373  Joseph H.H. Weiler: In defence of the status quo: Europe’s constitutional 
Sonderweg, in Joseph H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds.): European Constitu-
tionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 21.
374  See Article 4(2) of the TEU.
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The Constitutional Court tried, sometimes with greater, some-
times with less vehemence, to protect the FL, with more or less 
success. European bodies followed the process with great interest: 
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe kept providing its 
opinions on the significant amendments to the FL and on the car-
dinal laws and the European Parliament adopted several resolutions 
as well. The sharpest criticism was induced by the Fourth Amend-
ment to the FL, in which amendment lex specialis rules (e. g. Article 
U) were introduced in comparison to the fundamental principles 
of the rule of law, democracy and the protection of fundamental 
rights; regulations (e.g. student contracts, acknowledgement of 
churches, concept of family) evading or bypassing Constitutional 
Court rulings were enacted substantially reducing the space for 
constitutional protection, a specific review- and a new interpretation-
limit was raised in the way of constitutional judicature (excluding 
substantial review of the amendments to the constitution, repealing 
of Constitutional Court decisions adopted before the FL), open 
infringement of EU law (limitation of election campaigns, possibil-
ity of special taxation as an indirect result of court rulings) was also 
risked. The European Commission initiated several infringement 
procedures as well, on the basis of which the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as CJEU) adopted two 
judgments: in the subject of radical lowering of the retirement age 
of judges and in the subject of bringing to an end the term served 
by the Data Protection Supervisor. Hungary infringed EU law in 
both cases.375 
The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
ECtHR) also received Hungarian cases which had arisen from the 
elimination of the previous constitutionalism and from the arrange-
ments based on the new FL – such as the recognition of churches, 
layoff without reasoning, lifetime imprisonment without compul-
sory review, premature termination of the mandate of the President 
375  Case C-286/12, Commission v Hungary, judgment of 6 November 2012; Case 
C-286/12, Commission v Hungary, judgment of 8 April 2014.
155constitutional challenges in Hungary 
of the Supreme Court, and ban on parliamentary right to expres-
sion.376 The State of Hungary infringed the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECHR) in every case.
There is no room herein to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
all of the issues arisen and debated at European forums.377 I under-
take in this chapter to examine in terms of some European consti-
tutional values how much did the Constitutional Court of Hungary 
endeavour to enforce European standards in the course of interpret-
ing the FL and how much did it try to contribute in the European 
Network of (Constitutional) Courts.378
The reason for the chosen approach is that no European consti-
tutional system may be regarded as isolated within the multilevel 
constitutional area. Constituents of this area, the European judicial 
forums, may provide a legally binding decision on the harmony 
between the system based on the FL and the values and standards 
of European constitutionalism, but the opinion of a body holding 
376  Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and others v. Hungary, Judgment of 8 
April 2014; K.M.C. v. Hungary, Judgment of 10 July 2012; László Magyar v. Hun-
gary, Judgment of 20 May 2014, no. 73593/10; Baka v. Hungary, Judgment of 27 
May 2014, no. 20261/12., Karácsony and others v. Hungary, Judgment of 16 Sep-
tember 2014, no. 42461/13.
377  See for example Imre Vörös: The constitutional landscape after the fourth and 
fifth amendments of Hungarian Fundamental Law, Acta Juridica Hungarica № 1, 
2014, 1–20.; Zeller ‘Nichts ist so beständig’ 307–325., Attila Vincze: Wrestling 
with Constitutionalism: the supermajority and the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, International Constitutional Law № 4, 2013, 86–97.
378  Voßkuhle characterises the system of European courts and constitutional 
courts as follows: “The European constitutional courts are parts of a system that 
provides room for coordination: they constitute a, as it is called in German, ‘Ver-
bund’, a network, the cooperating network of European constitutional courts. 
There is not any supreme guard of fundamental rights in Europe. The whole 
European construction of human rights is not based on a single foundation stone, 
but on columns: and these columns are the European constitutional courts. As 
for their functions, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union may be regarded today, in my opinion, as the ‘European 
constitutional court’.” Andreas Voßkuhle: Az emberi jogok védelme a bíróságok 
európai együttműködésében [Protection of human rights in the European coop-
eration of courts], Alkotmánybírósági Szemle № 1, 2013, 69.
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great professional authority, such as the Venice Commission, may 
also be governing and influence their decisions. 
2.1 The Fundamental Law and the requirements of  
       European constitutionalism
2.1.1 Declarations of intent of the Constitutional Court within  
         the framework of relevant interpretation
It is without any doubt that the FL expresses commitment towards 
the international community and law (Article Q) and contains the 
Europe Clause (Article E) providing basis for cooperation with the 
EU. Having regard to these provisions – confirming Article B(1) and 
Article I –, the international treaties in force still oblige Hungary to 
maintain the rule of law, democracy, to respect and protect and 
enforce fundamental rights. Consistency between international law 
and Hungarian law must be assured, and part must be taken in the 
creation of European unity under the rules in, inter alia, the treaties 
on which the European Union is founded and in the ECHR. The 
relationship between the domestic law and the EU law has not 
changed, and the Constitutional Court emphasised its commitment 
to the European constitutional evolution, sometimes in a demon-
strative manner only, sometimes in a way affecting the case in ques-
tion as well.
Even when it was searching for standards in its Decision 61/2011. 
(VII. 13.) AB for the review of the unconstitutional amendment, but 
did not find any, provided however obiter dictum two important and 
forward thoughts, still (or already) before the entry into force of the 
FL. One of them suggested a potential standard for review, the other 
one promised a level of protection of fundamental rights. The first 
one had an overall negative career and brought harmful consequenc-
es for the Constitutional Court and is actually a floating one without 
having concretised itself in practice. The second one has however 
expanded itself, and played a role in specific cases as well.
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2.1.2 International and European Union constraint with  
          uncertain boundaries?
The first quotation: “The standards, fundamental principles and 
fun da mental values of ius cogens provide altogether a standard that 
must be met by every subsequent constitutional amendments and 
Constitutions. A larger part of these principles and values has been 
incorporated into the Constitution and into the case-law of the Con-
stitutional Court or has become part of laws of the branches of law 
(e.g. formulation of the prohibition of retroactive effect in terms of 
criminal law, the nullum crimen sine lege principle, the nulla poena sine 
lege principle or the principle of exercise of rights of good faith, the 
principle of fair trial, etc. in other branches of law). The principles, 
guarantees of ius cogens appear in the form of values in the laws of 
the branches of law and in other legislation as well.”379 This part 
seems to suggest that the Constitutional Court would in general, 
but not in specific cases, attribute in principle a certain level of 
“supraconstitutionality” to the international ius cogens standards, 
i.e. would consider them as holding an interpretative priority in the 
course of constitutional judicature.380 The quoted thought is how-
ever not so convincing: the only positive and in terms of law inter-
pretable argument of the body as regards the (potential) call for the 
ius cogens may be its incorporation into domestic law, i. e. its trans-
formation from supra-constitutional into intra-constitutional.
The above-mentioned standards appear again, although in a much 
more wrapped and an even more blurred form, in the Decision on 
the TPFL, as adopted about a year after the entry into force of the 
new constitution. The Constitutional Court established in its Deci-
sion 45/2012. (XII. 29.) AB that it has the power to review the TPFL, 
whereas it had become a regulation substituting the constitution 
379  HCC Decision 61/2011. (II. 13.) AB, ABH [Decisions of the Constitutional 
Court] 2011, 696, 711.
380  Blutman László: Az Alkotmánybíróság és az alkotmány feletti normák: könnyű 
liaison elkötelezettség nélkül? [Constitutional Court and Supraconstitutional 
Norms: An Airy Liaison Without Commitments?], Közjogi Szemle № 4, 2011, 1–11.
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and disrupting the unity and structure thereof and taking away the 
scope of competence of the Constitutional Court. The body pro-
vided an extremely faint reference in this decision to the possibility 
of eventual substantial review of future amendments to the FL in 
comparison with international standards. „Constitutional legality 
has not only procedural, formal and public law validity requirements, 
but also substantial ones. The constitutional criteria of a democrat-
ic State under the rule of law are at the same time constitutional 
values, principles and fundamental democratic freedoms enshrined 
in international treaties and accepted and acknowledged by com-
munities of democratic States under the rule of law, as well as the 
ius cogens, which is partly the same as the foregoing. As appropriate, 
the Constitutional Court may even examine the free enforcement 
and the constitutionalization of the substantial requirements, guar-
antees and values of democratic States under the rule of law.”381 
International standards are transformed here into a requirement to 
a democratic state governed by rule of law, and are internalised – 
without precise reference to their source, origin or scope.
Parliament exercising the power to amend the constitution found 
this indirect reference however more than enough – the fourth 
amendment closed the ways to substantial review of future amend-
ments. Upon the motion of the Commissioner of Fundamental 
Rights, the Constitutional Court undertook to review this amend-
ment, but no invalidity was found by Decision 12/2013. (V. 24.) AB. 
Getting out of the embarrassing situation, or in order that the pre-
vious searching for international standards does not appear as vain 
or as a kind of “fleeing ahead” from the expectable international 
criticism, the following admonishment was given obiter dicta in the 
closing remarks: 
“The Constitutional Court emphasises that the limitations implied 
by the interrelated system of fundamental rights, and implied in 
Articles E and Q of the Fundamental Law and applicable to the 
prevailing legislative and constitution making powers as well, which 
381  HCC Decision 45/2012. (II. 29.) AB, ABH 2012, 347, 403. para [118]
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limitations result from the obligations of Member State of the EU 
and from ensuring the harmony between the international law and 
Hungarian law in order to fulfill the obligations of Hungary under 
international law and from acceptance of the rules generally ac-
knowledged by international law may not be ignored either in these 
acts [i. e. the ones specifying the Fourth Amendment to the Funda-
mental Law] or in other ones. (...) [Besides the coherence of the 
Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court], in the course of as-
sessing the given constitutional issue, acting according to the gov-
erning rules, shall also consider the obligations undertaken by 
Hungary in international treaties and those accompanying its EU 
membership, and the rules generally acknowledged by interna-
tional law and the fundamental principles and values therein. All 
these rules, having special regard to their values being enshrined 
in the Fundamental Law as well, form such a single system (system 
of values) which may not be ignored either in the constitutional or 
the legislative process or in the course of constitutionality review 
by the Constitutional Court.”382 The encoded message is more spe-
cific than the previous one: inherent constraints are implied by the 
European Union membership and international obligations, i.e. 
from Articles E and Q, for the constitution making and legislative 
power. In light of the foregoing it is however highly improbable 
that the Constitutional Court would confront the constitution mak-
ing power with these constraints.
2.1.3 Equivalences and the lack of conflicts
In Decision 61/2011. (VII. 13.) AB, as direct continuation of the 
thoughts firstly quoted, the body adjusts the level domestic consti-
tutional protection of fundamental rights to the international level, 
not on hierarchic basis but as a conclusion from the pacta sunt ser-
vanda principle: “In case of certain fundamental rights, the Consti-
382  HCC Decision 12/2013. (II. 24.) AB, ABH 2013, 542, 547. paras [46] and [48]
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tution defines the substance of the fundamental right in the same 
way as it is in some international treaty (for example the Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of 
Human Rights). In these cases, the level of protection of fundamen-
tal rights provided by the Constitutional Court may in no case be 
lower than the level of international protection of rights (typically 
elaborated by the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights). As resulting 
from the pacta sur servanda principle [Section 7(1) of the Constitu-
tion, Article Q(2)-(3) of the FL], the Constitutional Court is required 
to follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the level of protection 
of fundamental rights defined therein, even if it did not necessarily 
arise from its own previous case-law decisions.”383 
Later it extends the international determination of the level of 
protection of fundamental rights with the stipulations of EU law, 
moreover, it considers the above quoted conclusion as being “even 
more true” for the law of the European Union, having regard to 
Article E(2)-(3) of the FL (compared to the rules of the Constitution 
however it did not elaborate in detail the meaning of the new Ar-
ticle E(3)).384 Therefore, without any particular dogmatic argument 
or foundation, Decision 32/2012. (VII. 4.) AB on student contracts 
did indeed refer to the jurisprudence of the CJEU and mentioned 
the necessity to consider fundamental freedoms of the EU, but did 
not profoundly investigate the connections between “binding down” 
and EU citizenship. With these decisions, the Constitutional Court 
basically defined the requirement for the equivalence of internal 
protection of fundamental rights.
In the decision on the concept of family, which decision had a big 
effect (because it resulted in an amendment to the constitution), 
the body confirmed maintaining the practice preceding the FL with 
that the case-law of the ECtHR is the starting point for interpreting 
the ECHR: “It takes, in line with its practice so far, the jurisprudence 
of the Court empowered by the states parties to the Convention to 
383  HCC Decision 61/2011. (VII. 13.) AB, ABH 2011, 696, 711.
384  HCC Decision 32/2012. (VII. 4.) AB, ABH 2012, 228, 233.
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provide authentic (authoritative) interpretation of the Convention 
for interpreting and clarifying the content of the relevant provisions 
of the Convention. This taking as a basis is done on the basis of 
those dictums (‘case-law’, in a figurative sense) of the Court when 
the Court interprets the Convention itself, its certain expressions, 
when it points out what is compatible with the requirements of the 
Convention and what is not”.385 It is important to underline that 
taking as basis does not mean the recognition of the ECtHR deci-
sions as binding or as automatic interpretative priority386 concerning 
the text of the FL.
Logically, the body adjusts itself when interpreting other conven-
tions concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe: “The 
interpretation by the Constitutional Court as regards the content 
of international treaties should of course coincide with the official 
interpretation by the Council of Europe as regards these treaties.”387
The body acknowledged in Decision 4/2013. (II. 21.) AB, in the 
case of the red star, that the ECtHR decision establishing infringe-
ment of the convention by Hungary may eliminate the res iudicata,388 
moreover upon the effect of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, but not 
expressly because of a specific decision, the Constitutional Court 
may depart from its previous case-law. The body confirmed at the 
same time that the Strasbourg ruling itself does not overwrite the 
385  HCC Decision 43/2012. (XII. 20.) AB, ABH 2012, 788, 800–801., referring back 
to HCC Decision 166/2011. (XII. 20.) AB, ABH 2011, 557.
386  For the concepts of interpretative, applicative and abrogative priorities and 
primacies see Blutman László: A nemzetközi jog érvényesülése a magyar belső 
jogban: két előkérdés [The functioning of international law in Hungarian internal 
law: two preliminary questions], in Blutman László, Csatlós Erzsébet  and Schiff-
ner Imola: A nemzetközi jog hatása a magyar joggyakorlatra [The effect of interna-
tional law on Hungarian legal practice], HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2014, 107–108.
387  HCC Decision 41/2012. (XII. 6.) AB, ABH 2012, 742, 745. [17]. Interpretation 
by the Constitutional Court of the conventions of the Council of Europe on the 
protection of minorities became necessary in this case.
388  HCC Decision 4/2013. (II. 21.) AB, ABH 2013, 188, 191. [20]: “Considering all 
that, the Constitutional Court established that the ruling of the ECtHR in the case 
Vajnai v Hungary, which ruling contains conclusions as regards Section 269/B of 
the Criminal Code (...), is such a new condition and aspect significant in terms of 
law, that makes the repeated constitutional review necessary.”
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jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and established the re-
quirement for reverse equivalence, i.e. the fact that the protection 
system of the ECHR is only a minimum standard which may not 
erode any higher level protection at member state level. With this 
declaration the Hungarian body did not say anything new, where-
fore this is clearly stated in Article 53 of the Convention, in the 
clause on non-reversal.389 According to the Constitutional Court 
therefore, “The ruling of the ECtHR is of declarative nature, i.e. it 
does not mean direct alteration of the points of law, its jurisprudence 
may however provide assistance in the interpretation of constitu-
tional fundamental rights, as set out in the Fundamental Law and 
in international conventions, and in the determination of their con-
tent and extent. The meaning of rights ensured by the European 
Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Con-
vention’) is embodied in the decisions adopted by the ECtHR in 
specific cases facilitating uniform perception of the interpretation 
of human rights. The Convention and consideration of the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR may not lead to the limitation of the protec-
tion of fundamental rights under the Fundamental Law or to setting 
a lower level of protection. The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
Convention set the minimum level for protection of fundamental 
rights that must be ensured by every state party thereto, the inter-
national law may however develop a different and higher system 
of requirements for the protection of human rights.”390 In the case 
of the red star the situation was however on the contrary: the Con-
stitutional Court adjusted the national level of protection of the 
freedom of expression to the level of Strasbourg.391
Decision 36/2013. (XII. 5.) AB declaring transfer of cases to be 
(ex post facto) unconstitutional and in conflict with the Convention 
389  Article 53 of the ECHR: Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as 
limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under 
any other convention to which it is a party.
390  HCC Decision 4/2013. (II. 21.) AB, ABH 2013, 188, 191. para [19].
391  See also Erzsébet Csatlós: The Red Star Story and the ECtHR in the Hungar-
ian Legal Practice, Jogelméleti Szemle Vol. 15, № 4, 2014, 2–11.
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goes even beyond and expressly acknowledges that interpretative 
primacy may be attributed to the decisions of the ECtHR in certain 
situations. “In case the national legislation has the same content as 
the law in the Convention or in any of its Additional Protocols or 
it serves the fulfilment of the obligation to ensure this right, then 
Article Q of the Fundamental Law implies that the Constitutional 
Court should refrain from interpreting the particular legislation (or 
legislative provision) in a way that would inevitably result in the 
infringement of obligations undertaken under international law 
and in repeated condemnation of Hungary in front of the Court.”392 
The other significant result of the decision is that the Constitu-
tional Court confirmed the followings as derived from the constitu-
tion: no reference may be made to the FL in order to become exempt 
from the obligations undertaken under international law. The con-
stitution making power, according to the reading of the body, ac-
knowledges to respect this fundamental rule of international law.393 
392  HCC Decision 36/2013. (XII. 5.) AB, ABH 2013, 1268, 1273. para [28].
393  HCC Decision 36/2013. (XII. 5.) AB, ABH 2013, 1268, 1276. paras [46]–[47]: 
“The Constitutional Court reminds that the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamen-
tal Law, regardless of the fact that Article Q of the Fundamental Law has already 
ascertained the fundamental rules of the relationship between Hungarian Law 
and international law taking the text of Section 7(1) of the Constitution as basis, 
but with the conscious readjustment thereof, devoted a separate point in the 
closing provisions again for the importance of the continuity of and respecting 
the obligations under international law. Therefore, by virtue of the Closing and 
miscellaneous provisions of the Fundamental Law: ‘8. The entry into force of the 
Fundamental Law shall not affect the legal force of legal regulations adopted, 
normative acts governing public organisations, and other legal instruments of 
state control issued, specific decisions taken and international legal commitments 
undertaken before its entry into force.’ The Constitutional Court established that 
the constitution making power expressed in this point its attachment to one of 
the fundamental rules of international law which had been declared by the Per-
manent Court of International Justice when it did not accept that Germany would 
become exempt from its obligations under the Peace of Versailles on the basis of 
its internal legal act (declaration of neutrality). (CPJI: A Wimbledon steamship 
case, 17 August 1923. Série A n° 1., pp 29–30). The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice stated in the case of Polish citizens of Danzig, and so setting the 
standards even higher, that ‘no state may refer to its own constitution against 
another state in order to become exempt from its obligations under interna-
tional law or treaties in force’. (CPJI: Advisory Opinion to the case on Treatment 
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This argument may be called as the requirement for conflict-free 
coexistence, which argument the Constitutional Court may use as 
a corollary of this decision to prevent eventual conflicts between 
the international law and the new Hungarian constitution.
Decision 6/2014. (II. 26.) AB is the last step that is worth men-
tioning in the process of adjustment to the European standard of 
fundamental rights. The body granted direct enforcement (applica-
tive) priority to the ECtHR decision establishing that the 98 percent 
special tax infringes the Convention,394 resulting in a certain level 
of supra-constitutionality regarding the specific limitation to review 
in the FL.395 The stakes were however not high because the 98 per-
cent tax rate is not in force any more (it is 75 percent due to the 
modification), the Constitutional Court ordered therefore a prohi-
bition of application in cases where the previous tax rate should be 
applied.396 The body took the opportunity however to “save” an-
other element of the practice preceding the FL for “the period fol-
of Polish Nationals in the Danzig Territory; 4 February 1932, Série A/B n° 44, pp 
24). These sentences have been of determinative nature since their statement: 
they provide the basis for conflict-free coexistence of international law and na-
tional constitutions, and are already reflected in the Fundamental Law.”
394  HCC Decision 6/2014. (II. 26.) AB, ABH 2014, 202, 204. paras [22] and [24]: 
“The Chamber of the Strasbourg European Court of Human Rights established 
in its Decision № 41838/11. (R. Sz. v Hungary) of 2 July 2013 (Para. (62)), Decision 
№ 66529/11. (N. K. M. v Hungary) of 14 May 2013 (Para. 76) and Decision № 
49570/11. (Gáll v Hungary) of 25 June 2013 (Para. 75) that the tax rate of 98 per-
cent under the law for lawful severance pays is in conflict with Article I (property 
protection) of the Additional Protocol I” (...) “The Constitutional Court did not 
see any reason in this case to depart from the content that was attributed by the 
decisions of the Court through interpretation to Article I of the Additional Proto-
col I in connection with the extent of the special tax. The Constitutional Court 
therefore establishes that Section 10 of the Act is in conflict with Article I (protec-
tion of property) of Additional Protocol I.”
395  The Constitutional Court made it clear that the review limitation does not 
cover investigation of conflict with international treaties: “The rule limiting the 
competences under Article 37(4) of the Fundamental Law is not applicable, either 
as regards the aspects of investigation or the establishment of legal consequence, 
to the investigation of conflict between legislation and international treaties.” 
HCC Decision 6/2014. (II. 26.) AB, ABH 2014, 202, 204. para [21].
396  The enforcement/applicative priority of would have become abrogative pri-
macy only if there had been any standard that could have been repealed. (The 
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lowing the Fourth Amendment”. It reinforced that any infringement 
to international obligations does not only violates the requirement 
of harmony between Hungarian and international law (Article Q(2)) 
but the principle of rule of law (Article B(1)) as well.397
2.2 Judicial independence, fair trial, rule of law
Assurance of the effective enforcement of EU law is significant in 
terms of EU membership, therefore the integration organisation 
generally pays a special interest to the functioning of the guarantees 
of justice at member state level. It is a special coincidence, obvi-
ously implied by the content of motions and the practice of their 
acceptance, that the Constitutional Court has dealt relatively much 
with the requirement of judicial independence and fair trial since 
the entry into force of the FL. 
After the adaption of the new constitution, the two-third major-
ity also challenged the judicial branch of power in many ways. First, 
the legislator lowered the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 
years. Since 1869, Hungarian judges could remain in office beyond 
the retirement age, thus they could freely choose their day of retire-
ment between the age of 62 and 70.398 However, the FL and Act 162 
of 2011 on the legal status of judges unexpectedly obliged them to 
retire at the general retirement age from the beginning of 2012.399 
It has led to a mass removal of over 270 judges in the first half of 
2012.
body did not investigate of course whether the new tax rate of 75 percent complies 
with the ECHR.)
397  HCC Decision 6/2014. (II. 26.) AB, ABH 2014, 202, 205. para [30], with refer-
ence to HCC Decision 7/2005. (III. 31.) AB.
398  See also Balázs Fekete: How to Become a Judge in Hungary? From the Profes-
sionalism of the Judiciary to the Political Ties of the Constitutional Court, in Sophie 
Turenne (ed.): Fair Reflection of the Society in Judicial Systems: a Comparative Analy-
sis, Springer, Heidelberg/London/New York, 2015, 169–186.
399  Tamás Gyulavári and Nikolett Hős: Retirement of Hungarian Judges, Age 
Discrimination and Judicial Independence: A Tale of Two Courts, Industrial Law 
Journal Vol. 42, № 3, 2013, 289.
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Second, in the course of the constitutional and judicial reform, 
the Supreme Court was renamed to Curia (in Hungarian Kúria, it 
is the historical name of the highest judicial body), without any 
significant changes regarding its competences, however, the TPFL 
terminated the mandate of the President of the Supreme Court, who 
was elected by the Parliament in 2009 for a 6 year term.400 The Pres-
ident of the Supreme Court earlier criticized the premature retire-
ment of judges and other supermajority actions concerning the 
independence of judiciary. 
Third, before the FL, the administration of justice based on au-
tonomy and judicial independence. In 2011 the reforms aiming to 
improve the efficacy placed the administrative powers held by the 
National Council of Justice and its president (the President of the 
Supreme Court) into the hands of two new bodies – the National 
Judicial Office and the National Judicial Council. While the Council 
serves mostly control and consultative functions, the latter exer-
cises the effective administrative competences over the judiciary. 
The President of the NJO had originally a vast array of compe-
tences relating to judicial appointments, case allocation, administra-
tion, management and supervision, and thus this extensive power 
over the judiciary belonged to a politically-appointed individual. 
However, following the widespread alarm of the national and in-
ternational community regarding these powers and their impact on 
the independence of the judiciary, in 2012 the parliament restricted 
certain of the competences of the President of the NJO and increased 
those of the NJC.
Fourth, the so called Nullity act, Act XVI of 2011 on the redress 
of the court judgments in connection with the crowd controls in 
the autumn of 2006, nullified certain judgments relating to the civil 
unrest of autumn 2006,401 on the basis that the law interfered with 
400  Attila Vincze: Judicial independence and its guarantees beyond the nation 
state – some recent Hungarian experience, Journal of the Indian Law Institute Vol. 
56, № 2, 2014, 204.
401  On 18 September 2006 a massive demonstration was held near the Hungar-
ian Parliament. The protests, allegedly attended by 40,000 people, concerned the 
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the right of judges (rather than the legislature) to assess evidence 
and decide on individual cases. The act suggested that the police 
gave false evidence in each case when exclusively their evidence 
confirmed the commitment of the act, in these cases the prosecutors 
brought charges wrongly, and that the judgments of the first and 
second instance were wrong.
These issues raised international criticism and ended in proce-
dures before the Constitutional Court. In most cases the Court ar-
gued solely upon domestic constitutional basis and did not refer to 
the European values of rule of law.
The radical lowering of the retirement age of judges in 2012 was 
the subject of the constitutional appeal leading to the declaration 
of the first unconstitutionality.402 The main argument of the body 
in this matter was the irremovability implied by judicial indepen-
dence, which means that the retirement age may be lowered grad-
ually, with a necessary transition period only. The decision was 
dominated by internal argumentation on basis of domestic consti-
tutional law, and only one of the relevant recommendations of the 
Council of Europe403 appeared to provide suitable support, though 
it was known that the CJEU was also dealing with the case as initi-
ated by the European Commission. The Constitutional Court did 
however avoid involving the issue of age discrimination into the 
review, seeking assistance in the law of the EU to interpret the 
amendments of the new constitution in the TPFL, or seeking direct 
contact to the Luxembourg court through initiating a preliminary 
ruling procedure. Impropriety of the ostrich policy and the insuf-
ficiency of the pro futuro nullification was even more highlighted by 
audio recording, which surfaced on 17 September 2006, on which the then Prime 
Minister Gyurcsány admitted to lying to the public for a couple of years, including 
lying about budget deficit. Police violence during the crowd control ended in 
criminal or offence procedures.
402  HCC Decision 33/2012. (VII. 17.) AB, ABH 2012, 242.
403  Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. Quoted by HCC 
Decision 33/2012. (VII. 17.) AB, ABH 2012, 242, 248. 
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the decision of the CJEU404 a few months later.405 Although the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court stated the unconstitutionality, failed to 
repair the infringement of the affected judges’ fundamental rights.
Premature termination of the mandate of the President and Vice 
President of the Supreme Court is also related to the transformation 
of the judicial organisation. Whereas the mandate of the President 
of the Supreme Court was terminated by the TPFL,406 only the Vice 
President could lodge a constitutional appeal, his term was termi-
nated pursuant to the Act on the organisation and administration 
of courts. The Constitutional Court found, with the narrow major-
ity of 8 to 7, that the transformation of the organisation of courts 
and the significant modification of the scope of responsibilities of 
the Kúria (Curia), its president and vice president provide sufficient 
constitutional justification for the shortening of their mandates and 
did not deal with reviewing the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.407 
According to the judges of the Constitutional Court providing a dis-
senting opinion, prejudice to the rule of law and violation of the 
right to remedies of the petitioner should have been established. 
Comparatively, the ECtHR stated on the basis of the complaint of 
the President of the Supreme Court that the State of Hungary had 
infringed the right to fair trial, whereas it had not ensured any ju-
dicial revision in the case, moreover the right of the President of 
the Supreme Court to free expression had also been infringed, 
whereas his removal may be related to his criticism concerning the 
transformation of the organisation of courts, which had not been 
his right only but as a court leader his obligation as well.408
In the decision on case allocation that belonged to the compe-
tences of the President of the National Judicial Office the Constitu-
404  Case C-286/12, Commission v Hungary, judgment of 6 November 2012.
405  Vincze Attila calls attention on the same: Vincze ‘Der EuGH als Hüter’ 324–325.
406  Presently in Point 14(2) of the Closing and miscellaneous provisions of the 
FL: The mandate of the President of the Supreme Court and of the President and 
members of the National Council of Justice shall terminate upon the entry into 
force of the Fundamental Law.
407  HCC Decision 3076/2013. (III. 27.) AB, ABH 2013, 434, 439.
408  Baka v. Hungary, Judgment of 27 May 2014, no. 20261/12, § 79, 100, 103.
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tional Court held the right to an appointed judge and the prohibition 
of being removed from an appointed judge to be basic requirements 
for a fair trial, and concluded that the appointment of the members 
of the proceeding court at the sole discretion of the President of the 
National Judicial Office does infringe these rights, and that the legal 
regulation does not meet the so-called objective test of an impartial 
judiciary.409 The Court heroically declared the rules to be not in 
force any more, but still having an effect on the cases of the petition-
ers causing them, to be unconstitutional and in conflict with inter-
national treaties, and provided subjective protection of 
fundamental rights as befits the function of a constitutional appeal. 
The Court’s reasoning provided extensive references to the relevant 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and it also took into consideration the 
relevant, and sharply critical, positions of the Venice Commission.
More of the decisions rejecting the petitions for appeal dealt with 
fundamental procedural rights. In the scope of the requirements for 
fair trial enshrined in Article XXVIII of the FL, the body considered 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR established on the right to reasoned 
judicial decision.410 To the interpretation of the right to protection, 
the Constitutional Court used the “understanding” of the ECtHR as 
well, moreover, it referred in order to support its argument, obvi-
ously interestingly, to the resolution of the Council of the EU on 
full enforcement and uniform application of fundamental proce-
dural rights and to the draft directive of the Commission outlining 
alternatives for regulating the issues of the right to employ legal 
counsel in criminal prosecution.411 It did not delay in recalling the 
Observation № CCPR/C/ HUN/CO/5 of United Nations Human 
Rights Committee of 16 November 2010 to Hungary.412 Such inter-
409  HCC Decision 36/2013. (XII. 5.) AB, upon normative appeal, with eight dis-
senting opinions.
410  HCC Decision 7/2013. (III. 1.) AB, ABH 2013, 382, 387–388. paras [30]–[32].
411  HCC Decision 8/2013. (III. 1.) AB, ABH 2013, 391, 402. para [50]. Recom-
mendation of the European Commission COM(2011) 326 final; 2011/0154 (COD)
412  HCC Decision 8/2013. (III. 1.) AB, ABH 2013, 391, 402. para [49]. According 
to the recommendation, it would be necessary to establish the conditions war-
ranting effective legal aid for every person deprived of his freedom.
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national, “meta-legal” reference of EU origin is rather of symbolic 
significance and is aimed at presenting the awareness of the Con-
stitutional Court. The body stated in cases connected to the prin-
ciple of impartiality, in harmony with the interpretation of the 
ECtHR, that it is necessary to enforce that strict standard by virtue 
of which the ruling court may not cease to appear impartial beyond 
impartial consideration of the cases. The ECtHR acknowledges two 
aspects of impartiality: impartiality in terms of subjectivity and 
impartiality in terms of objectivity. The subjective side of impartial-
ity defines the need that no member of a court may be prejudiced 
or biased in a particular case. Comparatively, the objective side of 
impartiality means whether any right doubt may arise regarding 
the impartiality of the judge beyond his behaviour in the course of 
the particular case.413
The picture would not be complete without mentioning the fact 
that the independence of judicial branch and the principle of rule 
of law suffered a severe defeat from the rather obscure argument 
about justice in the Constitutional Court decision on the Nullity 
Act, in which the reasoning considered foreign solutions only, and 
European standards did not appear included in the reasoning.414 
The Court found the act of Parliament on annulling the judgments 
of the courts of law justifiable and constitutional in the given his-
torical circumstances, which is clearly an argument beyond consti-
tutional law.
Reference to the principle of rule of law seems to become more 
and more relegated to the background in these decisions, and in 
other constitutional judicial review cases as well. The Court protects 
the principle of rule of law to a very narrow extent only, as far as 
the lack of required preparation time and the prohibition of adverse 
retroactive effect are concerned, but still not as far as the course of 
413  HCC Decision 25/2013. (X. 4.) AB, ABH 2013, 960, 964–965, 967–968. paras 
[27]–[28]; [38]; HCC Decision 34/2013. (XI. 22.) AB, ABH 2013, 1212, 1218–1221. 
paras [32]–[38]
414  HCC Decision Decision 24/2013 (X. 4.) AB.
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constitutional complaint procedures are concerned.415 Protection 
of acquired rights or protection of legitimate expectations (Vertrauen-
sschutz) are completely disappearing.416 
2.3 Democracy – right to vote and political participation
The principle of democracy has a central value in the legal order of 
the Council of Europe and of the European Union. It is an extreme-
ly complex principle, its conceptual items include pluralism, the 
majority principle together with respecting minority rights and 
human dignity, and the principle of representation complemented 
with direct exercise of power, legitimacy of the political institu-
tional system, fundamental rights, especially the enforcement of 
political participation rights, transparency of public authority, pub-
licity and freedom of the civil sector. Democracy formally presumes 
at the same time that the people (such as the population, the con-
stituent population, conscious political community) requires dem-
ocratic functioning of power and active participation in the 
assurance thereof. It is much more an issue of social need, practice 
and political culture than of a legal construction. In another way, 
while the rule of law may be controlled with legal instruments and 
may ideally be judicially enforceable, democracy may much less be. 
Due to the multitude of its components it may become deficient in 
several ways and may turn into post-democracy and then drift to-
wards autocracy. 
415  Originally: HCC Order 1140/D/2006 AB, but at the time when the Constitu-
tion was in force, this did not mean any problem due to the actio popularis sub-
sequent constitutional review.
416  See early retirement – HCC Decision 23/2013. (IX. 25.) AB; gambling mo-
nopoly – HCC Decision 26/2013. (X. 4.) AB. It is to be mentioned that when in-
vestigating the rules limiting the operation of slot machines, the Constitutional 
Court considered the legislative efforts of the EU and the decisions of the CJEU 
supporting free discretion of national authorities and the exceptions of public 
interest from the freedom of service provision as regards organising gambling.
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The Venice Commission emphasised in its comprehensive opin-
ion assessing the FL: “Elections (...) would lose their meaning if the 
legislative power would not be able to achieve changes in such 
important fields of legislation which should have been regulated 
with simple majority. If, as regards certain issues, not only funda-
mental principles but very specific and detailed rules are adopted 
in cardinal laws as well, then the principle of democracy itself shall 
become threatened as well.”417 In its position assessing the Fourth 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law, it recalled the followings 
while condemning the instrumental treatment of the constitution: 
“Democracy may not be reduced to the rule of majority; exercise of 
power of the majority is limited by the constitution and by law, 
primarily in order to protect minority interests.”418
It is without any doubt that the right to vote and political par-
ticipation rights are of outstanding significance in terms of democ-
racy. Within the limits of its possibilities, namely depending on 
petitioning and acceptance, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
dealt with these substantial elements of democracy in some of its 
decisions.
In Decision 1/2013. (I. 7.) AB it investigated the justification of 
registration, namely the necessity of limiting fundamental rights, as 
a preliminary question to the proportionality of the regulation of 
registration upon request. For this, it scrutinised the relevant juris-
prudence of the ECtHR, from which it concluded that setting the 
condition of active registration for exercising the right to vote may 
limit the right to vote freely with a reason of relevant gravity only, 
and such legitimate reason may not be found besides the already 
established and functioning voting list.419 As a result of the nature 
of the procedure, establishment of being in conflict with interna-
tional treaty, within preliminary constitutional review, was not pos-
sible but the body adjusted its internal arguments in constitutional 
law to the starting point synthetized from the Strasbourg jurispru-
417  See Point 24 of Opinion 618/2011. of the Venice Commission.
418  See Point 136 of Opinion 720/2013. of the Venice Commission.
419  HCC Decision 1/2013. (I. 7.) AB, ABH 2013, 50–87.
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dence. The propriety of declaring the rules limiting media campaigns 
as unconstitutional was confirmed by international criticism and the 
official objections of the European Commission that followed the 
incorporation of these limitations into the FL. (Perhaps these mutu-
ally strengthening effects had lead to the transformation of the lim-
iting rule into a presentable one by the Fifth Amendment.)
In the case of the so called winner-compensation (or winner-
premium), the Constitutional Court, in order to get out of the deli-
cate situation, tried to support the thesis of freedom of the legislative 
power concerning the election system as much as possible, and 
called upon assistance from two of the decisions of the ECtHR.420
The body contributes to the protection of the freedom of expres-
sion with having changed its previous restrictive jurisprudence con-
cerning the wearing of totalitarian symbols with regard to the 
decision of the ECtHR in the Vajnai case.421 This step forward was 
followed by a step back: the new and restrictive interpretation of 
420  HCC Decision 3141/2014. (V. 9.) AB, ABH 2014, 654, 659.: “The rules of the 
election system which effect the relative weight of votes as a result of the pre-
cisely non-predictable expression of will of the citizens, are not in connection 
with the equality in terms of procedure but with the so-called ‘effective equality’. 
Such typical rules are requirements defining the order of acquiring mandates, 
which requirements themselves are ‘neutral’, i.e. do not put groups of voters into 
a disadvantaged position. These result advantages or disadvantages implied by 
the improprotionality of the acquisition of mandates exclusively on the basis of 
the decision of the voters and subsequently establishable. This is not an issue of 
the discriminatory nature of the rule any more but of the proportionality of the 
voting system. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in this matter is in 
harmony with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as re-
lated to the right to free vote enshrined in Article 3 of the First Additional Proto-
col of the European Convention on Human Rights. ‘The Court has already 
established that Article 3 of Protocol 1 ensures individual rights including the 
right to vote and the right to be voted for. No matter how important these rights 
are, they are not absolute. Whereas Article 3 recognises them as not mentioning 
and defining them expressis verbis, ‘implicit limitations’ are possible and the states 
parties to the convention have a wide margin of manoeuvre in this respect. They 
may stipulate conditions for the right to vote and to be voted for in their own 
internal legal order whereas this is not excluded in principle by Article 3.’ (ECtHR, 
Orujov v Azerbaijan (4508/06), 26 July 2011, Para (40)”
421  HCC Decision 4/2013. (II. 21.) AB, ABH 2013, 188–211.
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the freedom of expression appeared, already after the Fourth Amend-
ment to the FL, with recognising the denial of the sins committed 
by the totalitarian systems as constitutional.422 The Constitutional 
Court relied on the decisions of the ECtHR related to Holocaust 
denial and abuse of rights as well although these decisions are only 
partly conclusive as compared to the Hungarian criminal facts of the 
case, which should have been assessed more sophisticated in the 
light of the relevant EU law and Strasbourg jurisprudence as accord-
ing to the dissenting opinions. Criticism of public persons did how-
ever win: the body maintained its former practice and tried to 
develop standards that may be used in the application of law as well 
and that are necessary for the harmony between the criminal judg-
ment of public statements regarding the discussion of public affairs 
and the requirements implied by the freedom of expression as en-
sured in Article 10 of the Convention and in the FL.423 The Consti-
tutional Court provided an implicit answer by this to one of the 
reservations of the Venice Commission to the Fourth Amendment.424
2.4 Conclusions
Constitutional evolution and constitutional practice has drifted 
away in many fields from European standards during the five years 
that have passed since the adoption of the FL. 
The Constitutional Court however, at least in the first two years 
tried to counterbalance the excesses of the constitution-amending 
and legislative power but did not exhaust the possibilities provided 
by the European standards. Questioning or complete rejection of 
422  HCC Decision 16/2013. (VI. 20.) AB, ABH 2013, 688.
423  HCC Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB, ABH 2014, 230. and HCC Decision 13/2014. 
(VI. 18.) AB, ABH 2014, 588.
424  See Point 141 of Opinion 720/2013 of the Venice Commission: the wording 
of the provisions on the dignity of communities is too general and the separate 
protection of the “dignity of the Hungarian nation” creates the risk that freedom 
of expression in Hungary may be restricted in order to protect Hungarian institu-
tions and officials in the future.
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the necessity to refer to the European and international standards 
and jurisprudence appears in the minority opinions within the body 
itself.425 For the time being, the majority does not share this under-
standing and does rely on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in its 
reasonings at least as an interpretation tool. Because of the Stras-
bourg ruling establishing infringement of the Convention by Hun-
gary, the body was ready to change its practice and to establish 
unconstitutionality in the case of the communist red star. In the 
425  Dissenting opinion of Dienes-Oehm Egon Judge of the Constitutional Court, 
HCC Decision 36/2013. (XII. 5.) AB, ABH 2013, 1268, 1282.: “Ad hoc decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights established for the rectification of infringe-
ments to fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention and for ruling in indi-
vidual cases only are not binding either for Hungarian legislation or for the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court. Following the jurisprudence of the Court is 
justified in several aspects, moreover it is a question meaning budgetary burden, 
in pure legal terms however it may not be of such gravity as to determine the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court and may not have more power than the own 
set of arguments and decisions, based on the Fundamental Law, of the Constitu-
tional Court.”
Concurring reasoning of Béla Pokol Judge of the Constitutional Court, HCC 
Decision 3025/2014. (II. 17.) AB, ABH 2014, 172, 168.: “The relevant decisions of 
the ECtHR may play a useful role in our draft decisions as information in the 
decision process of the Constitutional Court and pro domo for internal use; but 
my opinion is that they may not appear in the final decision, maximum as further 
arguments of the positions of individual Judges of the Constitutional Court in 
their concurring and dissenting opinions opposing it. Such a reference in the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court would mean that we attribute, beyond the 
Fundamental Law, a normative and for us binding power not only to the Conven-
tion but to the judicial practice interpreting it as well, and by this we acknowledge 
that the ECtHR may continue establishing international standards binding for the 
states parties to the Convention without their contribution.” ... “In their so-called 
Lisbon Ruling of 2009, the judges of the German Constitutional Court elaborated 
a theoretical construction enabling a country to act against the interpretation of 
any convention as delivered by the court of any multilateral international conven-
tion, with reference to the integrity of constitutional identity and further to pro-
hibit a decision made with such understanding to be applied within the country. 
Although the German constitutional judges formulated this doctrine of constitu-
tional judicature against legal acts of the European Union affecting the Member 
States, but its significant findings stand for every multilateral convention if the 
particular country waives its prerogative concerning its sovereignty therein and 
the court of the international organisation maintains a jurisprudence concerning 
the standards of the constitution of that country.”
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subject of the application of the, not in force any more, rules on 
special taxation, the body granted applicative (almost abrogative) 
priority to the decisions of the ECtHR upon judicial initiation, or-
dered general prohibition of application, wherefore it was able to 
ensure the protection of fundamental rights (namely property pro-
tection) against the Tax Act and the restrictive rule in Article 37(4) 
of the FL.
At the same time, there is no change in terms of the fact that the 
Constitutional Court still selects precedents from the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU426 in order to support its arguments as 
adjusted to its own preconception; and it bases its decisions rather 
on internal arguments of constitutional law, i.e. it uses the option 
of interpretative primacy to a limited extent only when using inter-
national and EU law and grants applicative priority to these stan-
dards exceptionally only.427 It did not clarify its position on the 
relationship between EU law and constitutional protection which 
had been controversially developed in the previous jurisprudence428 
and does not seek formal contact, manifesting in a request for pre-
liminary ruling, with the CJEU, for which it would have had the 
possibility not only in the case of the retirement of judges but in 
the review of the Hungarian regulation on the implementation of 
the European arrest warrant as well, where in the latter case it could 
have inquire about the harmony with the Charter and so contribut-
ing to the development in the protection of fundamental rights at 
426  Zoltán Szente: The interpretive practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
– A critical view, German Law Journal № 8, 2013, 1591–1614., 1602. http://www.
germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol14-No8/14.8.30.pdf
427  As it relatively rarely uses the option of establishing conflict with an interna-
tional treaty, and in general the option of investigating ex officio the conflict with 
an international treaty.
428  Attila Vincze, Odahull az eszme és a valóság közé az árnyék: a szuverenitás-
átruházás az alkotmánybíróság esetjogában [The shadow falls between the idea 
and the reality: transfer of sovereignty in the case-law of the Constitutional Court], 
MTA Law Working Papers № 2014/23, 13–15. http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/
mtalwp/2014_23_Vincze.pdf.
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EU level.429 The Constitutional Court did also not undertake to 
involve the procedural bond between ordinary courts and the CJEU, 
the procedure of preliminary ruling with constitutional emphasis 
into the interpretation of the right to a legitimate judge in case the 
EU legal conditions are met.430 According to the permanent juris-
prudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the CJEU 
may also be a “legitimate judge” by virtue of Sentence 2 of Article 
101(1) of the German Basic Law, namely if the German judge fails 
to request a preliminary ruling although the EU conditions are met, 
then reference may be made to the infringement of right to a le-
gitimate judge within a constitutional appeal procedure.431 Accord-
ing to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, this is not 
a constitutional issue but a technical legal issue falling within the 
scope of the judge of the proceedings.
“The Constitutional Court, acting within its powers regulated by Section 27 of 
the CCA, ensures the harmony between the judicial ruling and the Fundamen-
tal Law. Consequently, the Constitutional Court shall refrain from taking a po-
sition on technical legal issues or issues exclusively about interpreting the law 
that belong to the revisory power of courts while investigating the unconsti-
tutionality of the judicial ruling. {first see: Order № 3003/2012 (VI. 21.) AB, 
Reasoning [4]; (...)]}, {Order № 3028/2014. (II. 17.) AB, Reasoning [12]}. Ac-
cording to its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court interprets the essence 
of the fundamental right to a fair trial in the enforcement of procedural rules 
of constitutional significance, wherefore it does not consider elements of court 
429  HCC Decision 3025/2014. (II. 17.) AB, ABH 2014, 172, 189. In this decision 
by the way, the Constitutional Court used ECtHR decisions when interpreting 
the right to freedom and personal security, but did so only at one occasion, indi-
cating a reference to the CJEU decision. It appears from the dissenting opinion of 
Miklós Lévay that other decisions from the case-law of the CJEU may have been 
used for the argument and it would have been worth requesting the interpretation 
of the EU law for the sake of clarity at all.
430  HCC Order 3110/2014. (VI. 17.) AB, ABH 2014, 559.; reinforced by: HCC 
Order 3165/2014. (VI. 23.) AB, ABH 2014, 764. Petitioners argued in both cases 
that the court had not fulfilled the request to initiate a preliminary ruling in the 
base case and Article XXVIII(1) of the FL had been therefore infringed.
431  BVerfGE 73, 339, 366 ff. (Solange II); 75, 223, 233 ff. (Kloppenburg); 126, 286, 
315 ff. (Honeywell), latest in 2010 Urheberrechtsabgabe: 1 BvR 1631/08. www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20100830_1bvr163108.html.
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proceedings beyond that, especially the manner of deciding, with the applica-
tion of legislation and exercising the discretional right of the court, in the 
particular legal disputes as a constitutional issue. In the present case, with the 
interpretation of applicable legislation and having regard to the issues of fact, 
the court, the legitimate judge under national law, i.e. a judge acting at a com-
petent court and appointed pursuant to the order of distribution of cases defined 
in advance, of the proceedings had to decide whether it falls under the obliga-
tion to initiate a preliminary ruling or is exempt from it; wherefore the Con-
stitutional Court does not have the competence to review that as according to 
Section 29 of the CCA.”432
Although the Constitutional Court does not refuse but also does 
not endeavour to actively participate in the network of cooperative 
constitutionalism, however it could emphasise the Europe-friendly 
interpretation of the new constitution in a political context for 
which rejection by otherwise constructive European criticism, ques-
tioning of the decisions of Strasbourg and Luxembourg and a gen-
erally anti-EU rhetoric is typical. It appears that the political 
circumstances do not favour an extensive and activist constitution-
al judicature,433 reciprocity is however the essence of cooperative 
constitutionalism and the Hungarian Constitutional Court also 
received confirmation for example from the CJEU in the case of 
radical lowering of the retirement age of judges and from the ECtHR 
in the case of recognition of churches.434
432  HCC Order 3110/2014. (IV. 17.) AB, ABH 559, 562. See also Georgina Nasz-
ladi: The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s judgement concerning the preliminary 
ruling procedure – comments on a rejection order, Pécs Journal of International and 
European Law Vol. 1, № 1, 2015, 37–43.
433  See to this B. Pokol: A jurisztokratikus állam [The juristocracy], Dialóg Campus, 
Budapest, 2017, 38–42.
434  See also R. Uitz: Collective Constitutional Learning in Europe: European 
Courts Talk to Hungary (Again), VerfBlog, 2014/4/10, http://verfassungsblog.de/
collective-constitutional-learning-in-europe-european-courts-talk-to-hungary-
again/
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3 Solidarity in and beyond the constitution
3.1 The topicality of solidarity and its relevance  
        to constitutional law
In the era of the financial-economic crisis, terror threats, racism and 
segregation, impoverishment and famines, world-wide pandemics, 
climate change, environmental dangers and natural disasters, the 
question arises as to whether the motivation behind the measures 
planned, formulated and implemented with reference to combating 
the above-mentioned phenomena constitutes an effort merely to 
reduce, fight and eliminate the undesirable phenomenon or mitigate 
its consequences, or, underlying this primary motivation – as a sec-
ondary one – there is some common driving force.435 
My starting point is that such secondary motivation could be 
solidarity. In the case of such hypothesis, the question presents itself 
to what extent law as a means and the constitution as a system of val-
ues can be used to serve the purpose of solidarity. For such an inquiry 
one may need to answer the following questions. What constitutes 
solidarity based on the general and normative approach? Is it defined 
by the constitution, in other words, can it be considered a legal or 
constitutional value in a democratic state governed by the rule of 
law? If it has relevance from the aspect of (constitutional) law, is it 
expressed in the norm content? When and how does it appear as 
reality, to what extent does it have an effect on law-making as a mo-
tivating factor or impulse? In the present essay, out of the enumer-
ated ramifying questions, I will concentrate only on the quality of 
solidarity as a legal and constitutional value; at the same time, I con-
sider that the exploration and evaluation of solidarity norms to be 
found in the legal system would be worth further research.
435  The characteristic features of the era are comprehensively analysed in Antal 
Ádám: Alkotmányi értékek és alkotmánybíráskodás [Constitutional Values and the Prac-
tice of the Constitutional Court], Osiris, Budapest, 1998, 10–11; Antal Ádám: Bizton-
ság, felelősség, kötelesség [Security, Responsibility, Duty], Jogtudományi Közlöny 
№  7-8, 2005, 307–315.
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Before the interpretation of solidarity as a constitutional value, 
it is worth giving a brief overview of the conclusions of Hungarian 
dogmatics concerning constitutional values and how they permeate 
the practice of the Constitutional Court. Antal Ádám distinguishes 
between three layers of constitutional values. “Among the compo-
nents of the first layer of constitutional values, one may find values 
having existed already before constitutional regulation or existing inde-
pendently of it, values that are generally considered necessary, useful 
or advantageous. […] A large, wide-ranging group and, at the same 
time,  also the second layer of constitutional values is made up of 
objectives, tasks, basic principles, basic requirements, basic rights, 
basic duties, essential prohibitions, qualities, responsibilities, ex-
ecutive and other organizations, organs, institutions defined or es-
tablished by the constitution-making power.  […] As the third layer of 
constitutional values one may consider the provisions of the basic 
law pertaining to the values of the former two layers. Professor 
István Losonczy from Pécs qualified basic provisions and other legal 
regulations grounded on them as legal instrumental values in his 
excellent work on values written in 1948. ”436
By comparison, the Constitutional Court made an attempt at out-
lining the content elements of the “scale of constitutional values” in 
its decision on the conferment of honours.437 “The scale of consti-
tutional values of the Republic of Hungary comprises primary (fun-
damental) values defined in a normative way by the Constitution, 
constitutional principles and values deduced through construction 
from the normative provisions of the Constitution (derived values), 
as well as further values contained in the codes (statutes and other 
regulations) of the individual branches of law  […] – which give 
expression to (i.e., mediate) the primary and derived scale of values 
436  See earlier, Ádám ‘Alkotmányi értékek’ 39.; and for the quoted text, Antal 
Ádám: A rendőrség az alkotmányi értékek között [The Police and Constitutional 
Values], in Gy. Gaál and Z. Hautzinger (eds.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemé-
nyek IX. Tanulmányok a „Rendészet és rendvédelem – kihívások a XXI. században” című 
tudományos konferenciáról, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szak osztály 
Pécsi Szakcsoportja, Pécs, 2008, 10. 
437  HCC Decision 47/2007. (VII. 3.) AB, ABH 2007-I. 620.
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of the Constitution. These values are present in the interpretations 
(decisions) of the Constitutional Court and, in the final analysis, in 
the whole constitutional culture.”438 The Court considers “the scale 
of constitutional values” as a scale of values defined by the existing 
social, economic and political system, fixed in space and time, the 
basic elements of which are laid down in the basic law during con-
stitution-making by Parliament.439 The values expressed in the Con-
stitution are called terminal values by the Constitutional Court; while 
legal regulations detailing constitutional provisions and implementing 
those ends are considered instrumental values.440
Solidarity – from the aspect of constitutional law – may be either 
a value having existed prior to constitutional regulation or one 
formulated by the constitution-making power depending on wheth-
er it appears in an implied or express form in the basic law. How-
ever, this will be examined more closely only below, in point 3.4, 
since in order to establish the quality of solidarity as a constitu-
tional value, it is necessary to explore the notion and legal relevance 
of solidarity first.
3.2 The notion of solidarity
3.2.1 General interpretation of solidarity
Solidarity441 taken in its most general sense442 means, on the one 
hand, the consciousness of individuals and groups of belonging 
together and, on the other hand (but stemming from this first mean-
438  HCC Decision 47/2007. (VII. 3.) AB, ABH 2007-I. 620, 636.
439  HCC Decision 47/2007. (VII. 3.) AB, ABH 2007-I. 620, 638.
440  HCC Decision 47/2007. (VII. 3.) AB, ABH 2007-I. 620, 637.
441  Solidarietas from the (Neo-Latin) word solidus (firm, well-founded): sharing 
of fate, community of fate. available at http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/S/szolidarit%C3 
%A1s.html
442  Magyar Nagylexikon [Hungarian Encyclopedia], Vol. 16. Magyar Nagylexikon 
Kiadó, Budapest, 2003, 876.
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ing), joint and mutual commitment and assistance.443 The appear-
ance of solidarity as a frame of mind and as an act is based on the 
recognition of mutual dependence and on the established fact that 
mutual dependence between the members of a community gives 
rise to obligations. 
The scope of effect or, rather, field of effect of solidarity extended 
primarily (and historically) to the micro- and small community (it 
existed in relations within the family, the religious and corporate 
community) – at a higher (universal) level it appeared only as 
a moral principle (command) (in religious tenets,444 in theology and 
philosophy). Urbanization, industrialization and the appearance of 
443  A similar approach: “In a wider sense, the well-founded belonging together 
of a group or society motivated from several sides; in a narrow sense, the under-
taking of mutual obligations and mutual provision of assistance, by which each 
member of a group takes a stand for the group and the group takes a stand for 
them.” available at http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/S/szolidarit%C3%A1s.html
Concerning the definition of solidarity, see also: G. Kardos: Szolidaritás, szub-
szidiaritás és a szociális jogok védelme [The Protection of Solidarity, Subsidiar-
ity and Social Rights], in J. Frivaldszky (ed.): Szubszidiaritás és szolidaritás az Európai 
Unióban [Subsidiarity and Solidarity in the European Union], OCIPE Magyarország, 
Faludy Ferenc Akadémia, Budapest, 2006, 168. and K. Arató: Szolidaritás és civil 
részvétel az Európai Unióban [Solidarity and Civil Participation in the European 
Union], in loc. cit. 143–144. 
444  See Antal Ádám: Bölcselet, vallás, állami egyházjog [Philosophy, Religion, State 
Church Law], Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2007. Based on this work of Antal 
Ádám, if higlighting only the teachings of individual world religions, the following 
conclusions may be drawn. One requirement of Jewish religion is solidary charity 
(169). Judaism embodies the global solidarity of the Jewish people (171). An out-
standing command of the Roman Catholic religion is love of one’s fellow-beings, 
to which physical and spiritual works of mercy are attached (178). An important 
tenet of Protestantism is responsibility for the community (188–190). The third 
duty in the the Islamic religion is “obligatory alms-giving” (195). The divine attitudes 
expected of Buddhist people are: universal love and compassion for all living be-
ings, delighting in other people’s well-being and equanimity concerning one’s own 
affairs (217). One command of the Sikh religion is to help the poor (226). Confucian 
ethics lays down as a requirement to care for others and exercize the virtue of 
humanity (228). The review of religious rules provides an exciting opportunity for 
the association of ideas, which Zoltán Nemessányi points out quoting Lord Atkin’s 
reasoning given in the case of Donoghue (or McAlister) v Stevenson: the biblical 
rule that you are to “love thy neighbour” becomes in law: you must not injure your 
neighbour. In this case judicial practice transposes the religious requirement of 
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a service-providing state led to a definition of solidarity to be imple-
mented at a higher level: to the presumption that society was a sol-
idary unit. Within this scope, spontaneous mechanisms of 
solidarity gave way to the state’s policy of solidarity and to a “system 
of compulsory solidarity”.445 The globalization of risks and dangers 
described in the introduction necessitated the recognition and influ-
ence of solidarity in a new dimension, as the motivating force behind 
international union and cooperation – institutionalized to varying 
degrees – which is based on the restriction of the sovereignty of 
states and reciprocity. In summary, one may consider as fields of 
effect of solidarity the sub-national level, the national level and also 
the supranational and international level. Solidarity implemented 
and operating at one level may enhance solidarity at the other lev-
els, but it may also occur that the appearance of higher levels erodes 
solidarity that has existed in the small community, at the sub-state 
level.446   
At the level of individual behaviour, solidarity may be perceived 
as a frame of mind and as an act. The feeling of solidarity – which is 
more than sympathy and compassion, because it means a feeling 
of responsibility based on fate shared from some aspect – is a pre-
condition for solidary activity. Solidarity may be directed at persons 
(mainly in a community built on personal relations, e.g. in families, 
groups of friends or colleagues), or at issues (mainly in larger com-
munities, e.g. fight against starvation, aid provision to victims of 
natural disasters).447 
solidarity into law. Zolán Nemessányi: Rejtett képviselet az angol jogban [Hidden 
Representation under English Law], JURA № 2, 2008, 77.
445  Sz. Hámor: A szolidaritás világától a szép új világig? [From the World of 
Solidarity to the Brave New World?], Esély № 3, 2000, 4.
446  For example, the model of spending public goods elaborated by an interna-
tional aid organization, the state or a private company may eliminate the gener-
ally more effective small community model based on solidarity, which had been 
developed by the users of the goods. See also inter alia, E. Ostrom: Collective 
Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 
14, № 3, Summer, 2000, 153.
447  G. Bognár and L. Bokros: Verseny és szolidaritás [Competition and Solidar-
ity], BUKSZ № 4, 2004, 382–383.
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From the side of the individual, solidarity means that one volun-
tarily restricts the fulfilment and assertion of self-interest taking 
into consideration others’ interests as well.448 “The basic principle 
of conduct not based on self-interest can be altruism or equity; and 
it may be motivated by the improvement of others’ welfare, the 
desire to give and goodwill directed toward the unknown members 
of society (charitas), to the enhancement of social welfare. All these 
lead to the support of institutions serving others’ interests – which 
are expected to be “unprofitable” for the individual.449 
The system of solidary cohesion within the community presup-
poses the coordination of actions, which is based on joint consump-
tion – resulting from the risk of material scarcity or uncertainty. This 
may cause the members of the community, whose aim is to satisfy 
needs based on equality within the community, to restrain their 
momentary self-interests and provide mutual assistance.450 Solidar-
ity within the group does not stem from the emotional or natural 
(biological) conditions of the members, but from common interests 
such as common needs, fight against poverty or oppression, or the 
achievement of some common goals.451
3.2.2 Disciplinary approaches to solidarity
Solidarity has relevance to numerous fields of social sciences. Before 
exploring the legal significance of the principle, it is worth review-
ing briefly what aspects of solidarity are emphasized by other fields 
of science.
448  B. Farkas: A szolidaritás a társadalmi-gazdasági szerveződésben [Solidarity 
in Social-Economic Organization] http://www.vigilia.hu/1999/9/9909far.html 
(2009.09.10.)
449  B. Janky: Szolidaritás és jóléti preferenciák [Solidarity and Welfare Prefer-
ences], PhD- dissertation, manuscript, Budapest, 2002, 47. http://phd.lib.uni-
corvinus.hu/83/01/janky_bela.pdf 
450  Ibid. 18. 
451  Solidarity with the members of the community or group may be based on 
shared political conviction, economic or political situation etc. 
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In sociology – mainly as a central notion of Durkheim’s social 
theory – solidarity is the synopsis of social cohesion and two types 
of it may be distinguished. Mechanical solidarity corresponds basi-
cally to the traditional form of society defined by collective con-
sciousness, in other words, it is based on common pre-defined 
criteria relating to some group (e.g. belonging to the given sex); 
while organic solidarity – which is based on interdependence – 
serves the integration of modern, functionally differentiated societ-
ies grounded on the division of labour.452
In accordance with this – as viewed by political sociology – solidar-
ity represents a principle directed against isolation and massification, 
and emphasizes belonging together – that is, mutual responsibility 
for one another and joint obligation. Distinction may be made be-
tween group solidarity as the belonging together and joint action 
of persons of comparable social status who want to assert their 
common claims and interests jointly against others; and solidarity 
taken in a general sense oriented toward the common interests of 
all, toward the just order of society as a whole.
From the aspect of political history, in the workers’ movement – in 
the beginning as a political slogan –, solidarity gave expression to 
the working class’ self-consciousness and consciousness of belong-
ing together, to their moral value serving as the foundation for their 
mutual aid institutions. In the workers’ movement, solidarity pro-
vided opportunity for the members of the group to achieve freedom 
and social progress despite the fact that the members alone lacked 
the required power. It is also true of modern society that the indi-
vidual can pursue political aims only if he joins forces with others 
(through interest organizations, trade unions, parties, civil initia-
tives). Beyond individual and group interests, there has grown 
a need for (global) solidarity extending to the whole world as the 
condition for a humane way of life and the survival of mankind in 
freedom and peace. 
452  É. Durkheim: A társadalmi munkamegosztásról [On Social Division of Work], 
Osiris, Budapest, 2001, 69–80, 138–140. See also http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/
filozofia/durkheim-szolidaritas-080904
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In the approach of economics, the importance of solidarity is char-
acterized by differing intensity in the dominant trends from the 
aspect of the apprehension and modelization of market economy.453 
The least space to solidarity is afforded in Adam Smith’s theory, 
which oversimplifyingly proposed that, if everybody pursued their 
own interests in the economy, it would lead to the maximization 
of public good (through the “assistance” of an invisible hand). Con-
sequently, if through the pursuit of individual interests the maximum 
of public good can be achieved, the role of solidarity in organizing 
society will become questionable. In contrast to this logic (following 
the world economic crisis), John Maynard Keynes considered that 
it was the state’s task to interfere in market relations in order to 
increase employment. Parallel to this, state participation is also 
required to resolve social tensions and reduce inequalities, in other 
words, voluntary charity is not sufficient in this model. The value 
of solidarity was moved to the forefront as a result of the fact that 
the state provided welfare services for citizens through the redis-
tribution of wealth. However, based on Milton Friedman’s theory, 
(after the era known as the crisis of the welfare state) the idea reas-
serted itself that the socially detrimental effects of the operation of 
the market could basically be eliminated through civil solidarity 
and self-organization; it is not the state primarily that should provide 
remedy for them.454 
The outlined disciplinary conceptions of solidarity are to be uti-
lized by all means during legal interpretation, since they have been 
developed based on the examination of social reality from different 
aspects, and by its instrumental nature, law cannot disregard these 
results; at the same time, it flows from the function of law that dur-
453  On this, see Farkas ‘A szolidaritás a társadalmi-gazdasági szerveződésben’
454  According to Beáta Farkas: “As neo-conservative and neo-liberal economists 
place the emphasis on providing proof for the optimal functioning of the self-
regulating market, it goes without saying that the value of solidarity plays a sub-
ordinated role in their system.” Farkas ‘A szolidaritás a társadalmi-gazdasági 
szerveződésben’
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ing regulation solidarity may acquire a peculiar relevance different 
from the above.
3.3 Solidarity as a legal value
Based on Ádám Antal’s definition “the weight and hierarchical po-
sition of any value is determined or, at least, strongly influenced by 
the level of harmfulness of the danger, disadvantage, harm or lack 
of value constituting its opposite.”455 In our case it must be examined 
what can be considered the opposite of solidarity, in other words, what 
disadvantages and dangers may be caused by the lack of solidarity. 
In a socio-political sphere lacking the value of solidarity, one may 
reckon with the phenomena of isolation, separation, selfishness, 
hostility, massification, nivellization and inadequate assertion of 
interest. As a consequence of these phenomena – due to the lack 
of means or abilities, either through their own fault or through no 
fault of their own – certain members and groups of society get into 
a momentary or lasting disadvantageous situation; their living con-
ditions may become desperately hard. From a legal aspect, one is 
to examine what subsidiary help the state or executive power (even 
one being established at the international level) may provide by its 
self-definition and participation, and by what legal means it may 
encourage the natural functioning of social solidarity.456
455  Ádám ‘Bölcselet, vallás’ 71.
456  According to Pál Sonnevend: “State intervention […] becomes justified and 
necessary in many areas only where solidarity between the individual people 
proves insufficient: state activity concerning the improvement of the situation of 
those at a disadvantage is of secondary importance anyway.” P. Sonnevend: Szoli-
daritás és jog [Solidarity and Law], available at http://www.vigilia.hu/1999/ 
9/9909son.html. Concerning this, Lajos Bokros states the following: “If solidarity 
is raised to the level of social behavioral norm, its most beautiful form of imple-
mentation is constituted by voluntary social initiatives.” L. Bokros: Verseny és 
szolidaritás [Competition and Solidarity], Élet és Irodalom, Budapest, 2004, 29. 
However, this categorical imperative requires self-consciousness, independence 
and self-care (independent responsibility), the framework of which is set by de-
mocracy and market economy based on fair competition. This is adversely af-
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The recognition and formulation of solidarity rights,457 which may 
be regarded as a result of international legal development, contrib-
ute to the assertion of solidarity as a legal value. This circle com-
prises some modern rights (viewed by some as third generation 
rights) including the right to a healthy environment, sustainable 
development, proper feeding, consumer protection, the right to 
communication, protection of the future generations and the rights 
of the elderly as a manifestation of solidarity between the genera-
tions, as well as the right to peace, humanitarian aid or to the com-
mon heritage of humanity. The assertion of these rights requires 
active solidarity on the part of states and the international com-
munity; in the case of the major part of them one may regard as 
obligor all of the states taken together, while the part of obligee is 
taken by mankind as a whole. However, with a view to the present 
state of legal development, these rights can be enforced only to 
a low degree or hardly at all, since neither their content, nor their 
subjects and obligors are adequately defined.458 
In law-making states may utilize and assert the principle of soli-
darity in various ways, although this mostly results in solidarity 
implemented with the help of the state, in other words, rules prescrib-
ing citizens’ solidarity toward each other are rather rare. As exceptions 
to this one may regard the obligation to provide help (that is, the 
criminalization of the failure to provide help) and the obligation of 
support in family law.459 The legal imprints of the moral minimum 
stemming from a family tie are parents’ duty of childcare and edu-
cation as well as the rights and duties of children. The state may 
encourage voluntary, civil solidarity mechanisms, e.g. by tax discounts 
on the aid provided for the needy and by announcing grants for 
fected if the state forces people to undertake solidarity obligatorily and pushes 
self-care into the background. See Bokros ibid. 41.
457  V. Lamm and V. Peschka (eds.): Jogi lexikon [Lexicon of Law], KJK-KERSZÖV, 
Budapest, 1999, 563–564.
458  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 450. See also G. Halmai and G. A. Tóth 
(eds.): Emberi jogok [Human Rights], Osiris, Budapest, 2003, 88.
459  Sonnevend ‘Szolidaritás’
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charitable persons and organizations that carry out their activities 
in the interests of others.
Some sub-constitutional norms may contain an element of solidar-
ity as well exceeding their primary objective, or at least, the idea of 
solidarity may also be detected among the problem impulses of the 
regulation.460 One may consider as such obligations relating to the 
protection of the environment and nature, the protection of public 
health and emergency management. In the world of work one may 
mention social partnership, conciliation of interests, coalitional 
freedom and trade union activity as well as the exercise of the right 
to strike. Solidarity may function as significant motivation behind 
some pieces of crisis-legislation.461 Finally, the public interest action 
relating to consumer protection – besides cost-effective litigation 
– and compulsory liability insurance – besides substituting for and 
distributing individual liability – may also be regarded, at least 
indirectly, as manifestations of solidarity flowing from a shared risk.
Non-legal means contributing to the implementation of norms 
carrying solidarity also include employment and social policies, 
anti-discrimination and labour market integration programmes and 
strategies.462
460  It is worth mentioning that in the Hungarian legal system relatively few nor-
mative provisions concerned solidarity expressly already before the FL. Some 
examples: the preamble of Act XCVI of 1993 on Voluntary Mutual Insurance Funds, 
the preamble of Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Mi-
norities, the basic principles and priorities of Parliamentary Resolution 29/2008. 
(III. 20.) OGY on the National Climate Change Strategy, Parliamentary Resolution 
47/2007. (V. 31.) OGY on the National Strategy “Let it be better for Children!”
461  See Act XLVIII of 2009 on specific amendments required for the protection of 
citizens in a difficult situation caused by a house loan, Government Decree 
136/2009. (VI. 24.) on supporting persons in a situation of crisis.
462  See e.g. Community programme for employment and solidarity – PROGRESS 
(2007–2013). http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c11332.htm 
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3.4 Solidarity in the constitution
3.4.1 Solidarity as a constitutional value
Solidarity conceived as a constitutional value has three projections: 
political solidarity, social solidarity taken in a narrow sense and 
supra-national solidarity.
a) Political solidarity may be grasped, on the one hand, in the 
national consciousness of belonging together and its expression in 
the constitution and, on the other hand, in constitutional norms 
referring to cases and situations where the community-forming and 
cohesive force of some political issues is moved to the forefront. 
The former is supported, for example, by provisions laying down 
national sovereignty, the institution of citizenship, the emblems 
and symbols expressing belonging to the nation, and – if it is rel-
evant to the given state – rules relating to the diaspora. The extent 
and form of appearance of this aspect of political sovereignty in the 
Constitution are influenced by the given political community’s con-
cept of “nation”. More precisely, whether the constitutional order 
is dominated by the concept of “nation as state” or “nation as culture” 
(nation as language).463 The other constitutional aspect of solidar-
ity may be grasped in means intended for situations and events 
outside the law,464 namely, in the rights relating to political partici-
pation and communication (especially, in the guarantee of the right 
to assembly and association, freedom of opinion and the right to 
petition). 
b) The constitutional expression of social solidarity taken in a nar-
row sense465 may be found in the principles of the social state, social 
market economy, the guarantee of social rights, the protection of 
463  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 186–187.
464  For example, a matter of political nature (internal or foreign political event) 
that evokes reaction from the community or a defined group who also intend to 
give expression to this in a demonstration or joint action. 
465  In a wider sense, social solidarity as an actuality outside law also serves as the 
foundation for political, social – taken in a narrow sense – and supranational 
solidarity.
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social outcasts and the needy, which are implemented in the world 
of work and within the framework of the social care system. Social 
solidarity is a characteristic feature of the welfare state and it is 
related to the state’s social welfare services functions; the purpose 
of laying it down in the Constitution may be to outline the legal 
guarantees of secure livelihood. If social solidarity is outlined in 
a paternalistic model or by paternalistic methods, its practical effect 
is usually to push individual self-care and responsibility-taking to 
the background.466 Compulsory social solidarity also means the 
reorganization of relations of wealth to a certain degree, because 
people who have not borne the burden of averting risks also neces-
sarily receive social benefits.467 Therefore, the obligation of solidar-
ity may be prescribed only based on the principle of equality and 
in compliance with the constitutional standard of the restriction of 
ownership. 
The degree of solidarity manifested in the social security system 
depends on the size of the circle of members of the community 
involved in the system, the scope of the problems covered by it, the 
degree of intervention it leaves to the executive power and the 
degree of fairness of the model of redistribution applied by the 
system. Consequently, the distribution of risk is not determined 
individually but along a standard of equality adopted jointly by the 
whole society. Thus, problems constituting the subject of individ-
ual consideration earlier become politicized: what should happen 
in the case of illness, disability, old age, unemployment or parent-
hood is determined based on the principles of regularity, predict-
466  Hámor ‘A szolidaritás világától’ 3. According to Gábor Kardos: “Solidarity is 
if a person sympathizing with the situation of another person is also ready to act 
in his support. When the government carries out a financial transfer or redistribu-
tion through the taxation system and social policy with reference to solidarity, it 
quasi nationalizes this readiness. However, it is forced to do so because otherwise 
support for those in need could be implemented merely as voluntary care orga-
nized on a charitable basis. This way many people would be left without support.” 
G. Kardos: A szolidaritás határai [Limits of Solidarity], Liget – literary and ecologi-
cal journal Vol. 21, № 3, 2008, 95.
467  A. Takács: A szociális jogok [Social rights], in G. Halmai and G. A. Tóth (eds.): 
Emberi jogok [Human Rights], Osiris, Budapest, 2003, 803.
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ability and equality instead of eventuality and defencelessness.468 
All this leads to the recognition in the Constitution of the fact that 
individuals are not equal only in their civil and political rights but 
also in their risks. While the formal belonging together of the po-
litical community finds expression in citizenship, interdependence 
caused by personal and individual neediness and risk are mani-
fested in social rights and institutions.
c) The requirement of supranational solidarity presents itself, on 
the one hand, in relation to global challenges. Among them mention 
could be made of managing climate change, combating poverty and 
famines, crisis management, ensuring sustainable development – all 
these require global solidarity on the part of mankind.469 The asser-
tion of the solidarity rights mentioned above already also presup-
poses global solidarity of the international community. On the other 
hand, organizations of defence and economic integration also em-
phasize the requirement of solidarity of participating states. This is 
manifested in the basic documents of the said organizations, e.g. it 
is implied in the North-Atlantic Treaty,470 or expressly laid down in 
the Treaty on the European Union;471 but Constitutions also usu-
ally give expression to commitment toward the international com-
munity and readiness to international cooperation.
468  P. Baldwin: The Politics of Social Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1990, 2.
469  Ban Ki Mun: A szolidaritás víziója [The Vision of Solidarity], Figyelő January 
2009, 37.
470  See the Preamble and Arts 3-5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, available at http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
471  Preamble, Arts. 2-3, Art. 21, Art. 24, Art. 31 of the Treaty on the European 
Union (version incorporating the Lisbon Treaty); Preamble, Art. 67, Art. 80, Art. 
122, Art. 194, Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(consolidated version)
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3.4.2 Presence and interpretation of solidarity  
           in constitutional law in Europe 
At this point it is worth examining how solidarity appears in the 
individual European constitutions and the founding treaties of the 
European Union.
a) The first group is made up of the – otherwise small number of 
– constitutions that expressly lay down the principle of solidarity. As 
example one may cite the preamble of the Czech constitution, which 
speaks about “equal and free citizens who are conscious of their 
duties towards others and their responsibility towards the whole”. 
The Polish constitution provides an even simpler formulation of soli-
darity in its Article 20, which lays down, concerning the economic 
order, the principle of “a social market economy, based on solidar-
ity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners”, which is to 
be interpreted jointly with the basic principle of “a democratic state 
ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice” laid 
down in Article 2. According to the preamble, the basic value of the 
Republic of Poland, among others, is the obligation of solidarity with 
others. Finally, mention could be made of the Romanian constitution, 
Article 1 of which – besides other values – also refers to solidarity 
taken in a political sense: “Romania is a sovereign, independent, 
unitary, and indivisible Nation State. The State foundation is laid on 
the unity of the Romanian people and the solidarity of its citizens.” 
b) The second group comprises constitutions that are interpreted 
using the principle of solidarity. Article 2 of the Italian constitution 
asserts that “The republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable 
human rights, be it as an individual or in social groups expressing 
their personality, and it ensures the performance of the unalterable 
duty to political, economic, and social solidarity.” The Italian theo-
ry of basic rights interprets individuals within the framework of 
a way of thinking founded on social dependence. In Article 2 the 
Constitution lays down two basic principles: the principle of per-
sonality (il principio personalistico), according to which natural per-
sons have a sphere that cannot be violated by others and the 
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principle of plurality (il principio pluralistico), which protects indi-
viduals in their social relations. In addition to the general expression 
of the principle of plurality given in Article 2 (and Article 18 in the 
guarantee of the right to union), it is also specially formulated in 
the articles relating to social organizations having direct constitu-
tional relevance (family, linguistic minority, religious communities, 
trade unions, political parties). Solidarity is not simply a programme 
principle, but also influences civil law relations between citizens, which 
is true of provisions relating to the family (Article 29), the right to 
health (Article 32), the right to work (Articles 35-36), the limits of 
the right to property (Articles 42 and 44), private economic enter-
prise (Article 41 (1)), workers’ participation in the management of 
companies (Article 46), the system of cooperatives (Article 45) and 
the ability to acquire property (Article 47 (1)).472 As the Italian con-
stitution lists among basic constitutional principles the principle of 
equality (Article 3), the principle of solidarity and the right to work 
(Article 4), these principles provide guidance for legislature with 
establishing a social order in conformity with the constitution.473
Out of the state-organizing principles of the German basic law 
(GG), one may also mention the creation of a social state (GG, Articles 
20 and 28), which, taken in a general sense, means protecting and 
helping weaker people. In a wider sense, however, it may be con-
structed as the possibility for everybody to share common goods, 
moreover, ensuring dignified conditions of existence. The GG sup-
ports this by the declaration of basic social rights, the special regu-
lation of contributions to public revenues and the creation of equal 
472  In this sense, in Italy one may speak of the constitutionalization of civil law, 
which is manifested first of all in the decisions of the Constitutional Court relating 
to family law, labour law and the law of delict. The process of constitutionalization 
gained importance because the Constitutional Court moved away from the inter-
pretation of general principles of constitutional law as mere programme norms. 
473  T. Drinóczi: Államszervezési elvek és államszervezet az Olasz Köztársaságban 
[Principles of State Organization and the Structure of State in the Republic of 
Italy], Magyar Jog № 11, 2007, 672–674.
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opportunities.474 However, the state – as a social state governed by 
the rule of law – does not only protect the individual from social 
risks but also encourages self-help and solidarity communities. 
Consequently, the GG’s social state governed by the rule of law is 
not a “totally caring state” but, apart from the welfare of the indi-
vidual, its aim is also to realize “responsible freedom”.475 The task 
of the German social state is to implement and maintain social 
justice. The protection of work and incomes earned by work as well 
as the guarantee of social security irrespectively of the individual’s 
working capacity presuppose redistribution defined primarily by 
the principle of equality. This is grounded on the ethical principle 
of solidarity.476 The guarantee of social justice by the state transforms 
solidarity to be borne by society into a legal issue. The socially just 
social system ensures everybody the possibility to contribute to the 
economy and culture in a self-determining way based on his own 
decision and performance.477
c) The principle of solidarity emphasized in the amended found-
ing treaties of the European Union enhances – externally – the iden-
tity of the integrational organization (in other words, the fact that 
the integration of the member states forming an increasingly close 
union between themselves differs from other international organi-
zations),478 on the other hand – internally – it gives expression to 
the economic-social cohesion between member states, and to the com-
474  J. Zeller: Német Szövetségi Köztársaság [Federal Republic of Germany], in 
N. Chronowski and T. Drinóczi (eds.): Európai kormányformák rendszertana [Sys-
tematics of European Forms of Government], HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2007, 118–119.
475  T. Drinóczi: Gazdasági alkotmány és gazdasági alapjogok [Economic Constitution 
and Basic Economic Rights], Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2007, 145.
476  P. Badura: Staatsrecht, C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1996, 
256. 
477  Ibid. 257.
478  P. Szilágyi: Csak akkor(?) és abban a mértékben(?)…: Szubszidiaritás és 
szolidaritás az Európai Unióban, Recenzió [Only if? and to the Extent(?)…: 
Subsidiarity and Solidarity in the European Union, Review], Európai Jog № 1, 
2009, 63.
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mitment of mutual assistance.479 Internal solidarity is a natural con-
sequence of the development of the community established amongst 
states, which, on the other hand, serves as a foundation e.g., for the 
free movement of labour, temporary derogations for acceding states 
concerning the fulfilment of some requirements or the expansion 
of transfers of resources.480 The principle of social solidarity as the 
foundation for the social welfare system can also be found in the 
practice of the Court of Justice.481 This practice is justified by the 
title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights summing up solidarity rights, 
which acquired legal force through the Treaty of Lisbon.482 In this 
respect, attention must be drawn to the following idea of Gábor 
Kardos: “It is not unjustified to designate economic and social rights 
as solidarity rights. The reason for this is that the financial base of 
services provided on the basis of social rights is given by national-
ized solidarity, which receives its resources from taxes. At the same 
time, the inclusion of the concept of solidarity in the summary of 
basic rights to be protected by the EU further emphasizes the im-
portance of this value in the functioning of this institution.”483 Hav-
ing regard to international legal development, the modern catalogue 
479  Some examples: The material manifestation of enhancing cohesion between 
the member states is the Solidarity Fund, which provides emergency relief in case 
of natural disasters. (O. Sebők: A szolidaritás alapja [The Basis of Solidarity], 
Piac&Profit, October 2007, 22–23.) Joint action against terror attacks and mutual 
assistance in case of a terrorist attack are ensured by the solidarity clause. See Art. 
222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated ver-
sion).
480  P. Balázs: A szolidaritás határai Európában [The Limits of Solidarity in Europe], 
Esély № 2, 2002, 5. In connection with the economic driving forces and political 
significance of solidarity, Árpád Gordos states that “the principle of solidarity is the 
suspension point of our European policy”. Á. Gordos: A szolidaritás és a szubszid-
iaritás mint a közjó horizontális és vertikális szolgálatának alapelvei [Solidarity and 
Subsidiarity as the Basic Principles of the Horizontal and Vertical Service of Public 
Good], in ‘Szubszidiaritás és szolidaritás az Európai Unióban’ 182.
481  A. Somek: Solidarity Decomposed. Being and time in European citizenship. 
University of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper 07-13, 2007, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=987346, 4.  
482  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Title IV. Articles 27–38. 
(OJ C 303/8-10, 14.12.2007). 
483  Kardos ‘Szolidaritás, szubszidiaritás’ 170. 
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of fundamental rights does not merely declare classical solidarity 
rights (oriented to the world of labour), but also attributes impor-
tance to solidarity between generations484; and also regulates envi-
ronmental and consumption risks based on the universal principle 
of solidarity.485 
3.4.3 Solidarity-oriented provisions of the  
            former Hungarian Constitution (Act XX of 1949)
The former Hungarian Constitution did not expressly lay down the 
principle of solidarity; however, it contained several rules inspired 
by some aspects of solidarity. The solidarity-oriented rules, institu-
tions and solutions of the legal system might be traced back to them. 
At the same time, it was – and still is – a problem that solidarity – 
similarly to other constitutional values – has become interiorized 
to a low degree in the members of the political community, to 
whom the constitution is addressed and whom it is about. As op-
posed to other constitutional values – such as the rule of law, de-
mocracy, parliamentarism, freedom, security, human rights etc. –, 
the value-character and preciousness of which could be (could have 
been) learnt by society in the two decades following the demo-
cratic political transformation, the value of solidarity could have 
taken root in the era of socialism too as a community-organizing 
factor. This is what happened, for example, in Poland and Czecho-
slovakia, where solidarity against the dictatorial state and regime 
had developed and influenced social practice before the years of 
political change. In contrast, in Hungary the Kádár era was favour-
able for achieving modest individual prosperity and influenced 
public atmosphere in the direction of self-interest pursuing behav-
iour. As a result of these circumstances, Hungary has a lower level 
484  Art. 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (rights 
of the elderly). 
485  Arts 37-38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (pro-
tection of the environment, consumer protection).
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of social solidarity, and consequently, also lower levels of law-abi-
dance than other post-socialist countries with a similar line of de-
velopment. On the other hand, there is a  high demand for 
government intervention and high expectation of solutions of re-
distribution, in many cases without the recognition of the justified 
need for readiness to individual sacrifice. The outlined attitude of 
the political community may serve as explanation to the question 
why solidarity as a constitutional value has such a low impact on 
the actual state of reality in Hungary. 
In spite of the above, from the aspect of Hungarian constitu-
tional law, solidarity was considered a value that is independent of 
constitutional regulation, which, at the same time, may be served 
by several instrumental values laid down in the basic law or a lower 
level legal norm. The solidarity-oriented provisions of the Hungar-
ian Constitution might also be analysed in political, international 
and social dimensions based on the system described above.
a) In the Constitution one might find only provisions giving ex-
pression to political solidarity indirectly, e.g., in the provision con-
cerning the sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living 
outside the borders (Article 6 (3) – responsibility clause), the insti-
tution of the Head of State designed to express national unity (Ar-
ticle 29), or the recognition of the rights of the national and ethnic 
minorities defined as participants in the sovereign power of the 
people (Article 68).486 During the identification of solidarity norms 
it caused a problem that the basic law used the terms “people”, 
“people representing a constituent part of the State” and “nation” 
as well (both in the form of subject and attribute). The expression 
“(Hungarian) people” denotes nation in a political sense having the 
meaning of nation as state, which also includes persons belonging 
to (national and ethnic) minorities. If the category of nation is used 
within the meaning of nation as culture, nation is both a narrower 
and wider category than political nation. It is narrower, because it 
486  Concerning political solidarity, see A. Zs. Varga: Alkotmányunk értékei. 
A fogalmi keretek [The Values of Our Constitution. A Notional Framework. ], 
Iustum Aequum Salutare № 1, 2009,  97–100.
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embraces only the part of the citizens of the state who share the 
same culture, speak the same language, have the same origins, 
identity etc. On the other hand it is wider, because it regards as part 
of the nation also those who live in other countries and are citizens 
of other states, but who otherwise belong to the nation based on 
their language, culture, origins etc. Because of the complicated na-
ture of the notion of nation, the terms “people” and “citizenship” 
are rather applicable in constitutional law. Therefore – in this sense 
– “people” may be regarded as the indispensible element of the 
state, the source of state sovereignty and the community function-
ing as the vehicle of political solidarity.487
b) The international dimension of solidarity was manifested primar-
ily in the foreign policy objectives of the state formulated in the 
Constitution (Article 6), the provision about the acceptance of in-
ternational law (Article 7 (1)), the authorization relating to Euro-
pean integration (Article 2/A) as well as in compliance with certain 
policies (Article 57 (4)). Although solidarity with the international 
community and the other member states of the European Union was 
not expressly laid down by these provisions, nevertheless, it might 
be taken into account as an immanent value during the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. Help with the latter was provided by the 
expressions: rejection of war and violence,488 endeavour to cooper-
ate, taking part in establishing European unity, joint exercise of au-
thority, which presuppose solidarity with those concerned. Moreover, 
because readiness to international and supranational cooperation 
is expressed in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, during 
487  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 185–188. A different view is held by 
e.g. János Zlinszky, who considers “people” an ethnic concept and “nation” a po-
litical category. J. Zlinszky: Tudjátok-e, mi a haza? [Do you know what motherland 
is?], in Formatori Iuris Publici – Ünnepi kötet Kilényi Géza professzor 70. születésnapjára 
[Special Volume Dedicated to the 70th Birthday of Professor Géza Kilényi], PPKE-
JÁK, Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2006, 599. 
488  This may also be regarded as the declaration of the right to peace, which may 
be grouped with the solidarity rights described above. See Zs. Balogh et al.: Az 
Alkotmány magyarázata [Commentary of the Constitution], KJK-KERSZÖV, Budapest, 
2003, 157. 
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its interpretational activity, used489 the provisions of conventions 
containing accepted international obligations which give expression 
to and serve solidarity.490
c) The rules of the Constitution inspired by social solidarity and 
giving expression to the social responsibility of the state491 were: 
providing support for those in need (Article 17), the protection of 
the young (Article 16), the right to social security (Article 70/E) and 
health (Article 70/D). In a wider sense and having regard to the 
tendencies of international legal development, solidarity may be 
associated with the right to a healthy environment (Article 18) and 
the right to access to culture (Article 70/F), freedom of coalition 
and the right to strike (70/C), parents’ duty to educate their children 
(Article 66), and the obligation to contribute to public revenues, 
which constitutes the financial base of institutions of solidarity 
encouraged or organized by the state (Article 70/I). 
With respect to the interpretation of the mentioned solidarity 
norms – expressed mostly in social rights – , determinative sig-
nificance were attributed to the right to human dignity, the prohibition 
of discrimination, equal rights and opportunities;492 while the back-
ground for their implementation is provided by the principle of 
market economy. According to the position of the Constitutional 
Court, apart from the declaration of market economy, the Constitution 
489  For more detail concerning the role played by international law in the inter-
pretation of the constitution, see László Blutman: A nemzetközi jog használata 
az Alkotmány értelmezésénél [The Use of International Law during the Interpre-
tation of the Constitution], Jogtudományi Közlöny № 7-8, 2009, 301–315.
490  See, for example, HCC Decision 357/B/2002 AB of the Constitutional Court 
(30 May 2006) dealing with the the protection of victims, in which the Constitu-
tional Court also referred to the solidarity principle of the European Convention 
of 1983 on the Compensation of the Victims of Violent Crimes in its reasoning. 
491  According to Sonnevend: “With regard to society-scale solidarity, the social 
responsibility of the state is what is laid down by the Constitution. In this context, 
two constitutional principles of central importance may serve as a starting point: 
respect for and protection of human dignity and the principle of citizens’ equal-
ity before the law.” Sonnevend ‘Szolidaritás’ 1–2.
492  The above also serve as guarantees of social justice and tolerance (and social 
immunity). Solidarity is also connected with these values.
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was neutral from the point of view of economic policy,493 which 
meant that it was not committed to any model of market economy.494 
Social market economy, laid down in the preamble, was merely 
a state objective in the Republic of Hungary; therefore, it was not 
invoked concerning the principle of solidarity.495
In the present chapter, I do not provide a detailed analysis of the 
basic rights, fundamental duties and constitutional principles listed 
above, but merely mention the fact that, in its practice, the Constitu-
tional Court invoked the principle of solidarity during its interpreta-
tional activity primarily in connection with the right to social 
security and the social security system guaranteeing this right.
The Court considered the right to social security a constitutional 
value: “The Constitution defines the right to social security as a ter-
minal value (Constitution, Article 70/E), which – by way of the 
state’s objective obligation to protect the institutions (maintenance 
of social insurance and social institutions) – ensures to those en-
titled to it the support required to live in old age, and in the case of 
sickness, disability, being widowed or orphaned and in the case of 
unemployment through no fault of their own. The instrumental 
values attached to the terminal value (the conditions for the estab-
lishment and operation of the institutions and for receiving the 
specific provisions) are set forth in statutes and other legal instru-
ments relating to the institutions.”496
Out of the connected “instrumental values”, it was in the case of 
the characterization of the mixed nature and operation of the social 
security system and the services provided within its framework as 
493  HCC Decision 33/1993. (V. 28.) AB, ABH (1993) 247, 249.
494  HCC Decision 21/1994. (IV. 6.) AB, ABH (1994) 117, 119.
495  If the Constitution contained, as a basic principle of the economic order, the 
requirement of social market economy or, in connection with market economy 
– similarly to the Polish Constitution – the principle of solidarity, then during the 
protection of the constitution, besides the requirements of fair distribution, social 
balance and the subsidiary responsibility of the state, the requirements of indi-
vidual responsibility and foresight could also clearly unfold. Concerning this, see 
Drinóczi ‘Gazdasági alkotmány’ 165.
496  HCC Decision 47/2007. (VII. 3.) AB, ABH (2007)-I. 620, 637.
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well as the created legal relations that the Constitutional Court 
invoked the principle of solidarity. State regulation of legal relations 
created within the framework of social security is governed by the 
principles of individual responsibility, self-care and social solidari-
ty.497 Social security, on the one hand, gives the insured persons 
some in-kind provisions based on the principle of solidarity, and 
on the other hand, it gives financial provisions to them adjusted to 
the amount of their payments.498 The Court itself found the system 
mixed in a double sense: “Firstly, in the respect that the state meets 
its obligation of care laid down in the Constitution by operating 
both a compulsory social security system and a system of social 
provisions. In this dual system both insurance and solidarity are 
present. Secondly, the legal relation created by compulsory social 
security itself has a mixed nature too, because it contains both the 
elements of insurance and solidarity.”499 The principle of solidarity 
also played a role during the constitutional examination of the es-
497  “In order to ensure the operability and financing of the social security system, 
there was a need for a comprehensive reform of the system. Since 1 January 1998 
the pension system has been characterised by mixed financing: it consists of 
a distributive-impositional element (social security pension) and a capital backing 
element (private pension). The change is aimed at regulating legal relations cre-
ated within the framework of social security in accordance with the requirements 
of individual responsibility and self-care and the principles of social solidarity.” 
HCC Decision 5/1998. (III. 1.) AB, ABH (1998) 82, 87.
498  “As applied in Art. 70/E of the Constitution, the notion of „social security” 
means a system based on legally compulsory membership and the compulsory 
payments of the members, providing both financial and in-kind services, the 
functioning of which is laid down by legal provision. In other words, state-oper-
ated social security is a supply system which gives insured persons in-kind provi-
sions – based on the principle of solidarity – independently of the amount of the 
contributions, in case of the occurrence of events that are certain or highly prob-
able to take place in a person’s life, as well as financial provisions of differing 
amounts adjusted to the amount of the contributions paid by the insured persons, 
who are required to contribute a percentage of their income laid down by law to 
the maintenance of the social security system.” HCC Decision 51/2007. (IX. 15.) 
AB, ABH (2007)-I. 652, 657.
499  HCC Decision 35/1997. (VI. 11.) AB, ABH 1997. 200, 214.
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tablishment of the obligation to pay a contribution,500 and the 
amount of the contribution501.
Finally, it could also be interesting to examine when the principle 
of solidarity played no role in the practice of the Constitutional 
Court. For example, in its decision on the wealth tax adopted in 
2010,502 the Constitutional Court does not mention it either as a rea-
son or as an aspect of interpretation – despite the fact that, concern-
ing the proportionality (fairness) of contributions to public revenues, 
social solidarity serves as a (not so hidden) underlying motivation.
3.4.4 Solidarity and the Fundamental Law
In the previous chapters of this book it was already discussed that 
in the field of international and social solidarity the  FL gives 
a weaker standard than the Constitution. Instead, it puts emphasis 
on political solidarity by establishing the system of national coop-
eration, but the latter is also restricted to a nationalist and Hungar-
ian ethnocentric concept.
500  “Therefore, it may be deduced logically from the constitutionally acceptable 
principle of solidarity that based on the Constitution, the legislator is free to extend 
the obligation to pay a contribution to all incomes earned by work but derived 
from different sources, consequently, even to incomes gained by the insured 
persons within the framework of their legal relations in their second or third jobs, 
as employees, sole traders or partners. Otherwise, the principle that – within the 
framework of medical care – those of lower income are entitled to the same social 
security services as the insured persons paying higher contributions would not 
be constitutionally acceptable either. Therefore, if the extension of the obligation 
of contribution to include incomes gained within the framework of further em-
ployment and entrepreneurial legal relations is – at least partly – accompanied 
by an element of insurance, the taking into consideration of the principle of soli-
darity to a higher proportion in this circle is not in itself unconstitutional.” HCC 
Decision 34/1997. (VI. 11.) AB, ABH (1997) 174, 187.
501  In accordance with the principle of solidarity, contributions defined as per-
centages impose a heavier burden on people of higher incomes than those having 
lower incomes or no income at all; on the other hand, the quality of in-kind health 
insurance provisions is independent of the amount of the contribution paid. HCC 
Decision 197/B/2002. AB, ABH (2007) 1389, 1394–1395.
502  HCC Decision 8/2010. (I. 28.) AB. 
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The ‘rule by law’ governance and the frequently amended new 
constitution of 2011/12 also reformulated the frameworks of the 
protection of human dignity and social solidarity. The decline of 
the standards in this field is spectacular and visible.
The recent case law of the Constitutional Court reaffirms the 
initial concerns, the dignity supported solidarity lost in the post-
democratic transitions in the past seven years.
The Constitutional Court recognised in 2012 that the FL com-
pletely abandoned the approach of the former Constitution on right 
to social security, thus found necessary to distinguish and overrule 
the former case law. The Court emphasized that no fundamental 
rights are provided by the new constitutional regulation on social 
security, instead, only state duties and aims are prescribed in Article 
XIX.503 This article mentions rights just in two cases, first the right 
to state pension of the elderly prescribed by law, and second the 
right to statutory subsidies in certain situations (maternity, illness, 
disability, handicap, widowhood, orphanage and unemployment 
for reasons outside of his or her control). These are far not enforce-
able right, their protection depends on the opportunities and eco-
nomic situation of the state.504 On the basis of the amendment to 
the former Constitution in 2011 and the new constitutional environ-
ment the Court found legitimate and just that the government re-
constructed the system of early retirement, substituted the pensions 
with aids and allowances, which are completely ex gratia subsidies 
thus not even fall under the protection of private property. The con-
stitutional protection of property is applicable to those social subsi-
dies in the future where individual financial contribution justifies it. 
The ex gratia subsidies are subject to the legislative discretion thus 
they are not protected as fundamental or constitutional rights – the 
only criterion that they cannot based on arbitrary decision.505 From 
503  HCC Decision 40/2012. (XII. 6.) AB, HCC Decision 9/2016. (IV. 6.) AB.
504  HCC Decision 28/2015. (IX. 24.) AB.
505  HCC Decision 32/2015. (XI. 19.) AB, reasoning [32], HCC Decision 25/2016. 
(XII. 21.) AB, reasoning [24]
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the argumentation of the Court references to human dignity or social 
solidarity have totally disappeared.506
The level of protection of the social rights may be reduced by the 
state, argues the Court, and the state duties are restricted to – on the 
one hand – the establishment of an institutional system in which the 
constitutional rights may prevail, and – on the other – the statutory 
rights shall be outlined for the access to the social institutions. The 
Court noted that the FL just reaffirmed the limited economic capac-
ity of the state and respected the fact that the former welfare model 
was unsustainable.507 However, some kind of protection is still not 
excluded, because the certain situations enumerated by the FL – al-
though do not generate subjective, justiciable fundamental rights but 
– create ‘constitutional background’ to the statutory rights.508
While the Constitutional Court was reluctant to find any uncon-
stitutionality in the governmental reconstruction of the social se-
curity system, the European Court of Human Rights in a subsidiary 
way guarantees some remedy although the protection of social 
rights fall beyond the scope of the Convention. A recent case509 
concerned a social security benefit paid to the applicant, who had 
506  See HCC Decision 40/2012. (XII. 6.) AB, press release: ‘The Constitutional 
Court has declared that the adopted Article XIX of Fundamental Law and the still 
applicable Article 70/E para 5 of the previous Constitution authorise the law-
maker expressly to reduce the pension or to modify it to social benefit if those 
who receive it are under the general retirement age, or even to terminate it in case 
of incapacity of work. Based on these regulations, the Hungarian Parliament 
adopted the Act that ensures health care insurance instead of retirement benefits 
for people with reduced ability to work. The Constitutional Court has declared 
that the Act contains transitional provisions because it took the previously declared 
age, the rate of disability and the previous forms of benefits into consideration 
when disposes the disbursement of benefits from 1 January 2012. Therefore, the 
concerned part of the Commissioner’s petition has been dismissed. The Consti-
tutional Court has declared as well that the regulation regarding the termination 
of eligibility for disability benefits does not infringe the Fundamental Law as the 
reasons of the termination are that the need thereof expires and an income neces-
sary to minimal subsistence is ensured.’
507  HCC Decision 25/2016. (XII. 21.) AB, reasoning [21]
508  HCC Decision 28/2015. (IX. 24.) AB, reasoning [34]
509  Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (application № 53080/13), Judgment of 13 December 
2016 (Grand Chamber)
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received a disability benefit for almost ten years, which was then 
withdrawn. The claim to re-start the payments was dismissed, be-
cause a legislative change had meant that the applicant was no 
longer eligible to receive the benefit. 
The ECtHR found in particular that Article 1 to Protocol 1 on 
protection of property had applied to the case, because the ap-
plicant had had a legitimate expectation that she would receive 
the pension, if she had satisfied the criteria set out in the former 
legislation. The refusal to grant her the benefit had been in ac-
cordance with the law (as it arose from the new legislation), and 
had been in pursuit of a legitimate purpose (saving public funds). 
However, it had not been proportionate: in particular, because it 
had involved the complete deprivation of a vulnerable person’s 
only significant source of income, resulting from retrospectively 
effective legislation that had contained no transitional arrange-
ments applicable to the applicant’s case.
* * *
Summarizing the observations contained in the essay, one arrives 
at the conclusion that solidarity may have an impact on the exis-
tence, establishment or interpretation of several legal institutions. 
However, compulsory solidarity prescribed by the state is only a re-
stricted means and may easily lead to paternalism.510 Therefore, 
510  A Hungarian example of the declaration of political solidarity by the state is 
Political Statement 1/2010. (06. 16.) OGY of Parliament about National Coopera-
tion, the posting of which in public institutions was ordered by Government 
Decision 1140/2010. (VII. 2.). Within the framework of this chapter it is impos-
sible to give a thorough scholar analysis of the statement. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the statement recognizes the system of national cooperation 
founded by the parliamentary elections of April 2010, it sets as its objective to 
build up the system of national cooperation, which has both a political and an 
economic projection. The statement enumerates certain values (work, home, 
family, health, order) which “bind the members of the diverse Hungarian nation 
together”. The content of the statement originally was a political declaration, but 
a certain extent it inspired the later constitution-making. By the constitutionaliza-
tion of some of its elements, the state/governmental scale of values, styled as the 
new social contract, may acquire a certain degree of normativity. The ‘system of 
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legal provisions expressing and implementing solidarity must be 
based on wide public social consensus. If the principle of solidarity 
is expressly laid down in the Constitution, this fact may encourage 
its assertion in legislation and the application of law because it 
enjoys the protection of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the 
assertion of the principle of solidarity in (constitutional law) may 
contribute to the more effective implementation of social justice 
and tolerance as well as social immunity. Naturally, this presup-
position is realistic only if the principle of solidarity laid down by 
the Constitution has real social legitimacy.
4 A nation torn apart by its constitution?  
     From the perspective of minorities
The new Hungarian constitution has introduced unique and often 
criticized regulations regarding the rule of law, democracy and 
human dignity. This chapter evaluates the constitutional rules in 
the context of national identity and ethnicity, with special regard 
to those articles which are of discriminative nature and may lead 
to social exclusion. The first point is that – while the former Hun-
garian constitution was neutral regarding the values and applied 
the political nation concept – the new constitution does not clear-
ly identify the political community to which it shall be applied, due 
to an inconsistent and controversial use of the concepts of political 
nation and cultural nation in the constitutional text. Using the cat-
egory of nation in a cultural sense, the text allows for both a nar-
rower and a wider meaning of membership than the category of 
national coopearation’ appeared in the National avowal (i.e. preamble) of the FL, 
but the Constitutional Court has not used it yet to the interpretation. See to this 
Berkes Lilla – Fekete Balázs: Nemzeti Hitvallás: csupán díszítő szavak? [The 
National Avowal: Simply Words?], Közjogi Szemle № 1, 2017, and Balázs Fekete: 
The National Avowal: More than a Conventional Preamble to a Constitution, in 
Z. Szente, F. Mandák and Zs. Fejes (eds.): Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent Hun-
garian Constitutional Development: Discussing the New Fundamental Law of Hungary, 
Éditions L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015, 11–24.
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political nation. Thus, because the definition of the ‘nation’ is rath-
er controversial, it is unclear whether ethnic minorities fall under 
the same norms of political solidarity as the Hungarian majority. 
The second point is that the rights associated with the social soli-
darity might be interpreted restrictively. The possibility of penal-
izing homelessness or distributing social benefits on the basis of 
the ‘usefulness of one’s activity to the community’ – again, com-
bined with the ethnocentric nation concept – may in practice lead 
to social exclusion and indirectly sanction systematic discrimination 
against the largest Hungarian ethnic group, the Roma people, the 
members of which are most likely to live in poverty.
Constitutions try to contribute to, and at the same time they are 
the evidence of the constitutional identity of the given political 
community.511 If the constitution drafting is a discoursive, demo-
cratic, representative and transparent process, it may help to close 
the gaps of the society, otherwise those gaps remain tenacious and 
anchored by the constitution. 
Before analysing the text of the FL from the perspective of nation 
and ethnicity, it is worth to recall how far national and ethnic mi-
norities were involved into the Hungarian constitution-making. 
Formally all minority self-governments and the parliamentary com-
missioner for ethnic and national minority rights (special ombud-
sperson) were invited to send proposals to the new constitution 
during the summer of 2010. Finally the special parliamentary com-
missioner and four – out of thirteen – minority self-governments 
(the Bulgarian, the German, the Croatian and the Ruthenian) sub-
mitted their recommendations. A common point was that they sup-
ported the elimination of the dual term (national and ethnic 
minorities) from the constitutional text and the introduction of 
a single term (nationalities) partly for historical reasons and partly 
for the better expression of equality of national minorities. They also 
recommended the extension of individual minority rights by precise 
enumeration, strengthening the special commissioner’s constitu-
511  G. J. Jacobsohn: Constitutional identity, The Review of Politics № 3, 2006, 363.
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tional position, guaranteeing the status of minority self-governments, 
and finding the solution for parliamentary representation.512 At this 
stage the expert and interest groups received no feedbacks from the 
parliamentary ad hoc committee, and their substantive participation 
was not provided for. As it was outlined earlier in this book, the ef-
fective constitution-making period was very short, and in reality 
neither the academic institutions, expert organizations, civilians, 
nor minorities and other groups of the society were involved into 
the process. From the expressed proposals of the national and ethnic 
minorities the need for a parliamentary representation and the 
change of denomination, however, were taken into consideration. 
In return, the minorities lost their special, independent parliamen-
tary commissioner513 and the chance for better defined rights.
It is also interesting to have a look at the number of the members 
of national and ethnic minorities, which has increased to 555,507 
from 313,832 between 2001 and 2011.514 The reason for the differ-
ence may be the better advertisement of the census and the intro-
duction of the minority electoral registration.515 The actual number 
512  A. L. Pap: Észrevételek a kisebbségek parlamenti képviseletének szabályozásához 
az új alkotmányban [Remarks on the parliamentary representation of minorities in 
the new constitution], Pázmány Law Working Papers № 27/2011, 2–3.
513  Hungary was one of very few European states that has established a specialized 
Ombudsman for the protection of minorities. The Parliamentary Commissioner 
(Ombudsman) for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities was first elected in 
1995 and was independent from both the judiciary and the executive power, report-
ing exclusively to parliament. The powers of this body were based on the former 
Hungarian Constitution of 1989 and it assumed an important function in the for-
mulation of laws and policies regarding minority protection.
514  The data of the national census in 2001 and 2011. For a comparative table see 
Table 1. However, this data is criticized by experts, for methodological problems 
of the survey and for measurement multiple ties.
515  As Minority Rights Group International assessed: “Critics contended from the 
late 1990’s that as the right to participate in minority self-government elections 
was open to all Hungarian citizens, i.e. it was based on the general right to vote 
at local elections, and did not depend on effective membership of a minority, 
many minority representatives were not from the relevant minority. The abuse of 
minority self-governments for political or other purposes was also addressed by 
modifying the system of minority elections. Article 70 of the former Constitution 
was amended in 2002 (entering into force in May 2004) so that only persons 
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– based on voluntary and anonymous confession of the residents 
– is more than 5 per cent of the total population. As the data on 
belonging to a national or ethnic minority are sensitive and their 
confession is voluntary on the census questionnaire, almost 1.5 
million people omitted the question. Thus the above mentioned 
number is far not exact; other estimates – which are naturally not 
based on self-confession of the concerned – put just the proportion 
of the Roma minority at 5 to 10 per cent of the total population. The 
regulation of national minority rights may directly affect approx. 10 
per cent of the population.516 Neither this significant number of the 
citizens, nor other groups of society were directly represented in 
the 2011 constitution making process in Hungary. In the following 
the examination focuses on the political and societal status of na-
tional and ethnic minorities as it is reflected in the FL.
Table 1 – number of nationalities  
– voluntary confession on censuses 1980-2011
Source: http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tables_regional_00517
Number
1980 1990 2001 2011
Total
belonging to minorities can elect their self-governments and to stand as candidates 
in those elections. According to this legislation, those who decide to run in elec-
tions for minority self-governments are required to register with the head of the 
local election office and declare their ethnic identity. However, the declared eth-
nic identity may not be questioned by the state organs.” http://minorityrights.
org/country/hungary/  <http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=5804>
516  A. Magicz: Re-regulation of National Minority Rights, in Their Shield is the Law 
– The Ombudsman’s Protection for Vulnerable Groups (eds. Barnabás Hajas and Máté 
Szabó), Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, Budapest, 2013, 27.
517 The significant change of number between 1980 and 1990 does not mean the 
exponential increase of the number of births in the Roma ethnic group, it just 
means that the number of voluntary confessions increased.
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Hungarian 10 638 974 10 142 072 9 416 045 8 314 029
National and  
ethnic minorities 
Bulgarian .. .. 1358 3556
Gipsy  
(Romany, Bea)1
6404 142 683 189 984 308 957
Greek .. .. 2509 3916
Croatian 13 895 13 570 15 597 23 561
Polish .. .. 2962 5730
German 11 310 30 824 62 105 131 951
Armenian .. .. 620 3293
Romanian 8874 10 740 7995 26 345
Ruthenian .. .. 1098 3323
Serbian 2805 2905 3816 7210
Slovakian 9101 10 459 17 693 29 647
Slovenian 1731 1930 3025 2385
Ukrainian .. .. 5070 5633
National and ethnic 
minorities together
.. .. 313 832 555 507
Arabic .. .. 1396 4537
Chinese .. .. 2275 6154
Russian .. .. 2341 6170
Vietnamese .. .. 958 3019
Other 16 369 19 640 36 472 28 068
Did not wish to an-
swer, no answer
– – 570 537 1 455 883
Total .. .. 10 343 856 10 373 367
Population 10 709 463 10 374 823 10 198 315 9 937 628
4.1 Conceptualisation of the Hungarian people  
       and nation in the Fundamental Law
It is problematic, from the perspective of the principle of democ-
racy and popular sovereignty, that the FL does not clearly identify 
the political community to which it shall be applied, because the 
use of the concepts of political nation and cultural nation is incon-
sistent and controversial in the constitutional text. Article B of FL 
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refers to the ‘people’ as the source of public power,518 and the pre-
amble – at least according to its closing sentence – is written on 
behalf of citizens.519 Both statements are the proofs of the political 
nation approach. At the same time, the opening sentence of the 
preamble called National avowal puts the Hungarian nation into 
the centre,520 without defining who belongs to the nation, and the 
text of the preamble later also refers to the “intellectual and spiri-
tual unity of our nation torn apart”.521 In the first part of the FL, 
under the title “Foundation”, Article D uses the expression of “one 
single Hungarian nation”.522 This wording seems to support the cul-
tural nation concept; i.e. the cultural and linguistic belonging to-
gether irrespective of territorial unity, which became common – in 
sense of ethno-nation – in Central Eastern Europe during the 19th 
518  Article B(3)-(4) of the FL: “The source of public power is the people. The 
people shall exercise their power through their elected representatives or, in 
exceptional cases, directly.”
519  Closing sentence of the preamble: “We, the citizens of Hungary, are ready to 
found the order of our country upon the common endeavours of the nation.”
520  A. L. Pap: Who Are “We, the People”? Biases and Preferences in the Hungar-
ian Fundamental Law, in Z. Szente, F. Mandák, Zs. Fejes (eds.): Challenges and 
Pitfalls in the Recent Hungarian Constitutional Development: Discussing the New Fun-
damental Law of Hungary. Éditions L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015, 35–73.
521  Preamble, opening sentence: “WE, THE MEMBERS OF THE HUNGARIAN 
NATION, at the beginning of the new millennium, with a sense of responsibility 
for every Hungarian, hereby proclaim the following: (…)”; Preamble, thesis 6-8: 
“We promise to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn 
apart in the storms of the last century. We proclaim that the nationalities living 
with us form part of the Hungarian political community and are constituent part 
of the State. We commit to promoting and safeguarding our heritage, our unique 
language, Hungarian culture, the languages and cultures of nationalities living in 
Hungary, along with all man-made and natural assets of the Carpathian Basin.”
522  Article D of the FL: “Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation 
that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians 
living beyond its borders, and shall facilitate the survival and development of 
their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian iden-
tity, the assertion of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of 
their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and 
shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary.”
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century.523 From this perspective the recognition of the “nationalities 
living with us” shifts the emphasis to their difference (from the 
majority), or their secondary status.524
Under the constitutional theory, the term of (Hungarian) people 
refers to the political nation in the meaning of state-nation to which 
also the national and ethnic minorities belong. Under the state-
nation concept all the citizens living in a given territory belong to 
the nation, irrespective of their ethnic belonging, cultural diversity 
or different mother-tongue. This egalitarian nation concept is char-
acteristic to the common law countries and French constitutionalism, 
and its roots lie in the civil enlightenment. It is recognised by the 
FL as well, when it states that the “nationalities living with us form 
part of the Hungarian political community” and they “shall be con-
stituent parts of the State” (see the preamble and Article XXIX).525 
However, the preamble of the FL makes a very clear grammatical 
distinction between the ‘nation’ – although it is not unambiguous 
who this nation exactly is – and the ‘minorities’: the ‘nation’ is ‘we’, 
the minorities – living with ‘us’ – are ‘they’. This is a linguistically 
very manifest exclusion of the minorities from the ‘we’ (whatever 
that represents in this context), and this exclusion makes it neces-
sary to reintegrate them at least into the state in Article XXIX and 
in the preamble – but not into the nation. It is problematic, because 
the preamble clearly puts the nation above the state.526
523  G. Brunner: Nationality problems and minority conflicts in Eastern Europe: strate-
gies for Europe, Gutersloh Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996, 9–10., Cs. 
Pákozdi – M. Sulyok: The Birth of a »New Nation«? Mapping progressive ap-
proaches to the nation-concept based on the Hungarian Fundamental Law, Miskolc 
Journal of International Law № 2, 2011, 43–55., H. Küpper: Paternalista kollektiviz-
mus és liberális individualizmus között: az új magyar Alaptörvényben rögzített 
emberkép normatív alapjai, Közjogi Szemle № 3, 2012, 9.
524  B. Majtényi: The Nation’s Will as Trump in the Hungarian Fundamental Law, 
European Yearbook on Human Rights 2015, 250.
525  N. Chronowski: The new Hungarian Fundamental Law in the light of the Europe-
an Union’s normative values, Revue Est Europa № spéciale 1, 2012, 135.
526  H. Küpper: Ungarns Verfassung vom 25. April 2011, Einführung – Übersetzung – 
Materialien, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main, 2012, 55–56.
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Using the category of nation in cultural sense, on the one hand 
has a narrower, on the other hand, however, a wider meaning than 
the political nation. It has narrower meaning, because it comprises 
only those citizens who belong to the majority national-ethnic group 
of the country with the same culture, language, identity, historic 
fate perception etc. At the same time, it has a wider meaning, as it 
identifies as belonging to the nation also those who live in other 
countries and are citizens of other states, but their language, culture 
and origin bind them to Hungary. These ethnic ties are underpinned 
with Article D on the responsibility for Hungarians living outside 
the borders, and Article G on the constitutional protection of descent 
principle (ius sanguinis) in citizenship law – the combination of 
them supports the preferential naturalization of ethnic Hungarians 
living abroad without any effective territorial link to the country.527 
Thus, because defining the ‘nation’ is rather controversial,528 under 
Hungarian constitutional law it would be better to use the term of 
‘people’ or ‘citizens’. That also means that one can consider the 
(Hungarian) people as indispensable component of the state, as 
well as a community bearing the political solidarity.529 From this 
perspective, it is extremely controversial that the FL specifies the 
subject of the constitution making power three ways. At the begin-
ning of the preamble it refers to the “members of the Hungarian 
nation” – it is not clear yet whether in political or in cultural sense530 
–, at the end of the preamble speaks about citizens of Hungary, and 
then at the very end, in the postamble it turns out that the FL was 
adopted by the members of Parliament elected in 2010. If the con-
527  Zs. Körtvélyesi: Az »egységes magyar nemzet« és az állampolgárság, Funda-
mentum № 2, 2011, 49–50.
528  A. Jakab: Defining the Borders of the Political Community: Constitutional 
Visions of the Nation, Manuscript, 2012, 43–44., B. Majtényi: Alaptörvény a nemzet 
akaratából, Állam- és Jogtudomány № 1, 2014, 80. According to Küpper, the FL ap-
plies the concept of ethno-nation. Küpper ‘Paternalista kollektivizmus’ 9.
529  Petrétei ‘Az alkotmányos demokrácia’ 185–188.
530  According to Körtvélyesi, the text of the preamble refers to the cultural nation. 
Zs. Körtvélyesi: From »We the People« to »We the Nation«, in Constitution for 
a Disunited Nation (ed. Gábor Attila Tóth), CEU Press, Budapest, 2012, 113–114.
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stituent was the Hungarian nation, which shares the public power 
with the nationalities living in Hungary (or with ‘us’), then the na-
tionalities were not subject of the constituent power.531 If the con-
stitution making power is vested in the people in the sense of 
political community, and the nationalities form part of this com-
munity, they must have been subject of the constituent power.
The unique solution of the FL differs from those constitutions of 
the Central-European region, which could also legitimately reflect 
to the cultural nation context upon historical reasons. For a short 
comparison it is enough to refer to the Constitutions of the Polish 
and Slovak Republics. The Polish Constitution of 1997 makes clear 
in its preamble and Article 41 that the Polish Nation as the bearer 
of the sovereignty is composed of all equal citizens of the Republic.532 
Although the constitution refers to the Poles outside borders and to 
the rights of ethnic minorities, the main principle is the political 
nation concept with minor cultural elements. In the Slovakian Re-
public with its significant number of citizens belonging to Hungar-
ian national minority, the constitution defines Slovak people as all 
531  A. L. Pap: Észrevételek a nemzetiségek parlamenti képviseletének sza-
bályozásához az Alaptörvényben, a választójogi törvényben és a nemzetiségek 
jogairól szóló törvényben, in Vol. 1. of Alkotmányozás Magyarországon 2010–2011 
(eds. András Jakab and Tímea Drinóczi) Pázmány Press, Budapest–Pécs, 2013, 
434., 437.; B. Majtényi: Legislative Stupidities in the New Hungarian Constitution, 
Peace Human Rights № 1, 2012, 108.
532  Polish Constitution of 1997, Preamble: “We, the Polish Nation – all citizens of 
the Republic, (…) Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good – 
Poland, (…) Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the 
world, (…) Hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the 
basic law for the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation 
between the public powers, social dialogue as well as on the principle of aiding 
in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities.” Article 41: 
“Supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation.” Article 
35: “The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or 
ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to 
maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture.”
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Slovak citizens, together with national and ethnic minorities who is 
the subject of the constituent power.533
4.2 Parliamentary representation of minorities (nationalities) 
       in Hungary
Article XXIX of the FL recognises nationalities living in Hungary as 
“constituent parts of the State”, and Article 2 prescribes that „Na-
tionalities living in Hungary shall contribute to Parliament’s work 
as defined by a cardinal act”. 
In 1992 – before the adaption of the Act on the Minority Rights 
(1993) – on the basis of the former Constitution the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court declared that the legislature had created an 
unconstitutional situation with its failure to ensure minorities’ rep-
resentation. Whilst the Court accepted that parliamentary repre-
sentation is not a precondition for the enforcement of the rights of 
nationalities, it stated that it would be the most effective means 
towards this end. The Act of 1993 on the Minority Rights guaranteed 
the political representation through local and nation-wide self-
governments. To restrain ethno-business,534 after a thorough aca-
demic and constitutional discourse the minority registration was 
introduced in 2005 on minority self-government elections. The 
533  “We, the Slovak People, Bearing in mind the political and cultural heritage of 
our predecessors, the experience gained through centuries of struggle for our 
national existence, and statehood, (…) Together with members of national mi-
norities and ethnic groups living in the Slovak Republic, (…) we, the citizens of 
the Slovak Republic, have, herewith and by our representatives, adopted this 
Constitution” Preamble, Constitution of the Slovak Republic 1992.
534  Before 2005 in the absence of minority electoral registration every citizens 
had the right to vote and stand as a candidate on minority self-governmental 
elections. As the minority self-governments received fiscal support from the 
central budget, some candidates decided to make a good use of the system with-
out belonging to the national or ethnic minority they represented. See also Maj-
tényi: What has happened to Our Model Child? The Creation and the Evolution 
of the Hungarian Minority Act, European Yearbook of Minority Issues Vol. 6, 
2005/2006, 411–412.
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registration is voluntary and based on self-determination, its base-
line is the free choice on the (national or ethnic) identity – thus it 
cannot really prevent the abuse of minority rights.
After the 2010 parliamentary elections, the governing coalition 
almost immediately expressed its strong will for the introduction 
of minority representation in the parliament. The former Constitu-
tion (Act XX of 1949) was amended, and besides reducing the num-
ber of the seats in the parliament from 386 to 200 it was also 
prescribed that a maximum of 13 surplus mandates shall be guar-
anteed to minorities.535 It was a strong political declaration of intents, 
but at the end of the day the FL adopted another solution. The 
shortcoming of the fixed number of minority mandates was clear: 
it suggested that the number of recognised minorities is constant 
and the recognition of a new minority would require a constitu-
tional amendment as well. Thus this construction was put aside 
during the constitution-making. The final text of the FL does not 
guarantee parliamentary representation of the minorities explicitly, 
it just ensures a potential contribution to the work of the parliament. 
There are altogether 199 seats in the parliament (106 mandates for 
individual constituencies, 93 mandates for lists), and the nation-
alities may compete for preferential mandates during the general 
parliamentary elections. If a nationality list gets a preferential man-
date, the number of party list mandates is accordingly reduced.
The representation of the nationalities now is guaranteed by the 
Acts on parliamentary elections (2011 and 2013),536 and the new 
legal framework was applied first in April 2014. The ruling parties 
and their think-tanks assess the new regulation a great success, 
which remedies a twenty-year-old deficiency of the Hungarian po-
litical system. However the new solution is not unambiguous and 
535  The former Constitution was amended on 25 May 2010, but the cited rule 
never came into force, and the FL finally repealed the former Constitution. Thus 
the amendment was just an ad-hoc demonstration of political will.
536  Act CCIII of 2011 on the election of the members of National Assembly (Sec-
tions 7-18), and Act XXXVI of 2013 on electoral procedure (especially Sections 
86–87, 255–257).
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as it was endorsed during the legislative rush of the Hungarian 
parliament, the expert advises were not considered during the 
elaboration of the system. One of the core problems is who belongs 
to a nationality. The FL does not specify the notion of nationality 
or the conditions of being member of a national or ethnic group.537 
Under the new Act on Nationalities (2011) a person belonging to 
a nationality shall not be necessarily Hungarian citizen, but in re-
spect of voting rights the citizenship is a requirement.538 Another 
– dogmatically and practically confusing – problem is that the eth-
nic (nationality) representation is integrated into the political rep-
resentative system of the unicameral parliament, disrupting its 
political character, but in turn, with the risk of politicization.539 
A nationality MP will get necessarily into the attraction of political 
party factions, and finally will represent mainstream political inter-
est instead of specific minority interest. Furthermore, the national-
ity voters are forced to choose among their political or minority 
preferences. If they choose the nationality preference, automati-
cally exclude themselves from voting to party lists. 
The Act on parliamentary election links both active and passive 
voting rights of nationalities to registration on the nationalities’ 
electoral roll. When registering, the voter must explicitly state 
whether s/he wishes to vote in the election of MPs on party lists, 
i.e. refuses the possibility of the extension of nationality registration 
to parliamentary elections, or the vice versa, s/he wishes to extend 
the nationality registration to the parliamentary elections. In the 
former case, s/he can vote for a party list, in the latter case for a na-
tionality list beside the single constituency candidate. By choosing 
537  A. L. Pap: Recognition, representation and reproach: new institutional ar-
rangements in the Hungarian multiculturalist model, in Balazs Vizi, Norbert Toth, 
Edgar Dobos (eds.): Beyond International Conditionality: Local Variations of Minority 
Representation in Central and South-Eastern Europe, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2017. 
101–136.
538  Pap ‘Észrevételek’ 428–429. See also Sections 1 and 170 of the Act CLXXIX of 
2011 on the rights of nationalities.
539  G. Kurunczi: A nemzetiségek parlamenti képviseletének kérdéséről, Közjogi 
Szemle № 1, 2014, 58.
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the nationality-preference, the voter’s potential to express political 
preference wanes to the half compared to a non-nationality voter. 
The formal equality rule triumphs over the substantive: every voter 
has two votes, but some of the voters have initially less chance to 
influence the political composition of the parliament.
Exclusively the nation-wide nationality self-governments may 
set up nationality lists, thus other actors – e.g. minority associations 
or ethnic parties – have no influence on the composition of the lists, 
and cannot recommend candidates. On the 2014 parliamentary 
election all nationalities successfully entered their lists. They cannot 
cooperate, joint nationality lists are prohibited.  
The new electoral legislation provides nationalities with the op-
portunity to obtain preferential mandates. Under the preferential 
quota one nationality mandate is guaranteed for the quarter of the 
votes cast necessary to gain a list mandate. The exact number always 
depends on the participation, but taking into account the number 
of the members of nationalities and the nature of the new electoral 
system, estimates suggested long before the 2014 parliamentary 
elections that a preferential mandate can be obtained with approx. 
20,000-24,000 votes. The turn-outs justified the estimates, none of 
the nationalities had the chance for own MPs in 2014, as the willing-
ness of the citizens to register as nationality voters was extremely 
low, and 22,022 vas the limit of a nationality preferential mandate.540 
No more than one preferential mandate may be won from each 
nationality’s list, but theoretically if more than 5 per cent of all votes 
are cast for a nationality list, then other candidates may enter parlia-
ment from that list – but it is completely illusory considering that 
the total proportion of all nationalities together is approx. 5 per cent 
of the inhabitants according to the voluntary confessions. The Act 
states that if a nationality does not obtain a preferential mandate, 
it may send the top candidate on its list to parliament as a spokes-
person, who is not a full MP, just participates in the work of parlia-
ment with consultative rights. In 2014 all of the nationalities 
540  See Tables 2 and 3.
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delegated spokespersons to the National Assembly. This institution 
fits better to the unicameral political representation system of the 
Hungarian parliament, although it does not offset that those citizens 
who sacrificed their vote for a party list have the possibility only to 
elect a representative with limited status.541
Table 2 – Voters registered as members of a national minority
Source: National Election Office, 
http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/766/766_5_3.html
Number of voters in the nationalities’ electoral (2014)
National minor-
ity
Total number of 
voters registered 
as members of 
a national minor-
ity 
Registration is extended to the 
parliamentary elections
20 March 2014 – 6 April 2014
Bulgarian
Greek
Croatian
Polish
German
Armenian
Roma
Romanian
Ruthenian
Serbian
Slovakian
Slovenian
Ukrainian
232
483
3727
711
23 543
455
25 498
1852
993
673
3120
461
544
101 104
135 140
1535 1623
130 133
13 749 15209
186 184
18 150 14271
635 647
599 611
320 349
1214 1317
194 199
453 502
Table 3 – Scores of Nationalities on 2014 parliamentary elections
541  Kurunczi ‘A nemzetiségek parlamenti’ 62.
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Source: National Election Office,  
http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html
 
All votes cast for nationality and party lists  5 047 363 
5% threshold  252 369 
Limit of nationality preferential mandate  22 022 
Number of nationality preferential mandate  0 
Number of nationalities’ spokespersons 13
List Type of list Votes Proportion
German Nationality Self Government 
(MNOÖ)
Nationality  11 415  0.23 %
Hungarian Gipsy Party (MCP) Party  8810  0.17 %
Roma Nationality Self Government Nationality  4048  0.08 %
Croatian Nationality Self Government Nationality  1212  0.02 %
Slovakian List Nationality  995  0.02 %
Romanian Nationality Self Government 
(ORÖ)
Nationality  463  0.01 %
Ruthenian Nationality Self Government 
(MROÖ)
Nationality  362  0.01 %
Ukrainian Nationality Self Government Nationality  293  0.01 %
Serbian Nationality Self Government 
(SZOÖ)
Nationality  236  0.0 %
Slovenian Nationality Self Government Nationality  134  0.0 %
Armenian Nationality Self Government Nationality  110  0.0 %
Hungarian Greeks Nationality  102  0.0 %
Polish Nationality Self Government Nationality  99  0.0 %
Bulgarian Nationality Self Government Nationality  74  0.0 %
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4.3 Human dignity, equality and solidarity  
 – lost in transition
During the Hungarian constitution making in 2011 it occurred – 
and the Hungarian Government inquired from the Venice Com-
mission – whether and to what extent it was necessary to 
incorporate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: 
Charter) into the national constitution. The Venice Commission 
emphasised that “up-dating the scope of human rights protection 
and seeking to adequately reflect, in the new Constitution, the most 
recent developments in the field of human rights protection, as 
articulated in the EU Charter, is a legitimate aim and a signal of 
loyalty towards European values”. However, the Commission also 
underlined, that the incorporation of the Charter as a whole or of 
some parts of it could lead to legal complications, thus “it would be 
more advisable (…) to consider the EU Charter as a starting point 
or a point of reference and source of inspiration in drafting the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms chapter of the new 
Constitution.”542
The adopted FL in its relevant Chapter (“Freedom and Respon-
sibility”) incorporated some sentences of the Charter, but – com-
pared to the Charter and especially after the Fourth Amendment of 
the FL in 2013 – the content of the rights enumerated by the FL is 
less detailed and the text raises the possibility of wider limitation 
of rights. Furthermore, the context of the two bills of rights are 
completely different. It is worth referring also to the preamble of 
the FL, according to which “individual freedom can only be complete 
in cooperation with others”. The Charter applies a completely dif-
ferent approach, and emphasises in its preamble that the Union 
“places the individual at the heart of its activities”. It raises the in-
dividuals’ responsibility only in connection with the enjoyment of 
542  European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 
Opinion № 614/2011, Strasbourg 28 March 2011, Opinion on Three Legal Ques-
tions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution of Hungary, Points 
21, 25–28, 32. 
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rights.543 While the approach of the FL – taking also into consider-
ation the numerous basic obligations – is communitarian and na-
tionalist, the Charter focuses on the philosophy of individual 
freedom and supports pluralism.544
The difference is not accidental. In the last decade the Hungar-
ian society has become more and more closed, exclusive, disunited, 
and discrimination, segregation, xenophobia, hate speech has be-
come part of everyday life with the support of political populism.545 
In the field of the most important human values the FL legalised 
and reaffirmed unprecedented solutions based on unacceptable 
societal practise. 
While most of the national and ethnic minorities are integrated 
into the society, the target group of the above mentioned phenom-
ena is the Roma people. The facts are well known. As Minority 
Rights Group International reported “the marginalization of the 
Roma population increased. (…) Roma were among those most 
affected by Hungary’s difficult transition period from socialism to 
a market-based economy and many lost their employment follow-
ing economic decline and privatization of state industries.  (…) 
Living conditions for Roma communities continue to be signifi-
cantly worse than for the general population. Roma are signifi-
cantly less educated and have below average income and life 
expectancy. The unemployment rate for Roma is estimated at 70 
per cent, more than 10 times the national average, and most Roma 
live in extreme poverty.  (…) Widespread discrimination against 
Roma continues in education, housing, penal institutions, employ-
ment and access to public institutions (…) especially Roma children 
suffer from stigmatization, exclusion and socio-economic disparities, 
543  Charter Preamble: “Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and 
duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future gen-
erations.”
544  Also refers to this European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Ven-
ice Commission) Opinion № 621/2011, Strasbourg 20 June 2011, Opinion on the 
New Constitution of Hungary, Point 57. 
545  I. Gy. Tóth: Bizalomhiány, normazavarok, igazságtalanságérzet és paternalizmus 
a magyar társadalom értékszerkezetében, TÁRKI, Budapest 2009, 13.
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notably related to housing, unemployment, access to health ser-
vices, adoption and educational facilities because of their ethnic 
status.”546 The low clearly came in 2008 and 2009: “According to 
media reports and information provided by the Hungarian Chief 
of Police and the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and the 
Open Society Institute, since the beginning of 2008 there have been 
15 incidents of Roma houses being firebombed with Molotov cock-
tails, and two attacks on Roma homes with hand grenades. During 
this time, at least five people of Roma origin have been murdered 
and more seriously injured in these and other incidents involving 
stabbings and beatings. (…) On 23 February 2009 a Roma father 
and his five-year-old son were shot dead in an attack on a family 
home in Tatárszentgyörgy, a village 40 miles south-east of Budapest, 
and two children were injured when the house was set on fire.”547 
Against this background, it is worth to assess how the FL reflects 
on the problems. Several of its provisions are deepening the gap 
between the Roma minority and the majority of the society, either 
by sanctioning poverty, or having an anti-egalitarian character and 
implicitly addressing Roma people.548
The FL in its Article XV regulates the equality rights in order of 
the EU Charter, however without applying the latter’s up-to-date 
solutions. Article XV lacks any mention of the prohibition of dis-
crimination on the ground of sexual orientation,549 genetic features, 
age,550 ethnic origin or membership of a national minority. Although 
the FL prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour 
546  http://minorityrights.org/minorities/roma-8/
547  http://minorityrights.org/minorities/roma-8/
548  K. Kovács: Equality: the missing link, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation (ed. 
G. A. Tóth) CEU Press, Budapest, 2012, 186.
549  See the Opinion № 621/2011 of Venice Commission, Points 76–80. It is im-
portant to note in this context that the Hungarian Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal 
Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities forbids discrimination based 
on factors that include sexual orientation and sexual identity in the fields of em-
ployment, education, housing, health and access to goods and services as yet.
550  The prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age has an increasing 
significance in the case law of the CJEU, see e.g. C–144/04. Werner Mangold v 
Rüdiger Helm, Judgment of 22 November 2005 [ECR 2005, I–9981], or C-499/08. 
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and national origin, but taking into consideration the special situ-
ation of ethnic and national minority groups in Hungary an up-
dated constitutional text should contain the legal consequences of 
the facts. In the context of the FL the ‘national origin’ refers the 
more to the majority nation, and does not really imply to minori-
ties.551 Article XV(2) of the FL is an open-ended provision, thus 
during its interpretation the legislator, the courts of law and the 
Constitutional Court will be able to extend the grounds of non-
discrimination, still it would have been reasonable to name ex-
pressly the mentioned grounds. The equality of men and women 
in Article XV(3) of the FL can be considered laconic compared to 
the Charter. The FL only declares gender equality but does not 
specify it to employment, work, pay, marriage and family relations, 
although in practice discrimination appears in these relations most 
frequently. While Articles 25-26 of the Charter contain positive 
rights of the elderly and disabled people, the FL in its Article XV(5) 
only promises the protection by the state in form of special measures. 
It is worthwhile to mention that Roma minority is not mentioned 
among the target groups of affirmative action.552 
After the Fourth Amendment to the FL, Article XV(4) reads as 
follows in the official translation: “By means of separate measures, 
Hungary shall promote the achievement of equality of opportunity 
and social inclusion.” The Hungarian text, however, applies the 
word ‘felzárkózás’ – catching up, instead of ‘befogadás’ – inclusion. 
The difference is revealing. The term ‘social catching up’ created 
constitutional bases for school segregation, the most affected by 
which are the Roma children. 
As an evidence, the Hungarian Supreme Court in April 2015 
declared that segregation of the Roma in parochial schools is legal. 
The Chance for Children Foundation (CFCF), a Hungarian organ-
isation that campaigns for Roma education rights and was applicant 
Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v Region Syddanmark,  Judgment of 12 October 
2010.
551  Chronowski ‘The new Hungarian Fundamental Law’ 130–131.
552  Kovács ‘Equality’ 193–194.
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in the case, reported: “Although the previous decisions by the Hun-
garian courts established on two instances that the school in Nyír-
egyháza segregates Roma children unlawfully, therefore this 
practice should be stopped, the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) 
has taken a very different view on this case: dismissed CFCF’s 
claims.”553 Antecedents of decision: “On 28 February 2014 the Court 
of Nyíregyháza delivered the first instance judgment. In 2007, as 
a result of CFCF’s court action and extensive negotiations, Nyír-
egyháza closed its segregated school in the Guszev settlement and 
provided a free school bus for Roma children who were integrated 
to mainstream primary schools in the city centre. Integration of 
children of the lower grades turned out to be successful, while for 
children of upper grades it was not. In 2011, the new mayor de-
cided to have the school reopened as part of the Greek Catholic 
Church’s primary school. He provided the school building for free 
and committed substantial local funds for extra financial help. (…) 
The Greek Catholic Church maintains a nursery, primary and a sec-
ondary school in the city centre which are considered elite schools. 
The Church has long been present in the settlement offering Roma 
missionary services.  The segregated school was reopened in Sep-
tember, 2011. Altogether 16 children of first grade enrolled to the 
‘re-segregated’ school.”554
CFCF sued both the Church and the Hungarian state for intro-
ducing segregation. The Court of first instance established that “the 
Church segregated its pupils on a school level, and that the mu-
nicipality segregated Roma students by handing over the school 
building to the Church. The Court also noted that the religious 
education provided by the Church in the segregated school could 
not justify racial segregation. The Court pointed out that parents of 
the children enrolled to the Roma school did not choose the school 
because of the religious education it provided but because of its 
location and the fact that many Roma children were harassed in 
553  Chance for Children Foundation, The Nyíregyháza resegregation case, http://
www.cfcf.hu/en/ny%C3%ADregyh%C3%A1za-resegregation-case
554  Ibid.
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other schools. The Court prohibited the continuation of the illegal 
activity, therefore it ban the Church to launch new classes in the 
segregated school. The Court however dismissed CFCF’s claim on 
termination of segregation by arguing that the Court could not order 
the closing down of the school completely because it would have 
violated the parent’s right to freely choose education for their chil-
dren and that it would have effected public law relationships which 
fall beyond the scope of civil litigation. The Court of second instance 
upheld the decision of the court of first instance. On 22 April 2015 
the Supreme Court repealed the judgment of the court of first in-
stance and dismissed the applicant’s claims. The Supreme Court 
argued that the Greek Catholic Church has successfully justified 
the segregation by proving that it provided religious education and 
that parents have freely chosen the school and exercised their free-
dom of religion. (…) The Supreme Court took the position that the 
fact that the Greek Catholic Church conducted Roma pastoral care 
(pastoration) justified its decision to open a school in a Roma settle-
ment and to maintain a Roma-only school, because it could not 
conduct Roma pastoral care in a school where the ethnic composi-
tion of the students was different.”555
The case clearly illustrates that the FL is not proper legal norm 
to prevent segregation. The argumentation and logic of the Hungar-
ian Supreme Court reminds to the ancient judgment of the SCOTUS 
in Plessy v Fergusson (1896) about “separate but equal” doctrine, 
which was overruled in the landmark Brown v Board of Education 
(1954). In the meantime, the Hungarian government communicates 
that this judgment was the victory of the new “delicate segregation” 
policy. 
At this point it seems necessary to reflect once more that the FL 
eliminated the dual definition of ‘national and ethnic minorities’ 
and introduced – for historical reasons and upon the demands of 
some minorities – the word ‘nationalities’ instead, which falls short 
in reflecting the fact that in Hungary, beside the national minorities, 
555  Ibid.
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also two ethnic minorities are recognised – the Roma and the Ru-
thenian.556 As to the linguistic and cultural rights, any commitment 
for protection of minority languages can be found only in the pre-
amble of the FL, while the protection of the Hungarian language 
– as official language – and sign language is a clear obligation for 
the state (see Article H of the FL). However, the FL contains in its 
chapter on fundamental rights also language rights of nationalities.557 
The former Constitution clearly asserted the Hungarian state’s ob-
ligation to ensure the fostering of the cultures of minorities, the use 
of their native language, etc. The FL uses the term ‘respect’ in con-
nection with these rights of nationalities, but avoids the use of terms 
‘promote’ or ‘protect’ in Article XXIX. Furthermore, only the rights 
to express and preserve one’s (minority) identity and the use of 
names in their native languages are formulated as individual rights, 
i.e. rights of persons belonging to nationalities. The other rights 
respected by the FL – just as the promotion of their own culture, 
the use of their native language, the education in their native lan-
guage – seem to belong to minority communities.558 The Fourth 
Amendment to the FL Article XXIX(3) has introduced the condi-
tionality of recognition as a national minority on the level of con-
stitution: “A cardinal Act may provide that recognition as 
a nationality shall be subject to a certain length of time of presence 
and to the initiative of a certain number of persons declaring to be 
members of the nationality concerned.” As the Amicus Brief to the 
Venice Commission explains: “The amendment explicitly indicates 
that the recognition of a group as a nationality can be limited to 
556  Pap ‘Észrevételek’ 432.
557  “The Venice Commission finds regrettable that Art. H, which regulates the 
protection of Hungarian language as the official language of the country, does 
not include a constitutional guarantee for the protection of the languages of na-
tional minorities. It however notes that Article XXIX guarantees the right to the 
use of these languages by Hungary’s ‘nationalities’ and understands this provision 
as implying also an obligation for the State to protect these languages and to 
support their preservation and development (see also the Preamble and Article 
Q of the Constitution).” Opinion № 621/2011 of Venice Commission, Point 45.
558  See also Opinion № 621/2011 of Venice Commission, Point 82.
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those groups that have held national status already for a certain 
period of time, which appears to limit the ability of new groups to 
Hungary to claim such status. In addition, the recognition of a na-
tionality may be made contingent on a minimum number of mem-
bers of the nationality residing in Hungary, which limits the ability 
of smaller groups to claim nationality status. This may not sound 
terribly important, until one recognizes the rights that may not be 
claimed unless one is a member of a recognized nationality.”559 
By introducing the right to self-defence in the constitutional pro-
visions (Article V), the boundaries of the individual and state re-
sponsibility become uncertain. The relationship between the new 
right and the monopoly of the state to enforce the constitution and 
the legislation as outlined in Article C(3) of FL remains an open 
question.560 It can be presupposed that the former is an exception 
to the latter rule, however, this solution is rather unfortunate in case 
of a constitutional provision, because the constitutional text should 
be unambiguous, without exception rules. Furthermore, it is also 
open to debate, what the relationship between the right to self-
defence and the norm on justified defence in the Criminal Code is. 
Beyond the jurisprudential uniqueness, Article V clearly target the 
Roma population, whose members are living in great poverty and 
in need they commit petty offences against property.561
Among the rights guaranteeing free communication, the freedom 
to express one’s opinion originally was formulated in the FL simi-
larly to the former Constitution, but the Fourth Amendment to the 
FL introduced serious bans on speeches violating human dignity, 
the dignity of the Hungarian nation or minority groups.562 This is 
559  G. Halmai and K. L. Scheppele et al.: Amicus Brief for the Venice Commission 
on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Princeton, 2013, 56.
560  Article V of FL: “Every person shall have the right to repel any unlawful attack 
against his or her person or property, or one that poses a direct threat to the same.” 
Article C(3) of FL: “The State shall have the exclusive right to use coercion in 
order to enforce the Fundamental Law and legislation.”
561  Kovács ‘Equality’ 190.
562  Article IX(5) of the FL: “The right to freedom of speech may not be exercised 
with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, 
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the only point in the constitution where ethnicity became relevant, 
but the wording and the enumeration is still not in line with the 
non-discrimination rule of Article XV(2). Even the Venice Commis-
sion found it contradicting European standards, because “the provi-
sions on the dignity of communities are too vague and the specific 
protection of the ‘dignity of the Hungarian nation’ creates the risk 
that freedom of speech in Hungary could, in the future, be curtailed 
in order to protect Hungarian institutions and office holders”.563 The 
constitutional bans on free expression support the preservation of 
the disproportionate, impartial and controversial judicial practice 
in the field of hate-crimes that has been characterised by protecting 
the Hungarian majority against the Roma minority.564
In the previous chapter the low constitutional standards of the 
protection of social solidarity was already discussed. It is worth 
adding here that the uncertain measure of ‘usefulness of activity to 
the community’ in Article XIX(3) reflects to the prejudices and ste-
reotypes of the majority society that Roma people live on social 
subsidies, and creates constitutional basis for the government’s 
community service programme.565
* * *
Although the FL seemingly, on the surface recognizes the constitu-
tional values of dignity, equality and solidarity, an in-depth analysis 
brings out the contradictions, the non-egalitarian and abusive mes-
sages. The FL is unsuitable for the integration of the political com-
munity and the Hungarian society, it does not address the problem 
ethnic, racial or religious community. Persons belonging to such communities 
shall be entitled to enforce their claims in court against the expression of an 
opinion which violates the community, invoking the violation of their human 
dignity, as provided for by an Act.”
563  Opinion № 720/2013 of the Venice Commission, Point 141.
564  L. Balogh, H. Dinók and A. L. Pap: A jog által láthatatlan? A gyűlölet-bűn-
cselekmények szabályozási kérdései és gyakorlati problémái, Fundamentum № 
4, 2012, 95.
565  Kovács ‘Equality’ 191.
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of ethnicity, and does not even try to close the gaps, prevent from 
segregation and discrimination.566 The adjective ‘ethnic’ appears 
only once throughout the text; the ethnicity questions are hidden 
into the historic term ‘nationality’. In fact, this constitution was not 
created with the intention of uniting the political nation.
566  A. L. Pap: Az illiberális multikulturalizmus magyar modellje: a magyar kisebbsé-
gi jog változása 2010–2016 (I. rész), Közjogi Szemle Vol. 9, № 2, 2016, 39–47.

EPILOGUE
Despite the continued reliance on the rule of law and the respect 
of fundamental rights in the Fundamental Law as the foundational 
principles of the Hungarian state, there have been a number of 
significant systemic developments which indicate that in the new 
constitutional order the ability of the government to rule by law 
enjoys priority over the idea that for government to be constitu-
tional it must be constrained by law. The controversial practices 
followed in amending the constitutional text, the limitations im-
posed on the review powers of the Constitutional Court, and the 
evident subordination of the constitutional order as defended by 
the Constitutional Court to the political regime offer clear indica-
tions of this significant shift in Hungarian constitutionalism.567
Backsliding – i.e. providing lower than the former constitution-
al standards – may be external or internal. It is external, if the in-
ternational or supranational legislation or case law raises concerns 
by eroding the higher national standards, and it is internal if the 
national constitution or judiciary erodes the minimum-standards 
of the international or European community.568
At this stage in Central and Eastern Europe the internal backslid-
ing is threatening the common European values, and the Hungar-
567  Varju and Chronowski ‘Constitutional backsliding’ 296 et sqq., A. L. Pap: 
Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy, Routledge, 
2018.
568  Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg: How to lose a constitutional democracy, Vox 21 
February 2017, www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-constitu-
tional-democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian
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ian illiberal practices569 already cross-fertilised other countries: 
Poland as well follows the illiberal path. The developments under-
mining rule of law show significant similarities, as the ruling parties 
of both counties commenced attack on the constitutional courts. 
The actions taken against the courts are fostering the impression 
that a fight took place in both countries between the majoritarian 
democracy and the rule of law in the form of a parliament versus 
constitutional court struggle, where the former represents the ma-
jority rule and the latter the guardian of rule of law. After all, the 
constitutional landscape allows the assumption that the courts lost 
the game.570
In Poland the procedural constitutionality was the field of the 
battle – in the lack of supermajority the Polish government not 
easily get rid of constitutional control, and had to find different 
measures from the Hungarian by challenging the election of con-
stitutional court judges, and changing the rules of procedure of the 
court. While the Hungarian government created constitutional basis 
for the changes, the Polish entered even into open violation of the 
constitution.571
The European fora and especially the EU institutions are not able 
to effectively intervene when a member state does not observe the 
rule of law and respect for human rights voluntarily. The infringe-
ment procedures are of narrow scope, the parliamentary scrutiny 
is just a political tool of persuasion and the opinions of the Venice 
Commission are although prestigious but not legally binding. The 
EU Commission had some successful actions in case of the Hungar-
569  A. L. Pap: Constitutional identity? The Hungarian model of illiberal democ-
racy, in M. Steven Fish, Graeme Gill and Milenko Petrovic (eds.): A quarter cen-
tury of post-communism assessed, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017, 161–186.
570  Zoltán Szente: Die politische Orientierung der Mitglieder des ungarischen 
Verfassungsgerichts zwischen 2010 und 2014, Jahrbuch für Ostrecht Vol. 18, № 1, 
2016, 45–67.; Renáta Uitz: Poland, Hungary and Europe: Pre-Article 7 Hopes and 
Concerns, VerfBlog, 2016/3/14, http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-hungary-and-
europe-pre-article-7-hopes-and-concerns/.
571  Á. Lukonits: A demokrácia eszközeivel a demokrácia ellen Lengyelországban 
és Magyarországon, Közjogi Szemle Vol. 9, № 1, 2016.
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ian and Polish government but could not really restrain the sys-
temic changes and the renegade governments can easily circumvent 
the rule of law requirements by constitutional amendments or by 
chilling judiciary and constitutional review.
It is clear that the crisis chain started in 2008 with the credit 
crunch, and followed by economic depression, refugee crisis and 
exit strives of the member states requires a deliberate and considered 
bailout mechanism. The Hungarian and Polish experience indicates 
the renewal of legal fetisism and the rule by law solutions instead 
of the observance of rule of law.572 At the end of the day this pattern 
of member state disobedience can easily undermine the European 
community of law. The ideal way of change would be a more effec-
tive Article 7 procedure,573 a generally binding bill of rights, and 
a more federalised structure – otherwise the constitutional iden-
tity claims of the member states will subvert the consent in the 
common European values.
572  Some authors identify these developments as ‘political constitutionalism’ 
against ‘legal constitutionalism’ (see e.g. K. Pócza: Alkotmányozás Magyarországon 
és az Egyesült Királyságban, Kommentár № 5, 2012, 40. I. Stumpf: Erős állam – alkot-
mányos korlátok, Századvég, Budapest, 2014, 244–249.), but the theory and practice 
of the former does not justify its applicability to the Polish and Hungarian consti-
tutional environment. See Ágnes Kovács: Fényevők? A hazai alkotmányelmélet 
esete a politikai konstitucionalizmussal, Fundamentum Vol. 19, № 2-3, 2015, 19–40. 
Blokker and Halmai classifies the Hungarian situation as ‘populist’ constitutional-
ism. Paul Blokker: Populist Constitutionalism, VerfBlog 2017/5/04, http://verfas-
sungsblog.de/populist-constitutionalism/; Gábor Halmai: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity, VerfBlog 2017/1/10, http://ver-
fassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-and-constitutional-identity/.
573  Article 7 TEU demands the clear and present danger of the violence of the EU 
values for the initiation of the Council’s procedure and decision. It can be presumed 
that in practice it would mean multitudinous or at least numerous proceedings 
and/or omissions leading to foreseeable and certain violation of Article 2 of TEU 
in a given member state. As Article 7 has never been applied, it also allows the 
presumption that the actors would be very cautious and circumspect with initiat-
ing such procedure. And finally, the margins of appreciation can be supposed to 
be wide in cases falling into the scope of constitutional identity of member states. 
See also Halmai ‘Perspectives’ 165–168.
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